

## MIND

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OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

I.—COHERENCE AND CONTRADICTION.<sup>1</sup>

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IN the preceding article I pointed out how coherence and comprehensiveness are the two aspects of system, and I attempted to justify the claim of system as an arbiter of fact. In what follows here I am to endeavour to show how system stands to contradiction. The question is difficult and could in any case here be dealt with but imperfectly, and the reader again must excuse me if I approach it by a circuitous route.

What in the end is the criterion? The criterion of truth, I should say, as of everything else is in the end the satisfaction of a want of our nature. To get away from this test, or to pass beyond it, in the end, I should say, is impossible. But, if so (the suggestion is a natural one), why should we not set forth, or try to set forth, the satisfaction of our nature from all sides, and then accept and affirm this statement as truth and reality? That in practical life we should do this, at least in some sense, I am fully agreed. But I cannot on the other hand endorse generally such an answer in philosophy, for I am unable to see how by such a plan we avoid theoretical shipwreck.

Truth to my mind is a satisfaction of a special kind, and, again, it is a satisfaction which, at least at first sight, is able to oppose itself to others. But, however that may be, truth seems to differentiate itself clearly from other satisfactions.

<sup>1</sup> Another article, on Appearance, Error and Contradiction, is to follow.

And philosophy, I at least understand, is to meet specially this special need and want of truth. To say that philosophy's mission is to find ideas which satisfy all sides of my being, and that the truth of these ideas does not otherwise matter, remains to my mind untenable. Ideas which are inconsistent, chaotic and discordant must, I think, by philosophy in the end be rejected as false. The doctrine that there is no truth in the end but the general working of ideas, whatever is otherwise the character of these ideas, is, or may be, acceptable, I once more agree, as a practical creed. But on the other side, with such a doctrine, it seems to me, there is an end of philosophy (*cf.* MIND, No. 66, pp. 229-230).

To philosophise at once with all sides of my nature is, if you will, what I desire. But I at least do not perceive how I am to go about to accomplish this feat. If you agree with me that truth is special, then I am at a loss to see how to aim at it, or to find it, or to verify its presence, by some general movement of my being. On the other hand, to produce ideas at the dictation of all my particular wants is a thing which certainly I understand. But to maintain that, whatever the intellect may say or feel about these ideas, they are all none the less true, is to me ruinous theoretically. It seems the sheer denial in the end of intellectual satisfaction and truth. There is to be, in other words, no more philosophy except in the sense of a collection of useful ideas. The value of such a collection I do not seek to disparage, though the value disappears, I would insist, so far as the collection is onesided. Still, if philosophy has to end here, there is, I would repeat, in the proper sense to be no more philosophy.

Hence I have to remain so far in my old position.<sup>1</sup> If there is to be philosophy its proper business is to satisfy the intellect, and the other sides of our nature have, if so, no right to speak directly. They must make their appeal not only to, but also through, the intelligence. In life it is otherwise, but there is a difference between philosophy and life. And in philosophy my need for beauty and for practical goodness may have a voice, but, for all that, they have not a vote. They cannot address the intellect and insist, "We are not satisfied, and therefore you also shall not be satisfied". They must be content to ask and to repeat, "Are you in fact satisfied with yourself as long as we remain unsatisfied? It is for you to decide, and we can only suggest." Hence, I conclude, I can philosophise with my whole nature, but I cannot do this directly. On one hand the appeal is to the

<sup>1</sup> *Appearance*, chap. xiv.

intellect, but on the other hand every aspect of my being can and does express itself intellectually. And the question is how far, in order to reach its special end which is truth, the intelligence has to adopt as true the various suggestions which are offered. How far, in order to satisfy itself, must its ideas satisfy all our needs?

In the above I am of course not assuming that the intellect is something apart, working by itself, and, so to speak, shut up in a separate room. On the contrary those who teach the implication of all sides of our being with and in what we call thought, deny no doctrine held by me. All that I maintain is that we have a specific function, as such verifiable in fact, and claiming to possess special rights of its own. I insist that, unless we take that claim seriously, speculation is impossible. And, if any one differs from me here, I would go on to urge that he is in conflict with fact, and rests on inconsistency. And the result, I think, is confusion or total obscurity.

I retain therefore, on the whole (if I may repeat this), my former position. All that I would modify is the importance, perhaps one-sided, which was given to pain, and the emphasis on the special doubt which arose here from our ignorance.<sup>1</sup> I would not withdraw what I said as mistaken, but I would certainly prefer now to state the case otherwise. The better way, I think, is to point out that all sides of our nature press for satisfaction, and, if left unsatisfied, will manifest themselves so in idea. We cannot, I think, reasonably suppose an aspect of our being left somewhere outside and able to say nothing directly or indirectly. That this is not possible, we could hardly prove, but its probability seems really trifling. Every element of my nature then will find a voice. Every side of my being will represent itself as satisfied in idea and in reality, if not in what we call fact. And influenced, as we must be, by these claims within us and before us, we undoubtedly in a sense philosophise with the whole of our nature. But from this I still see no short cut to the conclusion that any need of our nature satisfied in idea is truth. The way of logical proof to my mind must on the contrary be indirect. Suppose, that is, the intellect completely satisfied and truth really attained, can you have with this the idea or ideas of other needs unfulfilled? These ideas, if so, will be there, and they will not be true, but, at least apparently, in conflict with the truth. For to admit them as necessary and as good, certainly does not in itself seem to make them true. And the real issue is whether, if

<sup>1</sup> *Appearance*, chap. xix. and pp. 609-612.

left outside and not included in the truth, these ideas do not make truth imperfect in itself. The intellect has to satisfy its own requirements, and the question is whether, if the above ideas are not included but somehow conflict, those requirements are satisfied. And the further question is whether the ideas can possibly be included without being taken as true.

It is obviously necessary therefore to inquire what does or would satisfy the intellect. Such an inquiry I am not undertaking in this article, but I may state the view which has commended itself to my mind.<sup>1</sup> Truth is an ideal expression of the Universe at once coherent and comprehensive. It must not conflict with itself and there must be no suggestion which fails to fall inside it. Perfect truth in short must realise the idea of a systematic whole. And such a whole, we saw (MIND, No. 71), possessed essentially the two characters of coherence and comprehensiveness. I will therefore, without pausing here to raise and discuss difficulties, go on at once to ask as to the connexion between these two characters. Have we in comprehensiveness and coherence two irreducible principles or have we two aspects of one principle?

If we can adopt a well-known view the answer is plain. The whole reality is so immanent and so active in every partial element, that you have only to make an object of anything short of the whole, in order to see this object pass beyond itself. The object visibly contradicts itself and goes on to include its complementary opposite in a wider unity. And this process repeats itself as long as and wherever the whole fails to express itself entirely in the object. Hence the two principles of coherence and comprehensiveness are one. And not only are they one but they include also the principle of non-contradiction. The order to express yourself in such a way as to avoid visible contradiction, may be said in the end to contain the whole criterion.

No one who has not seen this view at work, and seen it applied to a wide area of fact, can realise its practical efficiency. But, for myself, if this solution of our puzzle ever satisfied me entirely, there came a time when it ceased to satisfy. And when attempting to discuss first principles this was not the answer which I offered.<sup>2</sup> However im-

<sup>1</sup> *Appearance*. Cf. MIND, N.S., No. 62.

<sup>2</sup> *Appearance*, 1893. I have perhaps fallen in places into inconsistency, but there was, I think, no doubt in my mind as to which of the two answers was the right one. There is however a natural tendency to pass from *really* to *visibly*, and this tendency may perhaps at times have asserted itself unconsciously.



manent in each element the whole is really, I cannot persuade myself that everywhere in the above way it is immanent visibly. I cannot perceive that everywhere with each partial object we can verify the internal contradiction, and a passage made thus to a wider unity of complementary opposites. And, this being so, the question as to our two principles of coherence and comprehensiveness requires, so far as I am concerned, a modified answer.

To a large extent partial objects are seen (I at least cannot doubt this) to develop themselves beyond themselves indefinitely by internal discrepancy. Everything, so far as it is temporal or spatial, does, I should say, thus visibly transcend itself, though, if there are many orders of time and space, the same self-transcendence will not hold between them. But I will not seek here to urge a principle as far as it will go, when I admit that, so far as I can see, it will not go to the end. The visible internal self-transcendence of every object is a thing which, as I have said, I cannot everywhere verify.

And the principle which in my book I used and stated was the following. Everything which appears must be predicated of Reality, but it must not be predicated in such a way as to make Reality contradict itself.<sup>1</sup> I adhere to this principle, and I will go on briefly to justify it with special reference to what we have called comprehensiveness and coherence. There are two main questions, I think, to which answers here are wanted. (1) If my object is really defective, and if it cannot develop itself for me beyond itself by internal contradiction, how otherwise can it do this? (2) How and in what sense does an isolated object make Reality contradict itself?

(1) The object before me is not the whole of Reality, nor is it the whole of what I experience. The Universe (I must assume this here) is one with my mind, and not only is this so, but the Universe is actually now experienced by me as beyond the object. For, beside being an object, the world is actually felt, not merely in its general character but more or less also in special detail.<sup>2</sup> Hence, as against this fuller content present in feeling, the object before me can be experienced as defective. There is an unspecified sense of something beyond, or there may even arise the suggestion in idea of the special complement required. We may perhaps

<sup>1</sup> This is of course not the same thing as taking up a suggestion (whatever it may be), and then, if you fail to see that it is visibly inconsistent, forthwith calling it real.

<sup>2</sup> The reader is referred here specially to *MIND*, No. 69.

hesitate to say that the defective object itself suggests its own completion, and we may doubt whether the process should be called Dialectic. But at any rate a process such as the above seems to furnish the solution of our problem. Exactly how that idea comes by which the partial object is made good, is, on the view we have just sketched, a matter of secondary moment. The important point is that with the object there is present something already beyond it, something that is capable both of demanding and of furnishing ideal suggestions, and of accepting or rejecting the suggestions made.<sup>1</sup>

On a view such as this the essential union of comprehensiveness with coherence seems once more tenable. We have not only connexions in the object-world, temporal, spatial and other relations, which extend for us the content of a partial object. We have also another world at least to some extent actually experienced, a world the content of which is continuous with our object. And, where an element present in this world is wanting to our object, dissatisfaction may arise with an unending incompleteness and an endless effort at inclusion. The immanent Reality, both harmonious and all-comprehending, demands the union of both its characters in the object. The reader will notice that I assume here (a) that everything qualifies the one Reality, (b) that, when one element of the whole is made an object, this element may be supplemented even apart from visible inconsistency, and (c) that, to know Reality perfectly, you must know the whole of it, and that hence every partial object is imperfect. To this last point I shall return, but will proceed first to deal with the question asked as to Contradiction.

(2) "For," the reader may object, "suppose for the sake of argument that I admit the above, I still do not see how Contradiction comes in. Why am I to add with you that the test of truth is its ability to qualify Reality without self-contradiction?" In replying to this I will first dispose of a point which possibly is obvious. If, in speaking of Reality, you say 'R is *mere a*,' and if then, while you say that, another qualification, *b*, appears and is accepted, you contradict

<sup>1</sup> See further *Principles of Logic*, pp. 381-382, as well as the article just referred to. The reader should bear in mind that we may have (a) a detail or (b) a general character which is wanting in the object and which is actually felt by me. Beyond this there is the question whether content, not actually now felt by me, can be suggested by a reaction of the whole reality which is one with me. I am myself ready to accept even this further possibility, but I would urge on the reader the importance here of maintaining in any case the above distinctions.

yourself plainly. To this your answer, I presume, will be, "Yes, but I was careful *not* to say 'mere *a*'. I merely said '*a*,' and between these two assertions is a vital difference." The question as to this vital difference may perhaps be called here the real issue. It is contended against me that I may first say '*Ra*' and then later '*Rb*' and then later '*Re*' without any contradiction. For *a*, *b* and *c* may be separate, or, if related, they may be conjoined externally. Hence '*a* with *b*' (it is urged) is quite consistent with '*a*,' since '*a*' remains unaffected. It will hence be absurd to argue that by merely saying '*a*' the presence of '*b*' is denied.

My object here is to explain the sense of the doctrine which I advocate far more than to make this doctrine good against all possible competitors. And hence, if in what follows I seem to the reader to be assuming all that has to be proved, I must ask him to bear this warning in mind. Certainly I must assume here that the view of judgment which I hold is correct, and it is on this view that what follows is really founded. I have at least seen no other view of judgment which to myself seems tenable, but this is a point on which I cannot attempt to enter here. I assume then that in judgment ideas qualify Reality, and further that in judgment we have passed beyond the stage of mere perception or feeling. The form of qualification present in these cannot, as such, be utilised in judgment. And the question is whether in judgment we have any mode of qualification which is in the end consistent and tenable. I do not think that we have any.<sup>1</sup>

In all predication I assume that the ultimate subject is Reality, and that in saying '*Ra*' or '*Rb*' you qualify *R* by *a* or *b*. My contention is that, in saying '*Ra*,' you qualify *R* unconditionally by *a*, and that this amounts to saying 'mere *a*'. For is there, I ask, any difference between *R* and *a*? Let us suppose first that there is no difference. If so, by saying first *Ra* and then *Rb* you contradict yourself flatly. For *a* and *b*, I presume, really are different, and

<sup>1</sup> What follows in the text may perhaps be summed up thus. In feeling (with which we start) we have an immediate union of one and many, where the whole immediately qualifies the parts and the parts the whole and one another. In judgment this immediate unity is broken up, and there is a demand for qualification otherwise. This "otherwise" involves distinction and a relational plurality; and that, because simple qualification is now impossible, entails mediation and conditions. And, because in judgment we cannot completely state the conditions, we are forced into an indefinite process of bringing in new material and new conditions. The end sought by judgment is a higher form of immediacy, which end however cannot be reached within judgment.

hence, unless  $R$  is different from  $a$  and  $b$ , what you (however unwillingly) have done is to identify  $a$  and  $b$  simply. But the simple identification of the diverse is precisely that which one means by contradiction.<sup>1</sup> If on the other hand, when I say  $Ra$ , I suppose a difference between  $R$  and  $a$ , then once more I am threatened with contradiction, for I seem now to have simply qualified  $R$  by  $a$ , the two being diverse. The reader will recall that we are concerned here with judgment and not with mere feeling or perception. And the question to be answered is how in judgment we are to qualify one thing by another thing, the two things being different.

A natural answer is to deny that the judgments,  $Ra$  and  $Rb$ , are unconditional. That, it will be urged, was never meant. But, if it is not meant, I ask, ought it to be said, except of course for convenience and by a licence? Let it then be understood that the above judgments hold good because  $R$  is somehow different from  $a$  and from  $b$ , and that the assertion is made under this condition, known or, I suppose, here unknown. The assertion then will really be ' $R(x)a$ ' and ' $R(x)b$ ,' the  $x$  being of course taken to qualify  $R$ . But, if so, apparently ' $Ra$ ' is true only because of something other than  $a$  which also is included in  $R$ .  $R$  is  $a$  only because  $R$  is beyond  $a$ , and so on indefinitely. Merely to say  $a$  is therefore, if our view of judgment is sound, equivalent to denying the above and to saying mere  $a$ ; and that, since  $R$  is beyond mere  $a$ , seems inconsistent with itself. Contradiction therefore so far has appeared as the alternative to comprehensiveness, and the criterion so far seems to rest on a single principle.

If in other words you admit that the assertion ' $Ra$ ' is not true unless made under a condition, you admit that no knowledge in the form  $Ra$  can be perfect. Perfect knowledge requires that the condition of the predicate be got within the subject, and, seeking to attain this end (which, I assume, can never be completely realised), we are driven to fill in conditions indefinitely. The attempt to deny this, so far as we have seen, seems to force you to the conclusion that  $a$  makes no difference to  $R$  and that  $b$  makes no difference to either. And, if so, upon our view of judgment you have said nothing, or else have fallen into self-contradiction.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For a discussion of the nature of contradiction the reader is referred to *MIND*, N.S., No. 20, reprinted in *Appearance* since 1897.

<sup>2</sup> I will remind the reader once more that the above argument assumes that in judgment what is asserted is taken to qualify Reality, and that there is no other way of asserting. To those who believe in another way

The general position here taken must, so far as I see, be attacked either by falling back on designation or by the acceptance of mere external relations. I will say something more on these alternatives lower down, but will for the present seek to explain further the view which I hold. Judgment on that view is the qualification of one and the same Reality by ideal content. And, if we keep to this, we must go on to deny independent pieces of knowledge and mere external relations. The whole question may, perhaps, be said to turn upon the meaning and value of the word "and". Upon the view which I advocate when you say "R is *a*, and R is *b*, and R is *c*," the "and" qualifies a higher reality which includes *Ra Rb Rc* together with "and". It is only within this higher unity that "and" holds good, and the unity is more than mere "and". In other words the Universe is not a mere "together" or "and," nor can "and" in the end be taken absolutely. Relatively, that is, for limited purposes, we do and we must use mere "and" and mere external relations,<sup>1</sup> but these ideas become untenable when you make them absolute. And it would seem useless to reply that the ideas are ultimate. For the ideas, I presume, have a meaning, and the question is as to what becomes of that meaning when you try to make it more than relative, and whether in the end an absolute "and" is thinkable.

That on which my view rests is the immediate unity which comes in feeling,<sup>2</sup> and in a sense this unity is ultimate.

the above argument is not addressed. The same thing can again be put thus. The assertion of any object *a* is *Ra*. Here, if *R* is not different from *a*, you have really no assertion. But, if *R* is different, you either deny this difference and so have a false assertion, or else you qualify *R* (that is, a higher *R*) both by *a* and this difference. Hence you have now asserted a manifold. But, as soon as you assert of *R* a manifold (however you have got it), there arises at once a question as to the "how". You cannot fall back on mere sense, because in judgment you are already beyond that; and on the other hand again you cannot simply identify. Hence you have to seek ideal conditions, and this search has to go on indefinitely. The above statement of course does not claim to show how these special conditions which you want are supplied. The process, that is, so far does not point to the particular complement which is required. Again, the reader must not understand me to suggest that, given a single feeling or sensation, we could by any logical process pass beyond it. I am on the contrary assuming that at the stage of judgment we are beyond any single feeling or sensation, if ever we were confined to one.

<sup>1</sup> How the "and" is to stand to the external relations seems doubtful. If "and" itself is an external relation, then obviously, to unite it to its terms, you seem to want a further "and," and so on indefinitely.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Appearance*, p. 569, and *MIND*, No. 69. In my view (I am here of course in the main following Hegel) the "and" is a developed and

You have here a whole which at the same time is each and all of its parts, and you have parts each of which makes a difference to all the rest and to the whole. This unity is not ultimate if that means that we are not forced to transcend it. But it is ultimate in the sense that no relational thinking can reconstitute it, and again in the sense that in no relational thinking can we ever get free from the use of it. And an immediate unity of one and many at a higher remove is the ultimate goal of our knowledge and of every endeavour. The aspects of coherence and comprehensiveness are each a way in which this one principle appears and in which we seek further to realise it. And the idea of a whole something of this kind underlies our entire doctrine of judgment. You may seek, and I agree that it is natural to seek, for another view as to judgment and truth. But, so far as I see, that effort has resulted and will result in failure.

Judgment, on our view, transcends and must transcend that immediate unity of feeling upon which it cannot cease to depend. Judgment has to qualify the Real ideally. And the word "idea" means that the original unity has so far been broken. This is the fundamental inconsistency of judgment which remains to the end unremoved, and which in principle vitiates more or less all ideas and truth. For ideas cannot qualify reality as reality is qualified immediately in feeling, and yet judgment seeks in vain to escape from this foregone method. And thus, aiming to reconstitute with its ideas the concrete whole of one and many, it fails, and it sinks through default into the abstract identity of predicate with subject. But this is a result at which it did not aim and which it cannot accept as true. Judgment in the form 'Ra' never meant that between R and *a* there is no difference. What it meant was to predicate its idea of, and to reconstitute with its idea, the old immediate reality. But since that whole and its way of unity was not properly ideal, and since now we are in the world of truth and ideas, the judgment has failed to express itself. The reality as conditioned in feeling has been in principle abandoned, while other conditions have not been found; and hence the judgment has actually asserted unconditionally *a* of R and R of

yet degraded form of the immediate unity, and throughout implies that. Make the contents of the felt totality both objective and relational, and then abstract from any special character of the relations and any special character of the totality—and you have got what you mean by "and". But the point to be emphasised here is that, if you abstract *altogether* from the totality, you have destroyed your "and". The "and" depends essentially upon the felt totality, and of course cannot generate its own foundation.

a. And such an assertion, it perceives, is false. The way to remedy its falsehood is to seek the conditions, the new ideal conditions, under which 'Ra' is true. To gain truth the condition of the predicate must be stated ideally and must be included within the subject. This is the goal of ideal truth, a goal at which truth never arrives completely; and hence every truth, so long as this end is not attained, remains more or less untrue.

Every partial truth therefore is but partly true, and its opposite also has truth. This of course does not mean that any given truth is merely false, and, of course also, it does not mean that the opposite of any given truth is more true than itself. These are obvious, if natural, misunderstandings of our view. But surely it should be clear that you can both affirm and deny ' $R(x)a$ ' so long as  $x$  remains unspecified. And the truth on one of these two sides surely becomes greater in comparison, according as on that side, whether of affirmation or denial, you are able to make the conditions more complete. But, as long as and so far as the conditions remain incomplete, the truth is nowhere absolute. "It is possible to produce sparks by striking flint" is, I understand, offered as an instance of unconditional truth.<sup>1</sup> But the opposite of this truth surely is also true. The thing clearly, I should have said, is possible or not possible according to the conditions, and the conditions are not sufficiently expressed in the judgment. You have therefore so far a truth which can at once be affirmed and denied, and how such a truth can be absolute I fail to perceive. The growth of knowledge consists (as we saw) in getting the conditions of the predicate into the subject. The more conditions you are able to include, the greater is the truth. But so long as anything remains outside, the judgment is imperfect and its opposite also is true. Certainly the truth of the opposite becomes progressively less, and may even be negligible, but on the other hand it never disappears into sheer and utter falsehood.

I cannot attempt to deal here with the alleged absolute judgments to be found, for instance, in arithmetic,<sup>2</sup> but I

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Stout in *MIND*, N.S., 65, p. 42.

<sup>2</sup> The question as to mathematical truth appears to be as follows: (i.) Are there really independent, self-consistent, self-contained principles from which the conclusions are developed, and (ii.) can these conclusions be developed without inconsistency? The second of these questions I am through ignorance of the subject unable to discuss. With regard to the first all I can do here is to remind the reader that there is an emphasis on "self-contained". Unless the whole process is completely intelligible



must touch on the claim of designation to offer logical truth.<sup>1</sup> I mean by designation the essential qualification of our meaning by pointing, or by the equivalent use of such terms as "this," "now," "here," or "my". That in fact we are forced to use designation and cannot in life possibly get on without it, I suppose, is obvious. We may set this much down, I presume, as universally accepted. And how far in our knowledge, if at all, we are able to get free from it, I do not propose here to discuss (MIND, N.S., No. 60, pp. 460-461). We have to deal here with designation merely in regard to its ultimate logical value.

At the entrance of philosophy there appears to be a point where the roads divide. By the one way you set out to seek truth in ideas, to find such an ideal expression of reality as satisfies in itself. And on this road you not only endeavour to say what you mean, but you are once for all and for ever condemned to mean what you say. Your judgments as to reality are here no less or more than what you have expressed in them, and no appeal to something else which you fail to make explicit is allowed. When, for example, you say "this," the question is not as to what you are sure is your meaning if only you could utter it. The question is as to what you have got, or can get, in an ideal form into your actual judgment. And, when you revolt against the conclusion that "this" appears to be a mere unspecified universal, when you insist that you know very well what "this" meant, and protest that your object was something other than such illogical trifling and child's play—our answer is obvious. What are you doing, we ask, with us here on this road? You were told plainly that on this road what is sought is ideas, and that nothing else here is current. You were warned that, if you enter here, you are committed to this principle. If you did not understand, whose is the fault? And as to your protests and "refutations" they may count elsewhere but they count for nothing with us. If you cannot show that on our own principle our conclusion is wrong,

*per se*, it depends on an unknown condition (however apparently constant) in my mind or elsewhere. "A is such that *b* is *c*" may (we have seen) be perfectly compatible with the statement that "A is such that *b* is not *c*". The question is whether the "such" is completely specified and got within the judgment itself.

<sup>1</sup> What Prof. Stout calls "implicit cognition" I take to fall under the head of designation. Otherwise the instance which he gives (on p. 44) is far from helping his case. For if the "I give you etc." is true, surely it is obvious that "I do not give you" *also* is true, so far at least as our knowledge goes. I understand Prof. Stout really here to rely on the "this," in other words on designation.



then for us you have said nothing. Our whole way doubtless may be a delusion, but, if you choose to take this way, your judgment means what ideally it contains; and, contrariwise, what you have not explicitly expressed and included in it is not reckoned. And, if so, no possible appeal to designation in the end is permitted. "This," "my," "now" and the rest will mean once for all exactly what they internally include and so express. Your meaning has always on demand to be made explicit and stated intelligibly within the judgment.

This I take to be the way of philosophy, of any philosophy which seeks to be consistent. It is not the way of life or of common knowledge, and to commit oneself to such a principle may be said to depend upon choice. The way of life starts from, and in the end it rests on dependence upon feeling, upon that which in the end cannot be stated intelligibly. And the way of any understanding of the world short of philosophy still rests on this basis. Such understanding may despise feeling, and may claim to have risen into a higher region, but in the end it will be inconsistent and be found to stand on that which, taken as truth, does not satisfy. Outside of philosophy there is no consistent course but to accept the unintelligible, and to use in its service whatever ideas seem, however inconsistently, to work best. And against this position, while it is true to itself, I have nothing to say; though I regret that to be true to itself is a thing so seldom within its power. For worse or for better the man who stands on particular feeling must remain outside of philosophy. If you are willing to be inconsistent (this is now an old story) you can never be refuted, and that is why philosophy can be said to depend upon choice. On the other hand the impulse to truth is strong, and the abnegation often too difficult, and the reason for this abnegation often, if not always, invisible without some training in philosophy. And hence the way of life, and of ordinary knowledge, obscurely conscious of its own imperfection, for ever seeks to complete itself by that which, if it aimed to be consistent, would be philosophy.

On the other side even within philosophy itself the counter tendency is irrepressible. Even if you harden your heart to accept the view that philosophy, as against life, is onesided, and has to remain mere understanding, yet, even with this, you may revolt against the rule of mere ideas. If we have certainty anywhere, this seems obvious, we have certainty in feeling. Whatever else may be doubted, at least we know what we feel. And that is why to some persons volition

appears specially to give indubitable fact, for volition obviously is felt. And it seems monstrous, when we seek for truth, to leave certainty behind. But what is often forgotten here is that the certainty belongs to feeling only as that is actually felt. To translate this certainty unmodified into ideas seems impossible; and how you are at once to transmute it into another mode and still use it as a test, I have failed to understand. And this is my position here against the use of designation as logical truth. I appreciate the certainty, the knowledge beyond all words and ideas, that may belong to "mine" and "this". I recognise that in life and in ordinary knowledge one can never wholly cease to rest on this ground. But how to take over into ultimate theory and to use there this certainty of feeling, *while still leaving that untransformed*, I myself do not know. I admit that philosophy, as I conceive it, is onesided. I understand the dislike of it and the despair of it while this its defect is not remedied. But to remedy the defect by importing bodily into philosophy the 'this' and 'mine,' as they are felt, to my mind brings destruction on the spot. To import them half-translated and ambiguously hybrid may give immediate relief but no less entails certain ruin. And my conclusion therefore is that at all costs consistency is better. If philosophy remains onesided that is perhaps after all a sign that it is following its own business. And, until better informed, that is all that I wish to say with regard to designation.

Apart from designation what remains as an alternative to the view which I advocate? The alternative, it seems to me, is to maintain a plurality of self-contained pieces of ideal knowledge. That course, even if we can regard the ultimate reality as being somehow a kind of passive but all-containing reservoir, leads in principle inevitably to Pluralism. And Pluralism, to be consistent, must, I presume, accept the reality of external relations. Relations external, not relatively and merely in regard to this or that mode of union, but external absolutely must be taken as real. To myself such relations remain unthinkable, and it would be natural for me to end this paper by enlarging on that head. But my chief difficulty here is that, perhaps from defective knowledge, I am not acquainted with any sufficient attempt to explain and justify the proposed alternative.<sup>1</sup> A scheme of

<sup>1</sup> Such a work we may, I hope, expect from Mr. Russell. I do not understand that at present he has offered any view which could fairly be taken as an account of first principles. In such an account obviously it would not be permissible to introduce ideas, ultimate or otherwise, with-

external relations in the first place is confronted by the apparent fact of feeling with its immediate unity of a non-relational manifold. To attempt to deny this fact, or again to leave it somewhere outside, seems ruinous; but how on the other hand it is to be included in the scheme I do not know. And the external relations themselves, if they are to be absolute, must, I suppose, be thinkable apart from any terms. Such a position, to my mind impossible in principle, seems, when you consider the variety and detail of the relations required, to be more than staggering. On the other side, if the relations apart from terms are not thinkable, obviously, I should have said, they have ceased therewith to be external absolutely. Your ultimate has now become a unity of terms and relations. And in any case, even if the relations are really external, there is the problem as to how somehow in fact we take them together with their terms. Further there is the difficulty caused by the fact of knowledge. If the world, as a whole, has the above character and also is so known, is the fact of our knowledge of the world's general character compatible with the fact of the world's being thus? Or, from the other side, if external relations were absolute, could we get to know that they were so except by a vicious argument? These are perhaps the main questions which press on any attempt to advocate external relations, and I do not know where these questions have been answered. External relations, if they are to be absolute, I in short cannot understand except as the supposed necessary alternative when internal relations are denied. But the whole "Either-or," between external and internal relations, to me seems unsound.

Philosophy perhaps may be called an attempt, possibly in the end an unsuccessful attempt, to escape from the fallacy of false alternative. To assume, if external relations are unthinkable, the possibility of a scheme of relations founded

out in each case discussing whether the ideas are consistent with all the rest which is accepted. In a subordinate subject one can of course start with a "save as hereinafter provided," and in this way preclude objections as to inconsistency. But in dealing with first principles such a course is clearly inadmissible. I am not however proposing here to criticise a doctrine which, I confess, I do not understand. And I trust I shall not be taken as disparaging the remarkable contribution which Mr. Russell, I am sure, has made to philosophy. The general tendency which he so ably represents has long been as good as unadvocated among us, and there has been, I agree, a very serious defect in the main body of our speculation. Whatever the result, Mr. Russell's inquiries should do a service to philosophy which, I imagine, it would not be easy to over-estimate. On the inconsistency of some of the ideas used by him I hope to touch in a future article.

on and based in their terms, or again to pass from the rejection of internal relations as illusory to the acceptance of sheer externality, seem counterpart fallacies. The alternative in each case, if it is to stand, must justify itself independently. And in neither case to my mind is the justification likely to succeed. To myself it seems that ultimate reality is supra-relational. We find it first below relations, and again relations are necessary to its development, and yet the relations cannot rightly be predicated of the original unity. They remain in a sense contained in it, but none the less again they transcend it. And the natural conclusion in my judgment is to a higher unity which is supra-relational. In such a unity the imperfect relational scheme and the imperfect whole of feeling are both included and absorbed. And I have advocated this conclusion certainly not on the ground that it seems to explain everything, but because it appears to me to leave nothing really outside, while it loads us with nothing in the end worse than the inexplicable. My object, though I do not say that I never joined in aiming higher, is to be left with something which is positive and all-comprehending and not in principle unthinkable.

Criticism therefore which assumes me committed to the ultimate truth of internal relations, all or any of them, is based on a mistake. I cannot accept, for instance, the relation of subject and predicate as an adequate expression of reality. It evidently fails to carry over consistently into a higher region the felt sensible unity of the one and many. And there is no possible relational scheme which in my view in the end will be truth. The apprehended fact of terms in relation cannot itself, I am sure, be reconstituted ideally. In any mere relational synthesis there will be something left out, or else imported surreptitiously from elsewhere, and there will be ensuing inconsistencies which are rooted in and which point to incompleteness. I had long ago made it clear (so I thought) that for me no truth in the end was quite true, and I had myself (as I fancied) pointed out and dealt with the consequent dilemma. But it is in the nature of things, I presume, that there should always be some critics who know better.

The ideas, which we are compelled to use, are all in varying degrees imperfect, and certainly this is the case with internal relations. They seek to hold on to the initial felt fact of identity in difference, and they point to a higher consummation beyond themselves and beyond all relations. But, at least in the end, they cannot, I should say, be thought consistently. On the other side external relations, except

relatively and within certain limits, cannot in my opinion be accepted. They first of all seem to break wholly with the sensible fact, with that felt union of the diverse with which we begin. External relations not only dissolve its immediate totality, but they appear to wish to leave its carcass lying, so to speak, somewhere unexplained outside of truth and reality. And, having destroyed the starting-place, they further cut us off in principle (so far as I see) from any advance to a higher unity. The totality they seem to offer (though I hardly know what this is, or indeed whether or how it is offered) does not satisfy our ultimate desire, and, themselves unthinkable, the construction they build seems joined by inconsistency. This, at least until better informed, is what I am forced to think of external relations if taken as absolute.

Amongst ideas which, though imperfect, must necessarily be used, I may mention here the ideas of identity and difference. Identity must not on the one side be confused with resemblance, nor again on the other side can it be taken as abstract. There is, for instance, in the end no such positive idea, at least to my mind, as mere numerical sameness or diversity. On either of the above alternatives (I do not offer to argue the point here) identity is destroyed. On the other hand, when you take it otherwise as one aspect of the concrete union of sameness and difference, identity, when you think it out, becomes inconsistent. It leads at either end to an infinite process, and the same again is the case with diversity. These ideas therefore cannot be ultimate, and we naturally desire to get beyond them to something wholly consistent. Yet, if we find we cannot do this, the ideas still must be accepted. They will remain the best means we possess of approximating to the truth, or of removing ourselves, if you prefer that, from the furthest extreme of error. They are not ultimately true, but they are truer far than what is offered in their stead.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The above was written in June, 1908, and since then Prof. James's *Pluralistic Universe* has appeared, containing some controversial references on the subject of identity. I have however left the text as it stood, and will merely add that I cannot accept Prof. James's account of the difference on this point between himself and me. My difficulty with Prof. James has been that from time to time I am led to suppose that he is advocating a view opposed radically to mine, and then later discover that he holds the very view which I have defended against him. And hence I am inclined to suspect that this may be the case elsewhere. Prof. James asserts, for instance, "external" relations as absolute; but I am forced to doubt whether he, any more than myself, believes in such things except as relative. And, while professing Pluralism, to myself Prof. James appears really to be a Monist, or, at most, a Dualist.

Coherence and comprehensiveness then we have found to be each an integral aspect of system. In practice they may diverge but they remain united in principle. And system is connected essentially with contradiction and its absence. For what is inconsistent is so far unreal, and a diversity, judged unconditionally to be real, we found was inconsistent, and such internal discrepancy tends to involve an indefinite passage beyond self. Further, apart from this, an object which is short of the whole tends naturally, we may say, to suggest its complement. And, since that suggested complement is absent in fact, reality thus contradicts itself. How the suggestion is made we have inquired. The object itself may through its own internal content pass for us visibly beyond its own limits, or, on the other hand, the addition may come to us from that whole which we feel. And this whole, as felt, may contain, we saw, actually a special detail, or again a general character which was wanting in the object; or the whole may be present to us even more vaguely as a something beyond, a something which is not satisfied with what is before us. But when the suggestion is made, however it is made, we have a fresh predicate of Reality. Our object has thus become more comprehensive, and we must endeavour now to include this fresh predicate within it consistently.

With the various questions which arise there is obviously here no space to deal. There is however one point on which I will venture to add a few words. The reader naturally may ask what on the whole the above conclusion is to mean. Does it mean that I am forthwith to set down everything that I want as real? The answer is, Not so, if by "everything" you understand "all that you want and exactly as you want it". We have been compelled to conclude to the actual satisfaction of all sides of our being, and hence doubtless everything that we need must be included in reality. But, this being agreed on, the question remains as to the sense of such inclusion. Now to say that such or such a detail cannot be left entirely outside is one thing, and it is another thing to insist that, when included, this detail maintains

Again, if there is any difference between the "pragmatic" doctrine of free will and that which I, for instance, have advocated since 1876, I cannot find in what it consists. And other examples could be given. Hence, things being thus between Prof. James and myself (though I admit that this may arise from my own failure to understand), it seems to me that explanation is wanted far more than controversy. Our differences may perhaps on the whole be small when compared with the extent of our agreement. But apart from further information it would be hardly in my power to form an opinion on this point.

untransformed its special character. The burden of proof in my opinion lies here with the assertor, and that burden is likely too often to strain or to overpass his power.

It is after all an enormous assumption that what satisfies us is real, and that the reality has got to satisfy us. It is an assumption tolerable, I think, only when we hold that the Universe is substantially one with each of us, and actually, as a whole, feels and wills and knows itself within us. For thus in our effort and our satisfaction it is the one Reality which is asserting itself, is coming to its own rights and pronouncing its own dissent or approval. And our confidence rests on the hope and the faith, that except as an expression, an actualisation, of the one Real, our personality has not counted, and has not gone here to distort and vitiate the conclusion. Hence our confidence is but the other side of our willingness, so far as is possible, to suppress irrelevancy and to subordinate self-will. And, wherever this is felt, there is little desire to insist that what we want must be real exactly so as we want it. Whatever detail is necessary to the Good we may assume must be included in reality, but it may be included there in a way which is beyond our knowledge and in a consummation too great for our understanding. On the other side, apart from the belief that the ultimate and absolute Real is actually present and working within us, what are we to think of the claim that reality is in the end that which satisfies one or more of us? It seems a lunatic dream from some cell the walls of which are like a bubble against the inroad of fact. The ideas and wishes of "fellows such as I crawling between heaven and earth" how much do they count in the march or the drift of the Universe?

One or more of us men—between these two things, so far as I see, there is little difference. We have heard, at least in this connexion, surely too much about the social nature of mankind and about the accumulated funds of humanity. Offered as an explanation of our confidence, wise or stupid, as an account, that is, of how it comes to exist, these considerations of course have their value. But offered as a justification, how can they be anything but worthless? We know how joint action with its fellows, and even that reduplicated sense of self which comes from the perception of its kind, gives assurance to the humblest. But we know again how this assurance can prove to be illusory. The gardener's spade and the unheeding footstep have long ago pointed the moral which at least to my mind has not somehow grown obsolete. Its force to my mind is not lessened by that vapouring, new or old, about Humanity, which, if it

were not ambiguous, would be scarcely sane. We have here to choose, I imagine, between two courses. We must either hold to a view of the criterion which succeeds in separating it from our demand for human satisfaction; or, if we cannot do this (as I cannot), we must once and for all abandon and reject any special prerogative for human beings. Where humanity stands in the scale of being we do not know, and it seems presumptuous to fancy that we ever can learn. And such knowledge for us, so far as we can see, would be useless. But the meanest creature has its absolute right.

The spirit of the worm beneath the sod  
In love and worship blends itself with God.

And not only in love and worship does such union hold, but in will also and in the knowledge and enjoyment of beauty and truth. And, if we believe this, the result should be at once both confidence and humility. Our truth, such as it is, has its indispensable part in the one transcendent Experience and is so far secure. But that any particular truths of ours, as we conceive them, should be unconditioned and absolute, seems hardly probable.



## II.—EDWARD CAIRD AS A PHILOSOPHICAL TEACHER.

BY J. S. MACKENZIE.

THE close of the career of a philosophical teacher so distinguished and influential as the late Dr. Edward Caird is naturally regarded as an occasion on which some summary of his work may fittingly be attempted. Yet it is not altogether easy to know in what form this may best be done for the readers of such a Journal as this. Details of a purely personal or biographical kind would here be somewhat out of place. On the other hand, any attempt to expound or analyse his writings would seem to be almost an impertinence. If water chokes us—to use one of his own quotations—what shall we take to wash it down? The prince of expositors can hardly be in need of exposition. The best that could be done in this way would be to bring together, from some of his own writings, a number of passages in which his most central conceptions are enforced; and this has already been done in an admirable way by one of the earliest and most distinguished of his pupils,<sup>1</sup> and is readily accessible to any readers of MIND who may feel that it would be helpful. To readers of this Journal, however, his general position may be assumed to be familiar; and the bulk of his writings may be supposed to be, in some degree, known. Yet his most elaborate work—that on the philosophy of Kant—is probably less read than it ought to be even by professed students of philosophy; and the real basis of his philosophical teaching

<sup>1</sup> Prof. John Watson in an article on 'The Idealism of Edward Caird' which appeared in *The Philosophical Review*, vol. xviii., Nos. 2 and 3. I may refer also to the same writer's article on 'Edward Caird as a Teacher and Thinker,' and to the one entitled 'Edward Caird: a Reminiscence' by Prof. J. Cappon—both of which appeared in the *Queen's Quarterly*, Canada; and to one by Prof. R. M. Wenley in *The Harvard Theological Review*, April, 1909, which contains a complete bibliography. Many other accounts of his work and personality have already appeared; and it is to be hoped that the scattered references contained in these will be brought together before long in the form of a permanent Memoir.

is, in consequence, not always fully realised, and is, indeed, even in some danger of being seriously misconceived. Hence it may not be wholly unprofitable to try to give a general statement of his philosophical position, with special reference to some recent criticisms, in which it seems to me that such misconceptions may be traced. Indeed, notwithstanding Caird's undeniable excellence as an expositor, it is still true that some attempt to bring home the net outcome of his philosophical labours, in relation to other work of a similar or contrasted kind, is specially called for. For it was rather characteristic of his method of exposition that he seldom paused to sum up its final outcome. He had a strong conviction that results in philosophy, apart from the process by which they are reached, are almost worse than useless; and, though I think he would have agreed that a process without any definite outcome, a mere dialectical exercise, is equally worthless, yet he probably considered on the whole that the danger on that side is not as great. Most men are more ready to pick up the golden apples than to run the race; and, in his published writings at least, he was never willing to offer much concession to this weakness. For that reason, however, there is apt to be some vagueness in the minds of many readers as to what the final outcome of the discussions is. Now, I certainly cannot hope, in such a paper as the present, to do much in the way of removing the difficulty to which I refer; especially as my own interpretation of the results may very probably be a biassed one. Yet one who for some time sat at his feet, who has been in personal contact with him for a considerable number of years, and who has felt the difficulty of bringing together the results of his line of thought as a coherent whole, may be entitled to believe that an effort to summarise these results may be of some assistance to other readers who have not had the same opportunities for forming a judgment. It is my intention, then, in this article, to try to sum up in my own way, without special reference to Caird's modes of statement, what appear to me to be the most essential features of his philosophical teaching; distinguishing that teaching from other views that bear a close resemblance to it, and indicating how some of the leading objections that have been brought against it may be met. The objections that I have chiefly in mind are those that have been urged from the point of view of the new Realism and from that of Pragmatism or Pluralism. But, before proceeding to the consideration of these, some remarks of a more general kind on Caird's work in philosophy may here be in place.

In any estimate of the services that were rendered by Caird to the philosophical development of his generation, it is important to remember that, throughout the whole, or at least much the greater part, of his career, he was even more of a teacher than a writer. His teaching work, especially during his long period<sup>1</sup> as Professor of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow, had a value, which it would not be easy to overrate, in stimulating an interest in the subject, and communicating something of the largeness of his own conception of it, in the young minds with which he came in contact. The most striking results of this are seen in the writings of such faithful disciples as Profs. John Watson and Henry Jones, in whom its best traditions are carried on with a power that is at least comparable to his own; but it is to be traced also throughout a much wider commonalty. His ordinary class sometimes contained as many as 250 students at a time; and few left it without some lasting mark of his influence. As a teacher, he was generally recognised as one of the most effective—if not the most effective—of his time. His success did not depend on oratorical devices of the kind commonly described as popular, but rather on the care and thoroughness of his work. He could hardly be called an eloquent speaker; and his manner in lecturing did not always convey that impression of easy flow which was characteristic of his writing. But he spoke with great weight and fulness of illustration, repeating important ideas over and over again in different forms; so that, in the end, there was scarcely any one who was not, in some way or other, impressed by them. His teaching was distinguished by a very unusual breadth of treatment. The literary, historical, religious, and even the legal aspects of philosophical ideas were frequently emphasised, as well as problems of a more purely theoretical type. This broad outlook upon life was very characteristic of Caird. His mind was cast in a large mould, and he looked habitually at all the aspects of a subject. It may be that this tendency carries with it a certain defect, a certain vagueness in points of detail, a certain lack of clear-cut edges; but, for young students at least, it had the utmost value in opening up a fresh outlook on almost every side of life. Not only philosophy, but history, poetry, politics, religion, seemed to wear a new aspect for students who had been through his classes. To many it appeared like the revelation of a new heaven and a new earth. Here, however, it would hardly be in place to

<sup>1</sup> More than a quarter of a century. During a considerable part of this time, he taught Political Economy as well as Moral Philosophy.

dwell further on this aspect of his work, or upon his services to University organisation and social progress. It is with his work as a thinker and writer, rather than as a teacher or a man of affairs, that we must here be mainly concerned.

Even in considering his work as a thinker and writer, however, we cannot altogether ignore circumstances of a somewhat personal kind. In philosophical work—more perhaps than in any other kind of work, except poetry—the whole personality of a man tends to enter in, and has to be taken into account. That Caird was a Scot, for instance, is a fact not without significance in determining his general habit of thought. It is no doubt dangerous to dogmatise on national characteristics; but there are two things generally ascribed to Scotchmen, which were in him eminently noticeable—two things apparently opposed, and yet surely not requiring any Hegelian dialectic to reconcile. He had, on the one hand, a certain *perfervidum ingenium*—a deep-seated enthusiasm for ideas; and, on the other hand, a marked degree of caution in their development and application. He was a poet at heart, but with the constant curb of stern logic and rigorous self-criticism. As he was speaking the fire burned; and some were apt to think him overconfident, almost too much of a prophet, in the promulgation of his creed. Others complained of a certain hesitancy on ultimate issues, lack of detailed applications and positive results. I suppose it was this element of reserve that was in the mind of William James when—in one of the latest brandishings of his philosophical shillelah—he complained that British idealism tended to be rather thin. He thinks apparently that it ought to be fed up and fattened on such speculations as that with regard to the reality of the World-soul. Every one must admire the freshness of James's utterances on philosophical questions. He is one of the glories of our philosophical literature; and whether he gives us theories of emotion or of pluralism or of pragmatism, whether he discourses on organic resonance, on religious beliefs, or on the omnipotence of the will, we can always feel confident that he will not halt half-way, or be held back, in the language of Plato, by any fear of plunging into an abyss of nonsense. Perhaps there is a more stimulating air on the other side of the Atlantic. Within these shores—even when not on the northern side of the border—our thought is seldom so adventurous. It is not often that our best writers are guilty of rushing in where angels fear to tread. We are always conscious of the bridle, even in such purely English writers as Newton, Locke, and Darwin. Now, it is not my aim to vindicate this characteristic. It is

not, I think, found in those Germans to whom our British idealism is most indebted, with the possible exception of Kant, who was not purely German. Wisdom is no doubt justified of all her children. There is a place for unrestrained exuberance, as well as for the more patient builder. I only note that Caird was in the latter class; and may add that, with him at least, caution did not imply any lack of enthusiasm, or any tendency not to press his arguments to their full logical issue. It only meant that he was silent where he did not know. He gave the reins to his thought, but not to his fancy. He did not, like Plato, fill up the gaps in his reasoning with any form of mythology.

But certainly his caution did not mean any lack of fervour or of firm conviction. He never wavered in his strenuous support of the way of thinking that is specially associated with the name of Hegel. If he did not care to describe himself as a disciple of Hegel, it was only because, as he himself said, 'the days of discipleship are past'. It is of the very essence of the Hegelian view, that philosophy is an evolution; that its history is that of the mind of man at work; that truth is not to be found summed up in any one system, but is rather to be seen unfolding itself in all. This view was certainly very fundamental with Caird; and it was combined with the conviction that the ultimate truth is to be found embodied in religion and poetry, as well as in what is technically known as philosophy. Though not a pragmatist, he was certainly, in the best sense of the word, a humanist. He believed that the emotions and the will, as well as pure logic, have a legitimate part to play in fashioning our outlook on the world; or rather he shared, on the whole, Carlyle's objection to the separation of human faculties, and held that a man thinks, feels and lives with his whole nature. His was, indeed, one of those finely balanced natures in which the elements were in such constant harmony that they hardly seemed to be distinguishable modes of spiritual being. He passed readily from poetry to philosophy, and from both to religion, without any sense of a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*. This attitude of mind was of course not altogether peculiar to Caird. It is traceable, in large measure, to the humanistic atmosphere which has tended to prevail both in Oxford and in the Scottish Universities. But it may be doubted whether any one since Plato—or should I say rather since Lucretius?—ever showed a more harmonious blending of the spirit of philosophy with that of poetry, religion, and social reform than that which was to be found in Caird. Yet he never yielded to the temptation to substitute a poetical intuition

for a logical argument. Like St. Anselm—though with a difference—he might have taken for his motto *credo ut intelligam*. He drank in his convictions from the insight of the poets and prophets, and then went on to prove them. For such a mind there could hardly be any question of direct discipleship. As it was said of Wordsworth that every mountain was his favourite, and that he would never give his word against any; so it might be truly said of Caird that he lived habitually among the mountain-peaks of human thought and feeling, and realised his kinship with them all. Among the philosophers, however, Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant and Hegel were, I think, his special favourites;<sup>1</sup> and among the poets the Greek tragedians, Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe and Wordsworth.<sup>2</sup> But his sympathies, both in literature and in philosophy, were certainly very catholic; and his range of knowledge was extraordinarily wide. He had probably not as minutely accurate a scholarship as the late Prof. Adamson; but there cannot have been many others whose knowledge was more comprehensive. Yet his learning was as far removed from pedantry as his literary interest was from dilettantism. In his study of the great philosophers and poets, he was always seeking for a deeper insight into the nature of the universe and of human life. Of the physical sciences he had, I believe, comparatively little knowledge; but he had given a good deal of attention to botany, and was certainly well able to appreciate the work of Darwin, for which he had the highest admiration. In general, there were not many who had made themselves more fully at home in their world, or who were less liable to any one-sided fanaticism.

It is true, however, that he was, in all essentials, a disciple of Hegel. By what steps he was led to this position I am not able definitely to state. It is probable that, like many others of his generation, he received from Carlyle the most potent of his early incitements towards speculative thought. Carlyle of course pointed him directly to Goethe, whose way of thinking became thereafter a very essential part of his spiritual equipment. To one who thus starts with a conviction of the essential unity of man's spiritual nature, and of the universe to which that nature is related; and especially to any one who has been profoundly influenced

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps, at least in his later years, Plotinus should be added. In general, it may be said that he was specially interested in attempts to bring together Eastern and Western modes of thought. This is seen more particularly in his book (in some respects the finest he ever wrote) on *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*.

<sup>2</sup> Most of these are dealt with in his *Essays on Literature and Philosophy*.

by Goethe's manner of giving expression to this conviction; the philosophy of Spinoza presents itself at first as the most obvious scientific basis. It was Goethe's own speculative resource; and there can be little doubt that for Caird also this particular philosophy had always a certain unique fascination. Indeed, to any mind of a poetic, religious, and deeply speculative type—as we see in the case of our own Shelley, as well as Goethe—such a philosophy as that of Spinoza can hardly fail to make a strong appeal; like that which was made, in an earlier time, by the poem of his great prototype Parmenides. The mathematical setting of the one and the materialistic setting of the other are not likely long to deceive any mind of genuine philosophic insight with regard to the essential character of such systems. For, when any one says that All is One, or that the Infinite alone is real, it is evident that the nature of the One or the Infinite must somehow contain in itself what is highest and most complex as well as what is lowest and simplest; and it cannot, therefore, be in its essence geometrical or materialistic, whatever the language may seem to imply. The real enemy of idealism, as Caird always recognised, is not materialism, but dualism. Nevertheless, the contradiction between the form and the essence in the system of Spinoza soon becomes sufficiently apparent. Substance cannot be quite the right word for the ultimate reality, any more than the being or the well-poised sphere of Parmenides. We must, in some way or other, pass from substance to subject—a process which was accomplished in ancient thought by the transition from Parmenides to Plato, and in modern by that from Spinoza to Hegel. I believe that it was substantially in some such way as this that Caird was led in the end to find in Hegel, more than in any one else, the kind of solution for the riddle of the universe for which he had been in search. He did not, however, become simply a passive recipient of the Hegelian creed, or even simply an active interpreter of it. It seemed to him that the most important thing to do was not to expound the work of Hegel, but rather to show its necessity, by bringing out the main lines in the development of thought that lead up inevitably to some such system as that which Hegel established.

In order to appreciate rightly the work that Caird thus set himself to do, it is necessary to remember what the condition of philosophy was at the time when he began to write. The school that traces its filiation to Locke, Berkeley and Hume was still the dominant one in this country. The influence of German idealism had been but slightly felt through



its imperfect echoes in Coleridge, Whewell, Hamilton and Ferrier, though, in a more purely literary form, it had already shown its power in Wordsworth, Shelley, Carlyle, Browning, and others. There was thus a decided conflict between the poetical and religious ideas of the age on the one hand and its scientific and philosophical principles on the other. It was the chief work of Caird to effect a reconciliation between them; and both he and T. H. Green, who worked throughout hand in hand,<sup>1</sup> felt it to be their first business to bring the main conceptions of German idealism into direct relation to the prevailing tendencies of thought in their time. Green undertook an elaborate criticism of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, and carried on a less systematic polemic against some more recent writers; and afterwards made it his main business to formulate the ethical side of the new idealism, in relation to the types of utilitarianism that were then current—especially those of J. S. Mill and H. Sidgwick. Caird, on the other hand, took as his main task the criticism of the continental writers from Descartes to Kant, dealing at some length with the Cartesian school, and giving a very elaborate exposition and criticism of the work of Kant, showing how his philosophy leads up to a more definite type of idealism than that which he had himself conceived; dealing less systematically with Hegel and Comte; and finally—his most congenial task—seeking to bring out the religious aspects of his philosophical position. It was of course for the support of the religious or poetic view of life that his whole work was designed; but he felt it to be necessary to dig deep in order to lay the foundations firmly.

It may be well to note here, however, that, though Green and Caird were thus working hand in hand, there was always some degree of difference between them: and, as the former was the more patently constructive of the two and, through his position in Oxford, the more immediately influential among the rising generation of writers, it is probable that the distinguishing features of Caird's position were not very fully realised. Though it fell to Caird to be the exponent of Kant, Green was by far the more Kantian of the two. He based his metaphysical construction on what has since been shown to be a misquotation from Kant, to the effect that 'the understanding makes nature, but does not create it'. Taking this as a summary of the Kantian view, Green sought to amend it by representing nature as created by

<sup>1</sup> Of course Hutchison Stirling also, who worked independently, undertook a very similar task; and he was somewhat earlier in the field.



an 'eternal consciousness,' which reproduces itself in the human intelligence; a view which appears in the end to leave the essential difficulty of the Kantian philosophy—the fundamental opposition between the eternal reality and the appearance of a world in time—very nearly where it was. Similarly, on the ethical side, Green reproduces the categorical imperative of Kant, and even makes the Kantian position still more extreme by insisting, without qualification, that the only and complete good is the good will. It is true that here also he introduces a modification into the Kantian statement by representing the good will as realising itself through a world-process; but the process does not appear, for him any more than for Kant, to furnish the will with a real content. On the whole, the most that can be said for Green, whether on the metaphysical or on the ethical side, is that he points to certain conceptions by which the Kantian system might have been remodelled; but he does not actually show us how it is to be remodelled by means of them. Rather, it still remains on his hands, with all its leading features intact, and all its most urgent difficulties unresolved.

Now, it is no doubt true to say that the conceptions with which Caird was working were substantially the same as those that were in the mind of Green. But he carried them farther, both on the metaphysical and on the ethical side, and passed over more completely, by means of them, from the point of view of Kant to that of Hegel. How far his views are actually to be identified with those of Hegel it is not easy to determine; nor, perhaps, is it of very much importance to attempt it. Though he wrote an exceedingly interesting sketch of Hegel's life and work, and though he often read some of Hegel's writings with his more advanced students, yet he refrained from any attempt to expound the system in detail. He preferred to saturate himself with its spirit, to prepare the way for the establishment of its general principles, and to show its applications in the interpretation of some of the most important aspects of life. He certainly was not prepared to accept everything in the writings of Hegel as true. He thought, for instance, that Hegel was unjust in some of his criticisms of Kant, and premature in some of his attempts to interpret the results of the physical sciences; and I believe he would to some extent have agreed with Green in thinking that the scheme of the categories would require a good deal of reconsideration in its details. On the other hand, he would certainly have defended Hegel against some of the recent criticisms of Dr. McTaggart, whose subordination of the element of negativity, in particular, he considered to be a

serious mistake. On the whole, he undoubtedly believed that the general conception of idealism to which he had been led was in its essence identical with that of Hegel.

Readers of MIND can hardly need to be informed what that conception was. Yet it is to be feared that the common knowledge of it is often accompanied by a good deal of misunderstanding. The term idealism, by which the general point of view is usually described, carries to most minds—even minds trained in philosophical distinctions—certain associations that are apt to be in a high degree misleading. In particular, it is very difficult for the British mind to dissociate the term from the special significance that was given to it by the philosophy of Berkeley. Though it is generally known that modern idealism rests rather on Kant than on Berkeley, and that Kant believed himself to have given a cogent refutation of the kind of idealism that Berkeley represents, yet we constantly find both the supporters and the critics of idealism falling back upon modes of statement that are essentially Berkeleyan, and that are not merely incompatible with such an idealism as that of Caird, but often even diametrically opposed to it. For surely it cannot be denied that the Kantian and post-Kantian idealism rests on the rejection of the initial postulate of the Berkeleyan. It substitutes an objective order for the purely subjective determinations with which Berkeleyanism sets out. This is generally admitted; but I am afraid its implications are not, in general, very fully recognised.

The common view appears to be that modern idealism differs from Berkeley's mainly by the substitution of *intelligi* for *percipi*—a substitution which Berkeley himself was well on the way to make. It is regarded as having made some advance in the analysis of the content of experience, but not any essential change in its epistemological standpoint. It is from this point of view, for instance, that modern idealism is criticised by Mr. G. E. Moore; and it must be confessed that there is a good deal of justification for such criticism in the language of many—perhaps even of most—of our recent idealists. Now, to represent the change as simply one from *percipi* to *intelligi* might be accepted as a true account, if all that is implied in such a change were fully realised; but it is apt to be thought of as if it were only a slight—almost a verbal—improvement. Perhaps Green's mode of statement, among others, has tended to encourage the view that the modification is a comparatively insignificant one; for Green no doubt tends to speak as if the mind, in understanding the world, were at the same time creating it; just as Berkeley

tends to speak as if the mind were the creator of its own ideas. The objectivity of the world that we apprehend is in this way at least ignored or minimised. The more recent tendency to use the word 'experience' as covering the content of our knowledge has also favoured a similar interpretation. It is too apt to be assumed that thought or knowledge may be treated simply as something in the mind of a particular individual, just as an 'idea' may be so treated; and in this way we are brought back to the Berkeleyan position, his 'notions' being of course included along with his 'ideas'. What is called 'personal idealism' is no doubt more particularly associated with this way of thinking—a point of view of which Dr. Rashdall is probably the best representative. But there are distinct traces of it in many other writers. The chapter on immortality in Dr. McTaggart's *Dogmas of Religion* seems to be a piece of almost pure Berkeleyanism. Even Mr. Bradley, who in his *Principles of Logic* did so much to open up a truer way of thinking, especially by his admirable criticism of Associationism and by his clear distinction between the existence and the meaning of ideas, seems in some of his later writings—in spite of his steadfast insistence upon coherence as the ultimate test of reality—to have very largely succumbed to the fatal spell of subjectivism. Now, it was certainly one of the great merits of Caird that he kept himself singularly clear from this particular pitfall. It is hardly too much to say that, in his epistemological outlook, he was as far removed from Berkeley as he was from Reid.

The refutation of the Berkeleyan type of idealism is, indeed, not difficult; and it has been done over and over again, from the time of Reid and Kant to our own. Yet nothing could well be more important for philosophy than to press that refutation. It is that false idealism, more than anything else, that blocks the way of the true. For it is easy to see that the false type of idealism leads by inevitable steps to the devouring gulf of solipsism, from which the mind at once recoils. If once we allow that the existence of things consists only in their being known, it is soon seen to be impossible to exempt spiritual substance or any other kind of reality from this fatal doom. No objective world is left. Even we ourselves become nothing but shadowy ideas in our own minds. Nothing could well be further removed than this from idealism in any true sense of the word—idealism such as that which is represented by Plato. From this point of view, the work of the supporters of the New Realism, as I have already urged in a previous article, is of the utmost value. The essential point in their contention I take to be that facts of conscious-

ness always involve an objective reference, as well as a subjective reference. This applies even to what are called the secondary qualities of things. To be conscious of green is not to have a green consciousness : just as to be conscious of extension is not to have an extended consciousness. In both cases we are apprehending something which has to be distinguished from the act of apprehending, and which we refer to the objective world. It may be urged, no doubt, that this does not apply to simple organic sensations or to pure feeling. We naturally say 'I am hungry,' or 'I am pleased'; though we do not naturally say 'I am green,' or 'I am a triangle'. But, even in the former instances, reflexion might lead us to see that it would be a truer mode of expression to say 'I am conscious of an organic want,' and 'I am conscious of something as yielding pleasure'. The element of objective reference is not entirely absent even in these instances. It is, however, instances of this kind that tend to give colour to the distinction between the apprehension of pure states of our consciousness and the reference to an objective world, and to the contention that we can separate the one thing absolutely from the other. Once we grant this, it is natural to maintain that we begin with what is purely subjective and advance from this to the affirmation of an objective world. The next step is to urge that we have no real ground for this affirmation. It was this point of view that gave rise to the dualism of Descartes and afterwards to the more pure subjectivism of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Reid was quite right in urging that it was this view that was the fundamental error to be resisted in his time; and it is perhaps true that the service he thus rendered to philosophy has hardly been sufficiently recognised. Prof. Pringle-Pattison emphasised this very well in his series of lectures on *The Scottish Philosophy*, and rightly urged that in Reid's contention, so far, there is nothing in any way antagonistic to a true idealism. Kant also, though with a somewhat less direct emphasis than Reid, rejected the fundamental basis on which the philosophies both of Descartes and of Berkeley rested.

The objection to such a realism as that of Reid is not that it recognises that we are in contact with an objective order; but that it is too naïve in its interpretation of that order. In this respect also our newer realism, though much more reflective than that of Reid, appears to be almost equally at fault. Recognising that we are in contact with an objective system, we have still to ask ourselves what exactly we are entitled to refer to that system; and it soon becomes evident that we must draw some distinction between appearance and

reality. Even the most ordinary common sense recognises that some things that present themselves to us are illusory—*i.e.*, that their place in the objective system of reality is not exactly that which at first it appears to be. If we are to have any philosophical theory of reality at all, we must be able to draw some distinction between the first appearance of things and the view of their nature which subsequent reflexion leads us to take. It is here that the Kantian philosophy shows its superiority to ordinary realism. The real world of nature is for Kant a systematic order interpreted by thought. Kant, however, holds that the world, even as thus interpreted, is still a distorted world; and that the ultimate reality, as it is in itself, remains inaccessible even to thought; and is, at the best, only dimly apprehended by a rational faith. Here of course Caird separates himself from Kant. Thought, he conceives, is able to grasp reality, and does not ultimately fail in its attempt to interpret it.

The first and most fundamental contention of such an idealism as that of Caird is that the world is to be regarded as intelligible through and through. It is in this sense that he holds that *esse* is *intelligi*. The world as we ultimately think it, when we are trying to make it thoroughly intelligible to ourselves, is the real world. It is because this is the most essential point in idealism that Parmenides and Spinoza are rightly reckoned among its founders. The current misconception of the real meaning of such an idealism as that of Caird has led to the denial that Parmenides has any claim to be connected with it. He founded materialism, it is said, rather than idealism; and in a sense this is true enough. It is also true to say that Spinoza's conception of the infinite substance is in the end too geometrical to be truly idealistic. But it is certainly through Parmenides and Spinoza, rather than through Protagoras and Berkeley, that we may hope to reach a true idealism. Parmenides was the founder of idealism in the sense that he was the first who clearly opposed the world as we think it to the world of sense or unreflective opinion; and who definitely maintained that the former is the world of reality. No doubt his way of thinking of the world that is ultimately intelligible to us was extremely inadequate; and it is here that we come to the second great requirement of modern idealism.

The second fundamental contention is that the only kind of universe that is really intelligible to us is a universe that is intrinsically spiritual. But this again is apt to be misconceived. It does not mean what Berkeley understood by it—and what such modern writers as Drs. McTaggart and Rash-

dall seem to understand—that nothing really exists but spirits and their ideas. Caird's view is rather that the universe comes to the consciousness of itself in spirit; but that the process through which this consciousness arises is a real process, and involves the existence of real stages that are not in themselves spirit, but rather the necessary 'other' of spirit. The element of negation, in short, is for Caird real and essential. This does not, however, imply any ultimate dualism; since the element of negation finds its explanation in the spiritual result that is realised through it.

The universe, as Caird conceived it, is an organic system, developing towards the complete and self-conscious expression of that which is from the first implied in it. This view involves that the time-series through which the world unfolds itself is at once real and unreal—real as exhibiting an actual process of development, unreal inasmuch as what thus develops in time is, in some true sense, there from the beginning. Caird believed that this can be made intelligible by thinking of the reality of an eternal divine principle, of which the world that develops in time is the counterpart or real 'other'. This divine principle is of course not to be thought of as prior in time to the world-process, or as the creator of that process. Rather the eternal mind for which the world is and the evolution of that world in time are two essential aspects of the same reality. The existence of such a self-conscious mind implies the existence of its other. The two sides correspond broadly to the *natura naturans* and *natura naturata* of Spinoza; but the antithesis thus expressed finds a much more real place in the philosophy of Caird than it could have in that of Spinoza. The one side may be called the ground or explanation of the other, but not its antecedent—the ultimate nature of explanation being akin rather to final cause than to efficient cause. The world exists, in other words, because it is involved in the divine purpose, not because it is brought about by any temporal act. The unfolding of the world lies eternally in the divine essence.

I think it is involved in this view of Caird that the time-series must be regarded as limited, having a real beginning and end—though of course there could not be anything before the beginning or after the end. It must be regarded, in short, as a closed circle; and, as I have elsewhere urged, there does not seem to be any real difficulty in such a conception. I do not find, however, that this view was ever definitely put forward either by Caird or by his master Hegel; and, in referring to it here, therefore, I am only indicating something that seems to be necessary to complete

their view. It is important, especially in view of the many difficulties that have recently been raised about time, that this point should not be altogether overlooked. Dr. McTaggart, in particular, has emphasised the unreality of time in a remarkably clear and cogent fashion. And certainly it seems impossible to maintain the ultimate reality of the events in time regarded simply as a successive series. The transience of time cannot be accepted as ultimately real. Dr. McTaggart, however, himself allows that there is a real time-order; and this is all that seems to be important for the significance of process.<sup>1</sup> Now, Caird's conception, as I understand it, is that the time-order represents a process through which the world advances to an ultimate union with the divine principle which is its presupposition. The ultimate significance of the time-series appears at its end, which is identical with its beginning, and which is in truth eternal—the unfolding of the world being simply the exhibition of what it always essentially is. The time-order is eternally there; though for those who participate in its process it appears as a successive series.

A view of this kind is no doubt sufficiently paradoxical; and it is not altogether surprising that it has not won a very large number of adherents. The objections that naturally occur to it are of two types. On the other hand, it may be urged that it does not really give us an intelligible conception of the universe. It may be contended that there remains in it an inner incoherence. Or, on the other hand, it may be urged, that, though in itself perfectly intelligible and coherent, it is not sufficiently in touch with the facts of our experience, and cannot therefore be scientifically established. It may be contended that Caird's philosophy is still, as that of Leibniz was said to be, a sort of fairy-tale of speculation, comparable rather to the 'dreams of a ghost-seer' than to the system of a man of science. A few words may be useful on both these classes of objections.

The question as to the ultimate intelligibility of Caird's theory may be put most simply in this way. His view involves the conception of an eternal mind in relation to a temporal process. Now, it may be contended, either that

<sup>1</sup> More definitely it may be said that transience (Dr. McTaggart's A series) must be regarded as unreal; but that order (his C series) and direction (his B series) must both be regarded as real. The fundamental importance of direction (recently emphasised by Goldscheid) has been sadly overlooked by most of our philosophical writers. The series of numbers is surely a sufficient example of the possibility of order and direction without time transience.



the temporal process would be just as intelligible without the eternal mind, or that the eternal mind would be just as intelligible (perhaps even more intelligible) without the temporal process. If neither of these objections is sound, I think it must be allowed that the unity of the two sides, as conceived by Caird, does help to make the universe intelligible.

Few are likely to contend that the temporal series is in itself intelligible. A simple succession of events in time would have no explanation beyond itself, and could hardly be supposed to be *causa sui* or its own explanation. If any one is inclined to adopt such a supposition, he may be recommended to study the difficulties brought out in the Kantian antinomies, or those that have more recently been urged by such writers as Bradley and McTaggart. If the temporal series is thought of as limited, some account of its beginning would be required. If, on the other hand, it is thought of as unlimited, we must then suppose, as Kant put it, that an infinite series has been completed up to the present moment; or, to put it a little differently, that the time series is one of which the  $n$ th member (whatever  $n$  may be) is always infinite; and this does not appear to be a possible mathematical conception. It seems clear, therefore, that the temporal series must, in some way or other, be thought of not simply as a series of successive members, but as in its essence eternal. It may be urged, however, that we can think of it in this way without the conception of an eternal mind; and that this conception does not make it any easier for us to understand it. We might, for instance, say simply that the eternal nature that is involved in the temporal series, is something for us unknown and unknowable. But this at least is not a view that makes it intelligible—which is the point at present under consideration. Or we might think of it after the manner of Mr. Bradley's 'Absolute'. But his last word also is that 'Reality is one experience, self-pervading and superior to mere relations. Its character is . . . in the end, the sole perfect realisation of spirit. . . . Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and, the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real.' This has of course to be qualified by the somewhat questionable doctrine of 'Degrees of Reality'; and, when it is so qualified, it does not appear to be intrinsically different from the view of Caird—except that the use of the term 'experience' would have seemed to Caird somewhat objectionable. Or are we to say rather, as McTaggart and Howison appear to do, that the eternal reality underlying the temporal series consists of a multi-



plicity of spirits, rather than of the unity of an eternal mind? If so, then I think it might be urged that, just as the ancient Atomists recognised that their 'many' must possess the characteristics of the Parmenidean 'one,' so this multiplicity of spirits must have the essential characteristics that Caird ascribes to the one eternal mind. They must, that is to say, be eternal in their nature, and they must also contain the explanation of the temporal series. Now, the order of the temporal series is surely a single order; and to admit that it finds its explanation in the eternal nature of spirit is surely to admit that the eternal reality is at least one as well as many. Now, Caird of course recognised that there is a real multiplicity of spirits, and even, in one of his latest writings,<sup>1</sup> contended that they must be thought of as immortal. The ultimate difference between Caird and McTaggart—if I understand the two positions rightly—is that the former referred the multiplicity to the development of self-conscious personalities in time, while he thought of the unity as belonging to the eternal mind of which the world in time is the expression or 'other'; whereas McTaggart regards the multiplicity as belonging to the nature of the eternal, as well as to the series in time. This is a comparatively subordinate divergence; but I think Caird's view has a distinct superiority, which some of the considerations that follow may help to bring out.

What has now been urged may at least serve to show that, if we refuse to accept the hypothesis put forward by Caird, and yet seek to arrive at an intelligible view of the universe, we are driven to other hypotheses which are very little different from that of Caird. But now it may be said that, if the consideration of the temporal series leads us to think of an eternal mind or an eternal multiplicity of spirits, there is at least no possibility of reversing the process. The thought of an eternal mind, it may be contended, furnishes no explanation of the existence, or apparent existence, of a temporal series. This difficulty seems to have been felt by Green in connexion with his postulate of an eternal consciousness, which is certainly not far removed from that of Caird. 'Why any detail of the world,' he says,<sup>2</sup> 'is what it is, we can explain by reference to other details which determine it; but why the whole should be what it is, why the mind which the world implies should exhibit itself in a

<sup>1</sup> *Lay Sermons and Addresses*. It must be confessed, however, that Caird had no definite theory as to the nature of such personal immortality. Still less did he speculate on the problem of pre-existence.

<sup>2</sup> *Prolegomena to Ethics*, book i., chap. iii.

world at all, why it should make certain processes of that world organic to a reproduction of itself under limitations which the use of such organs involves—these are questions which, owing perhaps to those very limitations, we are equally unable to avoid asking and to answer. We have to content ourselves with saying that, strange as it may seem, it is so.' But is it so very strange? It may be suspected that the strangeness of it is due in the main to the somewhat abstract way in which the eternal consciousness tended to be conceived by Green, as if it were something prior to and independent of the world-process through which it is revealed. It was this way of thinking that Caird sought most strenuously to avoid. An intelligence without an objective world as its 'other' seemed to him inconceivable, as meaningless as a circle without a circumference. It was not a question, therefore, of creation or reproduction, but rather of an eternal process. An eternal intelligence, Caird conceived, could only realise itself through a world which appears at first as the opposite of itself. This, he thought, is the supreme instance of that activity of 'self-realisation through self-sacrifice,' which is the key to the life of the universe. The relation of the temporal process to the divine intelligence is thus regarded as an intrinsic one, and there is no real meaning in the question suggested by Green.

— The considerations thus briefly set forth may serve to show that the hypothesis put forward by Caird does at least supply us with an intelligible theory of the universe. But it may still be urged that it is not a strictly scientific hypothesis. The explanation to which it refers us is not, it may be said, of the nature of a *vera causa*. We cannot establish it by means of any of the facts of our experience; and there are even some of these facts that appear to be inconsistent with it. In answer to this, it may be noted, first of all, that a philosophical hypothesis is hardly on the same footing as a purely scientific one. In the case of the latter, we are generally concerned with some special facts that may be used to explain other facts, and that may be verified by independent methods. From the nature of the case, a philosophical hypothesis does not admit of any similar tests. If we accept it, we must do so on the ground that it is an intelligible hypothesis, and that it is the only hypothesis we can find that is both intelligible in itself and capable of making the universe as we know it intelligible. This, I believe, is the element of truth in the pragmatist position; and I think it was fully accepted by Caird, as by most other idealists. The test of the truth of a philosophical hypothesis is that it

'works' if by 'working' is meant enabling us to deal in an intelligible way with the facts of our experience—and this is what the pragmatists, in some of their statements, appear to mean. The question, then, is—Does the hypothesis of idealism, as understood by Caird, 'work' in this sense? Now, the contention of a considerable number of recent critics, writing from a great variety of standpoints, but with very similar arguments, is to the effect that the idealistic hypothesis, though in itself intelligible and coherent, does not succeed in making the actual world of our experience intelligible. Though intelligible as a general statement, it fails in its application to detail. I must now try to put this objection as clearly as possible, so far as I am able to understand it.

The objection, as it presents itself to most minds, runs somewhat as follows. If we are to regard the universe as the expression of an eternal mind, this must mean—as Plato urged in the *Phædo*—that it is the realisation of an eternal purpose. Now, even if we do not accept the Socratic *dictum*, as regards purely human purposes, that no one is willingly deprived of the good, it is at least hardly credible that there should be such a wilful deprivation on the part of the eternal mind; and, if not wilful, then there cannot be such a deprivation at all, since we are assuming that the world is the expression of this very purpose. We must, therefore, on this hypothesis, accept, in the fullest sense, an optimistic interpretation of the universe. We must believe, with Leibniz, that it is the best of all possible worlds. Now, it is contended by many that we can hardly doubt that it is at least possible to conceive of a better universe than that in which we find ourselves. A universe, it is urged, that had no evil in it at all, and not even the illusion of any evil—a Parmenidean universe, as we might say, without any negativity—would be better than that in which we actually are; and no general grounds can be assigned for the impossibility of such a universe. Leibniz himself admitted that we could not explain the 'impossibility' of positive qualities; and, if this is admitted, the presence of evil or negation, in any shape or form, would appear to be unintelligible. This is, I think, the chief—perhaps the only real—argument on which modern Pluralism is based; and Pluralism appears to be, in the end, the only real alternative to some such idealism as that of Caird. The new realism and pragmatism, as I have already urged, are not, so far as their fundamental principles are concerned, opposed to idealism. It is only by a misconception that they ever appear to be so. They become op-

posed to it only when they lead—as they both tend to do—to some form of Pluralism; and it is in this that all the opposition to idealism is in the end concentrated. It is to pluralism, therefore, that we must turn if we are to understand the ultimate objections to idealism.

Now, Pluralism of course presents itself in a great variety of forms. Even such a philosophy as that of Leibniz is apt to be characterised as pluralistic; and certainly, on a superficial view, it would seem right so to regard it; and, indeed, even on a deeper view, it must be admitted that it has some pluralistic aspects. Yet the leading ideas of Leibniz are not far removed from those of Spinoza; and it may be doubted whether his philosophy as a whole can really be rendered coherent without reducing it to a form that is scarcely distinguishable from that of modern idealism. It is clear at least that on the main point here under consideration—the existence of a unity of purpose in the universe, implying an optimistic conception of its structure—it is entirely at one with such a theory as that of Caird. The same, as I have already indicated, can hardly be said for such a philosophy as that of McTaggart, which, from the absence of any clear conception of a single purpose, seems to me to be much more truly pluralistic. Yet here also there is certainly the underlying unity of a system; and, indeed, I am somewhat at a loss to understand how this fundamental unity can be reconciled with the degree of pluralism that is still maintained. It would seem that the manifoldness of the system must be capable of explanation from the point of view of the whole; and, if the whole is, in any true sense, to be thought of as spiritual, this would seem to imply that it does contain a certain unity of purpose, pointing to the realisation of the best. Hence I cannot regard this kind of Pluralism as really distinguishable, in the end, from such a Monism as that of Caird. The position of Dr. Rashdall is, in many respects, closely akin to this; but here at least the elements of unity and plurality are rather more definitely separated off from one another. The diversity of created spirits is set over against the unity of the creative spirit, who is conceived of as being, though creative, yet finite; and it is by this somewhat quaint conception of a finite God that he seeks to account for the element of negativity or evil in the world. God is conceived as aiming at the good, but as being somehow too weak (apparently too weak of will) to bring it about. This view of Rashdall's, which certainly involves a glaring paradox, may be regarded as the connecting link between such a pluralism as that of McTaggart and the more

thoroughgoing pluralism of William James, which I am inclined to accept as the true type of what pluralism ultimately means.

The view of James has certainly been put before us with extraordinary vigour and rare charm of expression. If it fails to convince, it must be from its inherent defects, rather than from any weakness in its advocate. The way in which it has recently been connected with the fascinating work of Bergson has also gone far to commend it. I think we may fairly take James's presentment of pluralism as the best case that can be made out for it. It is the modern version of the philosophy of strife. The din of battle rings through the pages; and in this new doctrine of the *élan vital* we seem to hear once more the old utterance of Heraclitus—'War is the father of all and the lord of all'. Reality, from the point of view here represented, is not a single system, but rather a totality that is sustained only by the perpetual struggle of the vital energies of separate beings. There is, indeed, even from this point of view, the possible recognition of some sort of guiding intelligence that may be described as divine; but with James, much more emphatically than with Rashdall, any such power must be regarded as a finite God. Indeed, it becomes with him what one might call a distinctly Anglo-Saxon type of God—a sort of John Bull of a God who is doing the best he can in the midst of a rather adverse world, and may perhaps be expected somehow to muddle through in the end. Such a being can hardly be regarded as in any way representing the unity of the whole, but rather at the utmost as the strongest and best among the conflicting elements. And certainly it can hardly be denied that a view of this kind harmonises better with the appearance of the world, as it presents itself to us in our ordinary experience, than such a view as that of Caird. A Heraclitean doctrine nearly always seems somewhat nearer to common sense than one of a more Parmenidean type; though both are apt to strike the ordinary intelligence as exaggerating one side of the universe as we know it. The philosophy of the unreflective mind tends to be Manichean; and, as against any such conception, the Parmenidean type of speculation seems more uncompromising than the Heraclitean. If all is flux, there may still be occasional moments of rest; whereas if all is rest, there seems no place for even the appearance of change. But Caird's theory at least is not a doctrine of pure rest, whatever may be the case with some other types of modern idealism. It includes the aspect of change and struggle, as well as that of permanence; whereas I think it will be found that the

ultimate weakness of such a theory as that of James is that it leaves no real place for that element of permanence, without which the universe cannot be made intelligible. It seems to involve the unqualified reality of the time-series, whereas, as I have urged, we can only make that intelligible if we suppose it to be somehow 'rounded with the sleep' of the eternal. This difficulty proves fatal to such a theory as that of James as soon as we confront it with ultimate issues; when we ask, for instance—How long has this process of struggle been going on? Did it ever begin? Can it ever end?

*Denique, tantopere inter se cum maxima mundi  
Pugnent membra, pio nequaquam concita bello;  
Nonne vides aliquam longi certaminis ollis  
Posse dari finem?*

James seems to elude these ultimate issues only because he does not claim any ultimate intelligibility for his view. His view seems to be, in the end, that we can make the world partially intelligible to ourselves, but not completely intelligible. This can hardly be called pluralism: it is rather a form of scepticism. On the whole, therefore, I am led to the conclusion that there is no view of the universe, except one more or less of the nature of Caird's, that is really intelligible.

But, if this is the case, then we must try to find some way of meeting the difficulty that led to pluralism—*viz.*, the difficulty with regard to the presence of evil in the universe as we know it. This is undoubtedly the chief, and indeed the only real, difficulty of an idealistic system; and I do not wish to deny that it is a serious one. It seems clear that the only possible way of meeting it is by saying that what presents itself to us as evil is somehow a necessary condition of what is, in the ultimate sense, good. In concrete cases this seems to be in accordance with our actual experience. Fortitude is generally regarded as one of the qualities that are admirable in man; yet it seems inconceivable apart from pain, which to most people appears to be an evil. And further reflexion may serve to show that none of the things that we most value can really be thought of by us without some relation to what presents itself to us as evil. It may be doubted, therefore, whether good is really intelligible out of relation to evil. This is a question, of course, that could not be properly discussed without a thorough consideration of what is meant by good and evil; and we must, therefore, content ourselves here with these slight and unsatisfactory hints. But now at this point some are inclined to urge that, even granting that good and evil are only intelligible to us in relation to each

other, the conditions of intelligibility might yet have been different from what they are; and that a universe in which good was intelligible without evil would be better than one in which it is not. I must confess that this seems to me to carry us beyond the limits of legitimate speculation. Philosophy has done enough if it can show that, from a certain point of view, the universe becomes intelligible. That the conditions of intelligibility should themselves be accounted for, is a demand that might perhaps be made from the point of view of the whole; or perhaps, from that point of view, it might be seen to be uncalled for. It hardly seems to be a demand that can fairly be made of any human philosophy. At this point I believe we must fall back upon the contention of Green, that the universe as a whole cannot be accounted for. All that we can fairly ask is—On what hypothesis can it be made intelligible? The objection previously made to Green's statement was not, it will be remembered, with reference to this point, but to the attempt to account for the time-process on the assumption that the eternal consciousness is something capable of existing apart from it. If Caird was right in thinking that the key to the universe is to be found in the conception of 'self-realisation through self-sacrifice,' and that this expresses the ultimate nature of spirit, then what we must say is that a universe which conforms to this conception is the only kind of universe that is really intelligible to us.

I am well aware that considerations of this kind are not such as to carry conviction to most men's minds. The difficulties and evils with which we all have to contend in the course of our ordinary experience are too palpable, and the possibilities of transforming them into the vehicles of a higher good are too remote and obscure, for any view of this kind to be readily acceptable. The only argument, indeed, that ever forces its acceptance on any mind at all, is that which has been already set forward, that there seems to be no other view that is capable of making the universe intelligible to us; and this is an argument that can only avail with those who are making a strenuous effort to understand the universe in which they are. This class probably does not include all students of philosophy—perhaps not even all teachers of it. 'The mystics are few.' These few, however, realise, I think, that the alternative to such a philosophy as this is not some other theory of the universe, but rather some kind of confession of ultimate ignorance and mystery. Now, that the attempt to make the universe intelligible may fail in the end, is no doubt a result that we can never deny to be possible



with any complete assurance, so long as our view of the universe is imperfect. So long as we have not finally solved the problem of existence, there is always the possibility that there may be some irreducible surd at the end of it. The philosophic enterprise may be doomed to bankruptcy at the last; and I am disposed to allow that, if it did ever become bankrupt, it would be in some such way as that described by James that it would fail. But, at any rate, as Hegel said, darkness is not a form of light; and bankruptcy is hardly a form of business. The universe may be a hopeless tangle; but even a pragmatist can hardly accept such a view for its own sake, as a result to rest in. The human mind is at least bound to hope, so long as there is the faintest possibility of such a result, that the world may prove intelligible in the end. It is the glory of such a writer as Caird that he could claim, like the poet, to be

One who never turned his back, but marched breast-forward,  
Never doubted clouds would break.

This may be a large faith—indeed, it certainly is a large faith—almost too large for human nature to hold by with any steadiness. But pragmatists seem to pride themselves in the strength of their faith. Why should they turn back at the first rebuff? If they choose to say that the idealists only ‘will to believe’ that the universe must be in the end intelligible, this would not be an altogether untrue way of putting it. But it may be doubted whether a thinking being can really will to believe anything else. Even the most pragmatic of pragmatists does, in the end, after all, try to give some more or less intelligible account of the nature of reality. It is only a question of the degree of strenuousness with which the effort is persisted in. In this sense, I cannot but think that Caird was a more faithful pragmatist than the pragmatists themselves, just as he was also a more thorough realist than the realists.

These necessarily very summary remarks must suffice as an indication of what I believe to have been Caird’s fundamental position in philosophy, and of the grounds on which it may be defended, especially against some of the most recent attacks. It seems desirable, however, to add a few brief notes on what may be broadly described as the practical applications of his philosophy. On these also there have been some recent criticisms; and it is worth while at least to try to remove certain misunderstandings. It is significant that the criticisms on the more practical side, as well as on the more purely theoretical one, have tended to be directed with almost

equal strength from opposite quarters. Just as, on the theoretical side, the idealistic position is assailed both from the point of view of realism and from that of subjectivism; so, on the more practical side, it is attacked both as being too radical and as being too reactionary. In both cases this fact may be taken as at least affording some slight presumption that a reasonable *via media* has been found. But it is clear, I think, on the theoretical side, that such a mediating solution has not been found by anything of the nature of a compromise, but rather by pressing fundamental principles to their strictest logical outcome. I wish to urge that this is on the whole true on the practical side as well. In urging this, I may refer first to Caird's attitude towards popular religion, and afterwards to his attitude towards social and political problems. In neither case can I do much more than touch upon the subject; but this is the less to be regretted in view of the admirable manner in which these aspects of Caird's philosophy have recently been handled by Prof. Henry Jones in his series of lectures on *Idealism as a Practical Creed*.

It is certainly at first sight startling to find such a writer as Caird, a trained representative of modern critical thought, concerning himself so directly with the study of theology. The tendency among our modern 'intellectuals' is no doubt rather, as in the case of George Meredith, to think of religion as a sort of spiritual measles that some people catch at certain periods in their lives, or, at the best, as a help to the policeman; and of theology as a mediæval form of sophistry which has only an antiquarian interest. Others tend to connect them with occult phenomena and abnormal states of consciousness. It was certainly not in any of these ways that they were regarded by Caird. He took but little interest in the abnormal—differing in this, to some extent, from his master Hegel. He regarded religion as a quite normal and healthy attitude of the human mind, and theology (with Aristotle) as the coping-stone of the sciences. Some have been apt to suppose, in consequence of this, that he could not have fully caught the spirit of modern enlightenment. Yet, on the other hand, it is equally true to say that his theological views have been regarded with a good deal of suspicion by the accredited representatives of that subject. The fact of his standing between these two fires has led some to think of him as the upholder of a kind of compromise or adjustment, perhaps even of a more or less insincere adaptation to current opinions. If, however, the view that I have sought to give of Caird's fundamental metaphysical principles is correct, it must be apparent that there

is no real foundation for any such suspicion. His theory of reality had a real kinship with Christian theology, especially with the Christian conception of the Trinity; and, indeed, his work in theology was largely directed to showing that it was on philosophical grounds that this doctrine came to be introduced into the Christian tradition. On the more ethical side also he conceived that the most central idea of Christianity is that of 'self-realisation through self-sacrifice,' and that this does truly sum up not only the deepest conception of morality but also the essential nature of spiritual being, and consequently the essential nature of the universe. He believed further, if I understand him rightly, that the general attitude of the founder of Christianity expressed, in the most definite form, the recognition of human life as containing within itself the divine principle of the universe. This recognition had no doubt been given in a manner that was personal and prophetic rather than philosophical; but I think Caird believed that it is in the former rather than in the latter way that it can best be brought home to the consciousness of mankind in general. Men learn, he thought, by pictures and by mythology before they are able to appropriate general conceptions. Perception and imagination are necessarily prior to pure thought. If Caird erred in adopting this essentially Platonic view, it is at least noteworthy that even the leader of the ethical movement in this country, who will hardly be suspected of any undue sympathy with theological traditions, or of any undue tendency to accept practical compromises, has recently been led to recognise the ethical importance of a large part of the Christian ritual; though in his case the philosophical basis for its interpretation is obviously much less readily available. Yet I hardly think that Caird would ever have gone as far in this direction as Dr. Coit has done; and, apart from the points here referred to, it can hardly be maintained that he ever represented his views as having any specially close connexion with current creeds. He always made it apparent that his view of religion owed fully as much to Plato and to Goethe as it did to Paul or Augustine. He looked forward, I think, to the time, and was seeking to prepare the way for it, when religion would rest upon a thoroughly rational basis, and would be seen to be the natural crown of human thought, feeling, and action—when it would be recognised that all the deepest philosophy is theological, all the highest morality religious, and all the finest art a kind of ritual.

His attitude towards social progress has also, I think, been in some respects misconceived. Some have recognised his

genuine zeal for political and social reform, but have tended to think of it as a thing apart from his general philosophical teaching, and have often expressed regret for such activities, as if an attitude of more aloofness from the practical problems of the time would have been more consonant with the calm of a philosopher and with the dignity of the head of an important College. On the other hand, he has also been, directly or indirectly, criticised as one not sufficiently zealous in the cause of reform; and it has even been suggested that his philosophical views, by representing this world as the best that is possible, tended to discourage the reforming spirit. In this last view at least it is pretty safe to say that there is a profound misunderstanding. Caird's view was certainly not that the world as it stands is the best possible, but rather the very different doctrine—surely in itself an inspiring faith—that it can and will be made so. Such a faith is not lightly held. An optimism like that of Caird (or like that of Browning) can only be won through struggle. The surface appearance of things does not support it. It may no doubt be used, as most faiths can, by those who do not really grasp its significance, as a means of stifling effort. But, in any real and intelligent sense, it can only be held by one who is doing his utmost to make it true. 'The unlit lamp and the unglint loin' are assuredly not the natural concomitants of such a creed. No man can really believe the universe to be the expression of a divine purpose unless he is himself, to the best of his capacity, expressing such a purpose throughout his life. In this sense the doctrine of modern psychologists is certainly true, that we can only believe what we act on. Such a view as that of Caird would be little more than a form of words to any one who was not an active fighter for what he saw to be best. In himself there was assuredly no such opposition between creed and conduct. His wisdom was indeed not of the kind that cries out in the streets; but he was always on the side of progress (as Green also was), and, wherever he saw that he could be of real service, his help was neither tardy nor weak. Hardly Mazzini himself was a more sincere friend of God and the people. And surely if such divine fire may fittingly show itself in man, it may be permitted to display itself even in the head of an Oxford College.

In this paper I have sought to fulfil my task as a defender of the philosophy of Caird, both in its theoretical and in its more practical aspects. Of course it needs no such support. *Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis.* His own writings are his best interpreters; and indeed one feels it to be almost a

desecration even to commend a master of such a type. For he had something of the impersonal and cosmic quality that we associate with the most perfect teachers. He seemed to speak as the representative of all the sages, rather than as a man with an individual message. Yet I would not have it thought that I wish to set him on any superhuman pedestal. He would have been the last to seek such an exaltation. He was well aware of his own limitations. One can hardly claim for him the supreme kind of originality. He was an interpreter rather than a creator. His philosophy was of course in its main features Hegelian. If he did not always very directly connect his teaching with that of Hegel, this was not in the main due to any sense of divergence, but rather to his desire not to raise fruitless controversies as to what Hegel's exact meaning was. In this he was probably wise. It may be more open to question whether the exposition of his philosophical ideas did not suffer somewhat from the very intimate way in which he connected them with the criticism of Kant. Adamson once remarked that he probably did not fully realise how big a hole he had made in the system of Kant. I think he did realise it; but some will always regret that he did not set himself rather more directly to the exposition of the views to which he had himself been led, instead of to the interpretation and criticism of others. He might then have dealt more specifically with some of the difficulties that are felt as still remaining in the view to which he leads us—such as those with respect to the reality of time, the nature of evil, the relation between the finite and the infinite, and similar problems. The great value of the work recently done by Mr. Bradley and others, in their more direct handling of such problems, was fully appreciated by him, even if he could not always agree either with their methods or with their conclusions. But it should be remembered that it was his main business to introduce what was almost a new way of thinking to English readers; and even his enemies allow that in this at least he was successful. Those who complain of the thinness of its results should bear in mind what a young and tender plant our British idealism still is. It may be trusted to thicken with its growth. It was inevitable that, in its first beginnings, it should be mainly occupied with problems that may be broadly described as logical or epistemological, rather than with the more concrete cosmological constructions. But there is good ground for believing that these also will in due time have their turn. Caird, who (like Kant) was one of the most modest of men, was well aware that much remained to be done. On a memorable

occasion, when he was presented with his portrait in the University of Glasgow by some of his friends and admirers, he quoted with reference to his own work the lines—

Wo immer müde Fechter  
 Sinken im muthigen Strauss,  
 Es kommen neue Geschlechter  
 Und kämpfen es ehrlich aus.

His pupils have no reason to be ashamed of his work ; but they will undoubtedly have some reason to be ashamed of their own if they do not advance to a more definite treatment of the difficulties that are left in it. In the meantime it may perhaps be pardoned at least to the loyalty of an old pupil, to regard him as the St. Peter of our idealistic movement. It is on that rock, I think, that we must build—I will not say 'the walls of Jericho,' but rather our new Jerusalem.

### III.—THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION AND THE DOCTRINE OF FORMAL CAUSE.

BY W. J. ROBERTS.

By the problem of induction I mean the problem of generalisation, the question, namely, of inference from a limited number of observed instances to all possible instances, or from facts to universal laws by which we suppose those facts to be determined. We may very conveniently also call our problem the problem of the passage from *is* to *must be*. "How," writes Prof. Case, "from some particulars of experience do we infer all universally? The answer to this question is still a *desideratum* of logic."<sup>1</sup> I could not unreservedly subscribe to the opinion that modern inquirers have thrown no light on this central problem; indeed, the main suggestions which I shall make have already been offered, from various points of view and with variations of emphasis, by Lachelier and Janet in France, and by Venn and Hobhouse in England. My opinion is, however, that a great part of what is offered in modern manuals and elsewhere as a treatment of induction is not only unsound in itself, but, what is more important for my present purpose, confusing and misleading with regard to what all will agree to be a fundamental problem, whether or not it is allowed to constitute the whole problem of induction.

Among the advantages commonly claimed for the modern, as against the Aristotelian or scholastic logic, we find two in particular, which writers on logic are apt to connect closely with each other. The first claim is, that modern philosophy has elaborated a clarified and intelligible notion of cause, for which it is indebted in the first instance to the epoch-making speculations of Hume and Kant; the second is, that only in modern times has the inductive process been duly recognised and rightly explained. The second advantage is often, more or less explicitly, asserted to be due to the first. My object in this paper is to seek to establish another view of the re-

<sup>1</sup> *Encyclopædia Britannica*, vol. xxx., Art. "Logic," p. 338.



lation of induction to causation; and to contend that the view which I advocate is implied in the Aristotelian doctrine of Formal Cause. The only kind of Causation, I shall maintain, that has any special relation to induction is that which, in my judgment, Aristotle sought to indicate by the name of Formal Causation. If this contention is justified it will follow that the speculations of Hume and Kant, according to which causation is to be resolved into invariable succession (Hume) or into invariable and necessary succession (Kant), and the still further refinements of their followers, have not advanced our comprehension of the problem of Induction.

This last contention is indeed capable of demonstration, independently of the establishment of an alternative theory. But the now traditional doctrines of causation hardly need anything in the way of negative criticism from myself. For, in the first place, the theory which I shall oppose to the prevalent one will constitute, so far as I am concerned, its most effective criticism; and, secondly, the "development" of the notions of Hume and Kant at the hands of their philosophic successors may be viewed as a kind of internal decay of those notions themselves. Many writers on induction, for example, who profess the utmost admiration for Kant and Hume, and who do them the honour of taking their epoch-making speculations as the starting-point of their own discussions of causation, so refine upon these theories as to make them avowedly useless for the explanation of induction, and in their illustrations of inductive reasonings wholly abandon the theories of their masters as well as their own. Mill, for example, at an early stage in his treatment of induction, throws overboard temporal succession as being unessential to the relation of cause and effect, forgetting that he is thus sacrificing the only means which we possess, according to his philosophy, of distinguishing a cause from its effect; further, in describing the inductions of the sciences, he uses freely the language of 'common sense,' with its implications of agency, efficiency, and the like. More recently, Mr. Joseph begins his account of causation with Hume and ends with abandoning temporal succession and reinstating interaction.<sup>1</sup> The doctrine of real efficiency or activity has been maintained against the current views by many thinkers, as, for example, by scholastic writers, and by Martineau, Lotze and Sigwart. Some, again, have contended that the doctrine of causation according to which events at a particular instant are unambiguously determined by previ-

<sup>1</sup> See *Introduction to Logic*, chap. xix., especially note 1 on p. 390.

ous or contemporaneous events, lacks metaphysical cogency,<sup>1</sup> and that it possesses only the virtues of a postulate, justified by the considerable success with which it has been applied to the motions of material bodies. Some are fain to abandon the notions of real power and efficiency, as far as concerns the distributions of motion in 'closed systems,' only to claim their validity the more emphatically for the spontaneous operations of the will. Others again contend that the sum of events at the preceding instant stand in no unique relation of causation to the events at a particular instant, but that, in strictness, every event is equally necessarily connected with every other event, past, present, and future: 'cause' and 'effect,' if we are to attain to a rigorous metaphysical doctrine of causation, must both alike be identified "with the systematic whole of reality".<sup>2</sup>

Philosophers have, however, in general been less emphatic in repudiating the utility for the purpose of induction of the current theories of Causation, than in criticising those notions themselves. But it must be obvious that rigorous epistemological or metaphysical doctrines, according to which particular events or the whole sum of events at a particular instant are unambiguously determined by the whole sum of preceding events, avail nothing for the explanation of the logical process according to which *particular events*, when it is events that are in question, are attached to *particular events or things* as their causes; and not less obvious is the uselessness for this purpose of the most rigorous doctrine of all, that every particular event or thing is determined by everything in the universe, past, present, future and eternal. This is fully recognised and argued with great skill and clearness by Prof. Taylor.<sup>3</sup> According to this writer, the metaphysical doctrine of Ground and Consequent, by which he means the rigid determination of every particular event or thing by the whole system of reality, is evidently true, but wholly useless for practical life or experimental science; while the principle of inductive reasoning with its assumptions of the plurality of causes, of the possibility of isolating particular events from the rest of the universe, is as obviously false as it is obviously indispensable for practice and for science. Again, what warrant have we for supposing that antecedents and consequents exactly similar are ever repeated? In strict theory, therefore, particular laws of nature

<sup>1</sup>This view is, of course, implied in some of Kant's doctrines.

<sup>2</sup>See A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 183, and the whole chapter.

<sup>3</sup>*Elements of Metaphysics*, book ii., chap. v.

cannot be established on the basis of a rigidly determined system of nature.<sup>1</sup> The law of universal causation, in short, as understood by the modern followers of Kant and Hume, does not enable or help us to perform a single act of inductive reasoning.

Returning to our main subject, we may notice that many of our inductive reasonings have no reference to *efficient causation*, whether we abide by the popular sense of that expression, or prefer the explanations of Hume and Kant. Mathematical theorems are often suggested, in the first instance, by a process which every one would call inductive. This was probably the case, for example, with the theorem of Pythagoras (*Euc.* i. 47).<sup>2</sup> Fermat's diverse propositions relating to prime numbers were all thus suggested. One of them ( $a^{p-1} - 1 = a$  multiple of  $p$ , when  $p$  is a prime number and  $a$  prime to  $p$ ) was subsequently confirmed by rigorous mathematical deduction; others, as was shown through their being overthrown by a contradictory instance, did not admit of such confirmation.<sup>3</sup> The reasoning implied must have been the following: "in the large number of instances which I have investigated, I have always found that this result holds good, and I have not met any instance which failed to yield this result; I therefore am justified in assuming that there must be some necessary relation between the expression in question and the predicate which I find attached to it in so many cases, though I cannot establish this relation by strict reasoning". This reasoning, as I shall explain below, possesses the only characteristic by which induction can reasonably be opposed to deduction. But these inductions were not inductions of efficient causation in any sense of that term. So likewise such inductions as result in the propositions "lightning is always (= must always be) followed by thunder," "all men are mortal," "all gold is yellow," contain no reference to efficient causation, in the popular, or in any refined philosophical sense of that name.

It should also be observed that, in ordinary discourse, 'cause' and 'effect' are not always used as correlatives, though the language of logicians often implies the contrary. *Cause* is a word of much wider range than *effect*. Popular usage may not be quite strict; but we may say, I think, that the word 'effect,' as etymological considerations would suggest, is properly used as the correlative of 'efficient cause'

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Venn, *Empirical Logic* (2nd ed.), pp. 97 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See Hobhouse, *Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 436-437 with footnote.

<sup>3</sup> Such were the theorems ' $2^{2^x} + 1 = a$  prime number,' and ' $x^2 + x + 41 = a$  prime number,'  $x$  being any real positive integer.

only. Thus certain properties of geometrical figures are regarded as depending upon other properties—the essential or fundamental properties—as their causes; but a property is not spoken of as an effect of the nature of the figure. A man's actions are often referred to his character as their cause, but it would be awkward, to say the least, to view his actions as effects of his character. The fortunes of the so-called Law of Sufficient Reason bear witness to my contention; for while philosophers speak of a Law of Ground and Consequence, the popular correlative of Consequence is not *Ground* but *Cause*. Lastly, purposes or 'Ends' are without any sense of paradox spoken of as causes of events or arrangements, though it would seem violently paradoxical to speak of these events or arrangements as effects of the purposes. Indeed, Aristotle's doctrine of Final Cause is generally recognised to be in harmony with a very common and, as some would contend, with the most tenable philosophic use of the term Cause.

For all this, men will probably be reluctant to abandon the notion that induction, as such, has to do with causation; and I hope to show that this reluctance is justified by a still prevalent use of the term cause, and that this is the use which Aristotle had in view when he taught that in one sense of the word the Form or the Universal is a cause. Now while the practice of common men and of many philosophers is recognised as not having seriously diverged from the usage to which the Aristotelian doctrines of Final and Efficient Causation bear witness, it is supposed to be otherwise with his doctrines of Formal and Material Causation. The meagre and technical explanations of Formal Cause, in particular, found in modern manuals of scholastic metaphysics<sup>1</sup> are not likely to inspire interest in the doctrine or confidence in its possibilities. To regard this particular Aristotelian doctrine as an esoteric idiosyncrasy of the master's metaphysics would not be in harmony with what we know of the tendency of his philosophy to keep in close touch with popular and scientific habits of thought. I would suggest that this doctrine of Formal Cause, in spite of its peculiar technical vesture of phrase, is an intelligible account of a kind of explanation, of a possible answer to the question 'why?'—which answer is as prevalent in our day as it was in the time of Aristotle.

The doctrine of Formal Cause is in truth only another expression for the fact that generalisation, or the assigning

<sup>1</sup> E.g. Rickaby, *General Metaphysics*, pp. 300-302.

of phenomena to classes or kinds, is a kind of explanation. Let us take Aristotle's instance of the marble statue. We might ask, 'Why is that piece of marble a statue?' and we might receive the answer that it is a statue because it possesses the universal or specific characteristics of a statue. It is these characteristics which, in their way, account for its being what it is, as opposed to a mere block of marble. Again, the form or universal determines, not efficiently, but after the manner of a law or type, the details of the particular. The block of marble has this or that feature of the human shape because it is a statue and it is the nature of a statue to represent the detailed shape of human beings. The fact that in some cases other kinds of explanation, such as the assignment of efficient or final causes, are available does not destroy the utility of explanation by type or law.

That generalisation is at the same time explanation is argued explicitly and with much detail by Dr. Venn, from whom I will quote the following passage:—<sup>1</sup>

"'Why is it difficult to walk on ice?'—the spontaneous answer of the schoolroom or drawing-room will be, 'Because ice is slippery'. This is an explanation, though not the best we can obtain. The answer removes the experience in question from the awkward and dangerous category of isolated facts. The ice is thereby classed with muddy pavements, polished floors, smooth marble steps, and so forth. A slight advance has been made towards the great aim of all rational treatment of nature, by classing a number of different things according to their resemblances and relegating the new fact to its appropriate class."

Venn points out, moreover, that all explanation, however detailed, only goes a certain way, and that it issues finally in what we may call explanation by generalisation. A complex phenomenon may perhaps be explained solely by the law of gravitation; but the law of gravitation itself is only a generalisation of very wide range, not otherwise differing from the proposition 'Opium has a soporific property'.

"The action of the village pump is a case in point. The village workman is not so perplexed by it as to ask why it acts, though some of his early predecessors must pretty certainly have put such a question. It always does bring up the water, and that is (quite justly) enough for his purpose; the utmost length he is likely to go is to help himself out by a word, as we are all apt to do, and to account for the water rising by the fact that 'it is sucked up'; even this, it is evi-

<sup>1</sup> Venn, *Empirical Logic* (2nd ed.), p. 499.

dent, involving a certain amount of generalisation. The scientific man, starting with this explanation or law, explains it by analysing it into its component elements. He shows that the pressure upwards on the column of water in the tube is assigned by the weight of the whole column of air of the same diameter as the tube, and the pressure downwards is assigned by the weight of water in the tube. . . . So far as this explanation goes,—and like all explanation it only professes to go a certain way,—it completely answers our purpose. It analyses the already generalised phenomenon into its component elements.”<sup>1</sup>

We therefore come finally, in the process of explanation, to generalisations or laws not themselves explicable, which constitute at a given state of our knowledge our ultimate explanations of less general laws and of particular facts.

The essence of induction or generalisation consists in the fact that in inductive reasoning the universal proposition depends, as on its *causa cognoscendi*, on the particulars, while the particulars depend upon the universal as their *causa essendi*. Our discussion will, I hope, help us to understand how this can be so, and thus to resolve the difficulties which have given rise to so much controversy as, for example, between Mill on the one hand and Whewell on the other. Mill, like ourselves, supposed that the essential element in induction was generalisation or inference from some to all; Whewell in many parts of his writings ignores generalisation wholly, and speaks as if induction consisted merely in finding more general principles from which the particulars could be deduced. Mill is surely right when he contends that the universal proposition is the conclusion of the inductive inference; and inductive inferences must be recognised as a special source of universal propositions because in them the conclusion is not forced upon us through its being implied in known universal propositions, from which it can be deductively inferred, but by an implicit or explicit conviction that the particular instances would not exhibit certain characteristics, such as unfailing regularity, unless they were determined by some special law, which accordingly we express as our conclusion. Thus it comes that we consider the universal conclusion to be inferred from the particulars; for it is the peculiar character of the particulars which leads us to explain them not as ‘accidental’ combinations but as determined by a special law which requires this collocation and admits of no other.

Among the peculiar features, which serve to elicit this belief

<sup>1</sup> Venn, *op. cit.*, pp. 508-509.

in special universal laws, regularity or invariability seems to be one of the most important. In regard to this point, I consider Mill to be more nearly right than many modern logicians, who, eager to destroy every distinction between deduction and induction, assign to repetition only the subordinate function of facilitating "analysis". That this last is not the only service which repetition performs for us will be evident from the following considerations. We are in fact often prepared to concede that one instance of a particular combination might be due to 'accident'; but we find it more and more difficult to allow this as the number of instances increases. Let us suppose a person not to know that a charge of murder cannot legally be tried by a court of quarter sessions, and suppose him to observe that, at a particular sitting of such a court, no case of murder is investigated. He would probably not feel himself warranted to infer that this court has no power to try such cases. But if he examines the records of one quarter sessions after another, and finds that murder cases are absent from them all, he will now feel himself justified in passing from *is* to *must* and inferring that, in all probability, cases of murder *cannot* be tried at quarter sessions: if they could, he will say, it is very strange that my investigations have not brought to my notice a single instance of such an event.

Such reasonings are of course not rigorous deductions from absolutely certain premisses. If indeed induction proceeded on principles which could be exhibited as self-evident, as some thinkers consider the dependence of every event upon an irrefragable cosmic order to be, then our inductive conclusions would also be absolutely certain. But it is notorious that even our best-established inductive conclusions lack complete metaphysical certitude. Such reasonings do, however, in varying degrees possess the evidence of probability. And this kind of evidence is also enjoyed by the principle involved in such inductive generalisations as I have described. A second illustration may perhaps make this point still clearer.

Let us take the case of the properties of a chemical element, say gold. We may fairly assume that no one possesses complete insight into the mutual dependence of these properties on one another. We cannot understand and explain why there should not be a substance otherwise resembling gold, but differing from it solely in colour; whereas in the case of certain mathematical theorems which we have proved, we do possess this insight. Our conviction that 'All gold is yellow' (i.e. 'gold must necessarily be yellow') is based



upon induction and not upon demonstration from known truths or upon insight into the inherent incompatibility of the remaining qualities of gold with a quality other than yellow. But we consider the contradiction which experience supplies to the supposition of gold which is not yellow to be practically almost as strong as insight into its impossibility. The constant concurrence of the yellow colour with the other qualities of gold suggests to us so strongly that the colour and the other qualities are connected with each other by some necessary bond, that we feel ourselves absolved even from considering the possibility of a different combination; and this though we do not pretend to understand the nature of the necessary connexion concerned. The observed concurrence and the absence of any contradictory instance suggests to us, in fact, that the combination of the other qualities of gold with a different colour is not even possible.

A strong conviction of necessity seems, however, to be elicited by circumstances of observed instances, other than regular concurrence. Such a circumstance appears to be the instantaneous or speedy concomitance or succession of two or more extraordinary changes. I am disposed to think that a person noticing for the first time an instance of lightning followed by thunder would find it very difficult if not impossible to entertain the suggestion of mere coincidence. He would reject this suggestion, assuredly not from a cosmical conviction of the general interdependence of things, but from an explicit or implicit conviction that two such extraordinary events, so closely connected with each other in experience, could not fail to be related in some special 'causal' way with each other.

The mention of coincidence will recall to the mind the Aristotelian *συμβεβηκός*, which, as is known, is opposed by Aristotle to that which is universal or specific. It does not necessarily imply any belief in the possibility of chance or caprice in the universe; it recognises only that we do in fact distinguish coincidences from things which we know or suppose to stand in some universal relation to each other. Two things are held merely to coincide with each other when we know of no law which enables us, directly or indirectly, to attach those things to each other universally, or when their concurrence is not, by reason of frequency or some other circumstance, such as to suggest any such universal relation. Let A and B be two facts which in a given instance stand in a certain relation of concomitance or sequence: even though we may be convinced that both A and B are in that instance necessarily in that relation, and

even that the cosmic order would not in that instance have admitted any other combination, we should still regard the combination as accidental, unless we could prove or find grounds for presuming some universally necessary relation between A and B. If, on the basis of the regularity or of some other feature of the conjunction, we do presume such a relation, we thereby reason inductively.

It is not always sufficiently recognised that our intellectual operations proceed in great part instinctively, without advertence to the rational and intelligible principles involved in them. We reason deductively without advertence to the rules of the syllogism, or even to the fact that we are reasoning at all. In like manner we reason inductively without consciously using any such principle as the Law of Causation, the Uniformity of Nature, or the determination of particular instances by universal laws. We may even go farther and say that results equivalent to the results of reasoning processes come into being without conscious reasoning, but through the harmonious operation of our organisation, bodily and mental. The early stages of conscious life can be understood only on this hypothesis; but these processes also characterise much of our mature mental life.

This consideration will enable us to understand why Aristotle gives the name induction in several passages of his works to what is not a consciously performed intellectual act, but is nothing other than the extraction of the universal or the species from the data of sense and imagination.<sup>1</sup> Remembering that the form or universal is a cause, we may say that the rational principle in accordance with which this process takes place is the principle that the particulars are determined by the universal or species; but there is no advertence to this principle in the process nor even any conscious intellectual operation. It is in this sense of the word that the first principles of all the sciences, including the mathematical, are said by Aristotle to be ascertained by induction.<sup>2</sup>

We shall find the same principle implied though not explicitly formulated in the only formal reasoning process to which Aristotle gives the name induction. This is the

<sup>1</sup> See, for an account of Aristotle's use of the word induction, Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic*, chap. xviii. I am much indebted, in respect of this and the following paragraphs, to Mr. Joseph's erudite and lucid discussion.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. e.g. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* (*Eud.*), vi., 2, §3, ἡ μὲν δὲ ἐπαγωγή ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου· εἰσιν ἅρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐπαγωγή ἔσται.

reasoning known in modern times as Perfect Induction, which friends and foes of the Aristotelian tradition have succeeded in making so ridiculous. Jevons is indeed fain to concede that though there may be no genuine reasoning process involved in passing from 'January, February, March, etc., have less than thirty-two days' to 'All the months have less than thirty-two days,' the second is a very convenient summing up of the information contained in the first. Students of logic are indebted to Mr. Joseph for his vindication of this mode of reasoning.<sup>1</sup> As explained by Aristotle, who, however, made the mistake of trying to represent it as a syllogism, and still more clearly as illustrated by Mr. Joseph from mathematics, the process not only deserves to be recognised as reasoning but has strong claims to be called inductive. Aristotle's particulars, in fact, are not individuals but species, and the reasoning consists in attaching to the genus a property found in all its species: thus, to take Aristotle's own example—

The animals man, horse, mule, etc., are long-lived:

The animals man, horse, mule, etc., are (all the) gall-less animals:

Therefore all gall-less animals are long-lived.

It is clearly a step forward to attach a property to a genus, which might formerly only have been noticed to belong to this or that species of the genus. The result of the reasoning is to establish a presumption that longevity is causally or necessarily connected with the absence of gall.<sup>2</sup> It is easy to see that this mode of proof is, in an essential feature, very closely related to inductive reasoning from some instances or imperfect induction as above explained. For the property (longevity) is attached to the genus (gall-less animals), not because it is directly seen or understood necessarily to belong to it, nor because it is seen to be implied in the other properties of gall-less animals, but because some necessary connexion is suggested by the fact that all the species exhibit this property. The force of the reasoning can be represented by throwing it into the form of a question: 'if the absence of gall is not causally connected with longevity, how comes it that no species of gall-less animal can be found which is not long-lived?'

Of course the argument is not stringent and the conclusion is only probable: it is, for one thing, not secure, any

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 351-354; see also p. 503.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Joseph, *op. cit.*, p. 352, "in Aristotle's own example where longevity is proved of gall-less animals by means of man, horse, mule . . . it is supposed that the absence of gall is the cause of longevity".

more than other inductive generalisations, against the suggestion of 'plurality of causes'. But in mathematics we may sometimes be sure that the species enumerated are not the only known species of the genus, but that they are its only possible species. "A proposition may be proved independently of a right-angled, an obtuse-angled, and an acute-angled triangle, and therefore enunciated of the triangle universally; or of the hyperbola, the parabola, and the ellipse, and therefore enunciated of all conic sections. . . . The peculiar nature of our subject-matter in mathematics enables us to see in each case that no other alternatives are possible within the genus than those which we have considered; and therefore we can be sure that our induction is 'perfect'. The nature of our subject-matter further assures us that it can be by no accident that every species of the genus exhibits the same property; and therefore our conclusion is a genuinely universal judgment about the genus, and not a mere enumerative judgment about its species. We are sure that a general ground exists, although we have not found the proof by it . . ." (Joseph).

The last sentence quoted expresses our justification for regarding this mode of reasoning as inductive: theoretically, in spite of the stringency of this conclusion, the reasoning is inferior to a deduction which would show directly that the property belongs to the triangle or the conic section as such.

What modern students of logic are most likely to miss in Aristotle are, first, a discussion of the validity of generalisation from the individual instance to the species or law, and, second, a number of criteria for testing generalisations or inductions, such as Mill supplies, for example, in his methods of experimental inquiry.

As to the first point, I have endeavoured to show in this paper what Aristotle's answer would or ought to have been had he addressed himself to the discussion of this problem. What he had to say on the second head is in part preserved in the *Topics*, in which he discusses among other matters some tests of valid generalisation.<sup>1</sup> The *Topics* deals with Dialectic or with the principles of debate, the parties to which do not claim or require detailed scientific knowledge. The educated man may aspire to criticise the first principles or the arguments of the scientist without detailed knowledge of the scientist's special subject-matter. Certain principles "hold good in any science". "A man therefore whose

<sup>1</sup> See Joseph, *op. cit.*, pp. 358-363.

mind is stocked with principles of this kind has points of vantage, as it were, from which he may proceed to attack or defend any definition, any predication of a property; they are topics in common, 'common-places,' points of view whence you may approach to the consideration of the statements of any science. Just as a man who knows nothing of the truth of its premisses may be able to detect a flaw in a syllogism, so the dialectician, without a scientific knowledge of a subject, may know what sort of questions to ask if he wishes to test a scientific man's right to affirm the principles he enunciates."<sup>1</sup>

Inductive reasoning in the modern sense of the word provides abundant scope for dialectical principles. One of these would be, for example, the so-called 'plurality of causes'. A scientist may have satisfied himself, by the 'method of difference,' that a certain effect ( $x$ ) was in the experiments performed by himself produced through the introduction of a certain agent (A). The dialectician might remind him that though his experiments may prove that A is capable of producing  $x$ , they do not prove that this power is possessed by A alone. Again, in so far as Mill's experimental methods are 'methods of elimination' they may be used for the purposes of the purely critical and negative dialectics of the layman. Deriving his facts from his opponent's books, for example, he might argue, "B and C cannot be the causes of  $x$ , because they are present when  $x$  is absent, as well as when  $x$  is present" (Method of Difference); or "B and C cannot be the causes of  $x$ , because they are absent when  $x$  is present, as well as present in certain cases of  $x$ " (Method of Agreement). It may be remarked that Aristotle notices the principle of concomitant variations as a topic or common-place applicable to the question whether a property belongs or does not belong to a subject. Moreover, he applies it not only negatively but positively: not only does the absence of concomitant variation justify us in refusing to attach a predicate to a subject as its property, but the presence of such variation is a positive ground for the generalisation.<sup>2</sup> As I have already indicated, I do not consider the methods of Mill to be *mere* methods of eliminating suggested causal connexions; for I have recognised repetition,

<sup>1</sup> Joseph, *op. cit.*, pp. 361-362.

<sup>2</sup> See Joseph, p. 362, for the *τόπος ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον*. "That is not a property of a subject which does not increase or decrease with an increase or decrease in the subject, and conversely, if you find two things increasing and decreasing together, you may assert such connexion between them."

for example, as one of the circumstances which reasonably and as a matter of fact elicit generalisation. But, in so far as they are employed for purposes of criticism only, and not for the advancement of positive knowledge, they belong to the dialectical side of logic, and might as such have reasonably found a place in the *Topics* of Aristotle.

The *Topics*, however, do not supply an adequate logic of induction; and it would be idle to seek to deny the furtherance which the comprehension of the actual methods of science has received from the investigations of Bacon and his followers. The advance of positive knowledge in modern times has greatly enhanced the possibilities and responsibilities of logic and philosophy. For all this, the mastery possessed by Aristotle over a small extent of knowledge may well have enabled him to penetrate more surely than later thinkers to the logical principles involved in the sciences which he knew. He was in less danger than the modern philosopher of failing to see the wood for the trees. And I have contended throughout this paper that, in spite of the recognised inadequacy of his treatment of induction, Aristotle was able to keep himself in close contact with the essential nature of the inductive process; and I hope to have shown that his meagre statements on this subject, together with his metaphysical doctrine that *the form or, as we should say, the law is a cause*, enable us to reconstruct from his writings a theory of inductive inference which is fitted to make the process appear intelligible and reasonable.

Something will have been gained, moreover, if I have succeeded in doing something towards vindicating the true meaning of the despised doctrine of Formal Cause, and thus in tracing another and little recognised point of affinity between the thought of Aristotle and that of our own age.

#### IV.—THE ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE IDEA THEORY (I).

BY R. M. MACIVER.

THE Idea theory of Plato when it has not been reduced to a mere logical doctrine faultily expressed has generally been regarded as the strange aberration of a mind dominated by abstract notions. The value and the meaning of the theory has been greatly obscured in consequence. We generally approach the theory from the logical side, and forget that Plato was from first to last, from the *Laches* to the *Laws*, primarily an ethical thinker. To ethical thought a fact finds its explanation not in its relation to a system of efficient causes but in its relation to a culminating purpose. Plato's thought is fundamentally teleological: and if we approach it from the ethical point of view most of the difficulties vanish which are thought to beset it, and in particular the Idea theory reveals itself as the first really masterly attempt to solve the ultimate problem of philosophy. In this and a succeeding paper I shall attempt to show how a perception of the fundamentally ethical quality of Plato's thought explains the rise, the development, and the modification of his Idea theory.

Everyone must grant that a teleological explanation, when and if possible, is the fullest and ultimate explanation. The only causes we can really be said to know are the final causes of our own conscious activity. As soon as we pass from final to efficient causes our difficulties begin, for we have to ask—and cannot answer—how the final cause is itself the efficient cause of the first member in the chain of efficient causes to which it is prior. Because we thus fail to relate the two principles we can never outside the experience of our own activity deduce the presence of the final from the presence of the efficient cause. No "argument from design" can ever be more than probable, because design itself can never be demonstrated. Hence science whose nature it is to seek certitude will have nothing to do with teleology. It is right for science to reject it, but not to deny the ultimate value of such an explanation were it possible. Where it is possible,



*i.e.* in the experience of our own activity, it is at once manifestly the fullest explanation. In fact science to secure her partial explanation has to forego forever the full understanding of what she seeks to explain. A fact, and more particularly a process, is only truly known when its relation to a purpose is known, and even a denial of purpose, which equally with its affirmation is beyond science, becomes a form of explanation inasmuch as it is an answer to this necessary question.

It is just the necessary questions beyond the scope of science that philosophy considers, and certainly Plato believed that for knowledge the teleological explanation is ultimate. It is quite mistaken to regard him as a philosopher to whom the ethical is a secondary consideration, to whom "ethics, politics, logic, physics are so many forms of applied metaphysics".<sup>1</sup> On the contrary, the metaphysical theories of his predecessors and the logical concepts he himself helped to develop are rather his instruments or means for the solution of the problem of speculative ethics, poor enough instruments at first for so gifted a mind, but becoming finer and finer in his hands, themselves gradually shaped in the progress of the work they are meant to accomplish.<sup>2</sup> Consider *e.g.* how in the *Meno* the important logical distinction of knowledge and opinion arises out of the ethical question, and is introduced in order to solve it. There seems no reason to regard the ethical starting-point in this and so many other dialogues as merely a literary introduction. If we take it for what it purports to be many difficulties are avoided.

One further presupposition must be made. It is no longer possible to deny a development in Platonic theory from period to period, and therefore to understand it we must presume a certain order of the dialogues. The following chronological facts, which seem sufficiently established, will be here assumed,—(1) that the small "Socratic" dialogues are earliest; (2) that the *Symposium* is earlier than the *Phædo* and that both are earlier than the *Republic*; (3) that the "dialectical" dialogues, *Thætetus*, *Parmenides*, *Philebus*, *Sophist*, are later than the *Republic*; (4) that the *Timæus* and *Laws* fall in the last period.

Two seemingly inconsistent tendencies are characteristic of deeply ethical natures. (1) They insist on a certain direc-

<sup>1</sup> R. D. Archer-Hind's *Introduction to the Phædo*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Philebus*, 23 C, where in a dialogue that is essentially one of reconstruction Plato talks of "requiring weapons of another make from those he has used before, tho' some of the old ones will do".

tion of one's being, toward the good and away from the evil that is in the world, an insistence on the goodness of the good which derives half its strength of appeal from the implied acknowledgment that evil too is a real thing. (2) Yet they tend ultimately to deny the very existence of evil, and to make the good not only the supreme *ought* but also the absolute *is*. Such a type of mind will at the end of an essentially teleological system come to deny teleology altogether. For purpose, the differentia of the ethical idea, in the necessity for its realisation implies a present imperfection, and, more than imperfection, it implies duality. In religion similarly it would almost seem as if a man can hardly be in earnest about God unless he believe also in the devil. So the ethical system moving, as all systems strive to do, towards monism moves towards self-destruction.

Plato began by making the good *one*, this is the work of the early dialogues,—and then he made it *all*. As a disciple of Socrates he followed the method of concepts, but as a fundamentally ethical thinker he transformed—where too he may simply have followed Socrates—a logical into an ethical ideal. In doing so he took into account only one side of that logical doctrine. It was a method of saving reality in a world where else it would seem that “all things leak like a pot” (*Crat.*, 440 C), and its importance to Plato was that it saved those things which mattered. Plato's first thought was to save the reality of the good, and for the present he was heedless that his method of concepts must preserve equally that of evil also. The ethical claim is primarily for the security of the good: while it must admit the present existence of evil, it denies its right to existence and postulates the possibility of its final annihilation. But the good must be eternal. “The good,” said Epicharmus, “is a thing-in-itself.”<sup>1</sup>

Plato therefore asked: “Tell me whether there is or is not any absolute beauty or good, or any other absolute existence?” (*Crat.*, 439 C). In putting the question in this form Plato is not thinking merely of the reality and stability assured by a system of concepts. The ethical universal is clearly to him something more than any other. It has an attractiveness for and a claim<sup>2</sup> on the knower of it, making the relation

<sup>1</sup> τὸ γὰρ  
ἀγαθὸν τι πρᾶγμα εἶμεν καθ' αὐτὸ: ὅστις δὲ κα  
εἶδῃ μᾶλλον τὴν, ἀγαθὸς ἦδη γίγνεται.

<sup>2</sup> The Greeks, more loyal to life than we, preferred to see in the good the attractive rather than the imperative, but both aspects of the ethical idea, its attractiveness and its bindingness, the good as eternal law and the good as eternal source of satisfaction, presuppose this quality of, so to speak, *felt* independence.

between knower and known seem almost reciprocal, implying that they are indeed objects of knowledge, permanent realities answering to the permanence of mind, as distinct from the ever-changing and therefore unknowable objects of sense.

This is the starting-point of the Idea theory of the *Symposium*. Here the good appears under its form of beauty, under the form *i.e.* which reveals most clearly its quality of attractiveness, and to it there answers love, the generic name for all attraction. "There is nothing men love except the good, is there?" "No, certainly," I should say, "there is nothing." "Then," she said, "it is the simple truth that men love the good" (*Sym.*, 206 A). The important fact is that the good is loved for itself. We desire some things because they fall inside other purposes or schemes—they are rendered attractive because they fit in, a new item of knowledge, for example, that gives completeness to knowledge already possessed—but in contradistinction to these the beautiful or good has an immediate, even abrupt, attraction which gives it a sense of greater objectivity, and it is just this quality which made the Idea theory psychologically possible. No concepts can be simply "creations" of the mind, but ethical concepts least of all.

Once this foothold in reality has been found, logic comes to the aid of the ethical claim. There are logical grounds for regarding these concepts of beauty and goodness as fundamental. It might be said:—

(1) Other universals only cover a part of the nature of that thing to which they are applied. What is white is much else besides that bears no relation to whiteness. But 'beautiful' and 'good' (taking 'beauty' (*κάλλος*) in that extended meaning it has in the *Symposium*, as applying to the internal as well as the external nature, so that we can speak of the beauty of holiness or of goodness itself) are concepts which determine the whole nature. So far as they do not it is because there is contradiction in that nature, *i.e.* because it has in it that opposite which is the only limitation of the good. An object may hold not-white attributes without any diminution of its whiteness, but can it hold not-good attributes without having its goodness thereby limited or modified? Just as beauty in its ordinary acceptation comprehends all the external character of an object, so the beauty that is called goodness, if the term is applicable to anything without limitation, must comprehend its whole nature.

And we can go further. Suppose we take any beautiful material thing, a statue or a picture, it might be held that a single particular of that thing, a single feature of the statue,

a ray of light and shade in the picture, is potentially determinant of the whole, so far as that whole is adequate to the conception of beauty. (True, we cannot deduce the whole from the part, but then we have always in these matters to accept approximation and we recognise that our idea of beauty is imperfect no less than the object; as the artistic sense grows, more and more determinations would be ruled out as incongruous, thus suggesting the possibility of one unique perfection.) Given a starting-point of sense, the single conception of beauty may determine what the unity of the whole should be, so that any beautiful object, in so far as that unity is realised in it, is simply a particular embodiment of the one beauty. Its beauty is individual, true, but this individuality can be regarded as simply the limit set on the universal beauty when it is forced to submit to empiric laws, it may be the necessary particular way in which beauty appears under certain conditions of sense. And just as the beauty in all parts of any object is one, so is the beauty of all objects one.

This conception underlies the account in the *Symposium* of the soul's progress towards Beauty, as it moves up from particulars to the Idea. It is really a progress in knowledge, in the knowing of what we are all the time seeking. We desire the thing, the phenomenon, because it is an embodiment of beauty; if we only knew, therefore, it is the beauty manifested through it, the Idea of beauty, that we really desire. We seek without knowledge, not knowing even what it is we seek. This knowledge is the revelation of the Idea, and the nature therein revealed is "beauty absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, without diminution and without increase, or any change, in which participate the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things".<sup>1</sup> Such a nature is not "in the likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge, or existing in any other being, as for example, in an animal, or in heaven or in earth or in any other place". This assertion of the *ὑπερουσίτης* (to use a scholastic expression) of the good is very important. The essential, primary, Idea is to Plato *ὑπερούσιον*, above substance, the maker of realities, the disposer of substance. This is no mere hyperbole. Plato's Idea in the *Symposium* is beyond what we mean by substance, and the difficulties of the Idea theory only begin when Ideas cease to be *ὑπερούσια*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Here for the sake of accuracy I modify Jowett's translation, which I use for the various quotations from Plato.

<sup>2</sup> Lutoslawski and Shorey maintain that the superiority of the good to substance, i.e. material substance, cannot be taken literally, whereas in

(2) We know things partly under concepts which cover—or mean—part of their nature, wholly under those which cover the whole. In fact we can only be said to know a thing in so far as it is comprehended under one concept. But the good appears as the all-comprehensive concept, and therefore the knowledge of the good is the completest knowledge of reality.

In the *Phædo* this point of view has considerably developed. The question raised by Socrates, "Must not true existence be revealed to the soul in thought, if at all?" (*Phædo*, 65 C) is immediately particularised in the form, "Is there or is there not an absolute justice . . . and an absolute beauty and absolute good?" This identification of the good with the true was to carry Plato very far. The ethical motive which at first merely guided in the *direction* of the good, other ways being possible for the soul, now leads step by step to the denial of any reality but that object of study.

At the close of the *Symposium* two ways of development remained open. (1) Plato might have retained the one all-comprehensive Idea. Just as he had found the unity of the virtues in knowledge, so he might have found the unity of knowledge in the good. He might have limited the doctrine to the single Idea of the good, including thereunder whatever can be regarded as giving an absolute value to things, their beauty or desirableness. (2) He might extend the doctrine to include other Ideas than that of the good. Such an extension would weaken the original teleological character of the system, but on the other hand the logical argument for the Idea of good, the argument from universals, held equally for other Ideas. One further type of concepts in particular fascinated Plato, those of mathematical science. Not only did these illustrate excellently the higher perfection of thought-object over sense-object (as Plato had already shown in the *Meno*), a doctrine essential to the Idea theory, but there was also a very important precedent in the number philosophy of the Pythagoreans.

Plato therefore was led to extend the sphere of Ideas, and in the *Phædo* another class of Ideas besides the ethical, *viz.*, the mathematical, make their appearance. It is true that the Ideas of beauty and goodness are still those most insisted

fact this superiority is not only quite intelligible but is necessary for the Platonic scheme; the concept of good is prior to every other, including that of substance;—logically substance is prior to attribute, but ethically the comprehensive attribute of good is prior to substance. (We must remember also that Ideas of attributes are no less self-existent than Ideas of substances.) The great source of confusion in the Idea theory is that it does not distinguish logical from ethical presuppositions.

upon; when the question is one as to the nature of reality they remain in the foreground (*cf.* 77 A: "For there is nothing which to my mind is so patent as that beauty, goodness, and the other notions of which you were just now speaking, have a most real and absolute existence"), but those other Ideas begin to claim a place in reality also (*cf.* 78 D), though the difficulties they bring with them have not yet appeared. The Idea of the good is still the principle of explanation, and thus though no longer alone is exalted above all other Ideas.

This is clearly expressed in the famous autobiographical passage of the *Phædo* (97 C *sqq.*), a passage of very great importance for the interpretation of Plato. Unfortunately, this passage itself requires interpretation, more than one view of its meaning being possible. The interpretations generally offered seem to me either logically inconsistent or linguistically unsound, and this must be my excuse for dwelling on this section at some length.

Socrates has been relating his ineffectual attempts to master natural science, the problems of physics and physiology. He declares the subject fascinated and yet bewildered him. All this talk of hot and cold principles controlling growth and decay drove out of his head other and self-evident facts, *e.g.* that growth is in man the result of certain (consciously performed) actions, *viz.* eating and drinking. His bewilderment led him to conclude that he had no natural capacity for this study, and indeed leaving natural science out of the question he found in the most ordinary facts of perception much to perplex him.

"Then I heard some one reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, that mind was the disposer and cause of all, and I was delighted at this notion, which appeared quite admirable, and I said to myself: If mind is the disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular in the best place; and I argued that if any one desired to find out the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of anything, he must find out what state of being or doing or suffering was best for that thing, and therefore a man had only to consider the best for himself and others, and then he would also know the worse, since the same science comprehended both. And I rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of existence such as I desired, and I imagined that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or round; and whichever was true, he would proceed to explain the cause and the necessity of this being so, and then he would teach me the nature of the best, and show that this was best; and if he said that the earth was in the

centre, he would further explain that this position was for the best, and I should be satisfied with the explanation given, and not want any other sort of cause" (97 C-E).

Of this hope he was sadly disappointed on examining the system of Anaxagoras. That philosopher forsook mind altogether, and instead of explaining the reason that is in things if mind has ordered and disposed them, he had "recourse to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities". Anaxagoras like the rest failed to distinguish cause (*τὸ αἷτιον τῷ ὄντι*) from condition (*ἐκεῖνο ἀνευ οὗ τὸ αἷτιον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη αἷτιον*). "And thus one man makes a vortex all round, and steadies the earth by the heaven; another gives the air as a support to the earth, which is a sort of broad trough. Any power which in arranging them as they are arranges them for the best never enters into their minds; and instead of finding any superior strength in it, they rather expect to discover another Atlas of the world who is stronger and more everlasting and more containing than the good; of the obligatory and containing power of the good they think nothing; and yet this is the principle which I would fain learn if any one would teach me" (99 B).

Socrates himself has also failed in this pursuit, and has had to follow a second-best method (*τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν*). This is explained in the following passage: *ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι, μὴ πάθοιμι, ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοποῦμενοι· διαφθείρονται γάρ πον ἔνιοι τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ἢ τινι τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ διανοήθην, καὶ ἔδεια, μὴ παντάπασιν τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθεῖν βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. ἔδοξε δὴ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάσω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐ γάρ πᾶν συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοποῦμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις· ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ταύτη γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον, ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἔρρωμένεστατον εἶναι, ᾧ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν, τίτημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων τῶν ὄντων, ᾧ δ' ἂν μὴ, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. He goes on to explain that the method is the familiar way of Ideas, postulating the existence of an essential beauty and goodness and greatness and so on (*ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*). These are the only causes he pretends to understand. "I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other of those wise causes which are alleged; and if a person says to me that the bloom of colour, or form, or any such thing is*



a source of beauty, I leave all that, which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly, and perhaps foolishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing makes a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in whatever way or manner obtained; for as to the manner I am uncertain, but I stoutly contend that by beauty all beautiful things become beautiful" (100 D).

Of this very interesting account the following interpretations have been offered:—

(1) The knowledge Socrates abandons as too hard for him is the knowledge of natural science, the investigation of physical causes, from looking at which Socrates turned to study the "inner world of thought," making thought a sort of mirror of reality.

But it is totally unlike Plato to give the objects of physical science any reality at all, much more to make them superior in reality to the objects apprehended by thought (concepts as distinguished from percepts), to *λόγοι*. Would Plato for a moment have regarded the knowledge of final causes (revealed by the method of Ideas) as "second-best"? Would he have thought the modifying clause (*οὐ γὰρ πάντῃ συγχωρῶ, κ.τ.λ.*) a sufficient criticism of a view that was a denial of his whole philosophy? Besides, Socrates has been explaining that the principle he has failed to attain to was the principle of the sustaining power of the good (99 C), and that both the first and the second methods lead to the knowledge of this the final cause (*τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν*). But natural science with its "airs and ethers and waters," reckons nothing of final causes.

These objections have led to another interpretation which has at least the merit of not attributing to Plato a doctrine subversive of all his principles.

(2) The method Socrates abandons as beyond his reach is the direct study of the eternal Ideas. He is driven to investigate the ultimate reality not in itself but in thought-images, in universals or concepts "which shall represent the Ideas to him".

This view has the support of Mr. Archer-Hind and Prof. H. Jackson, the former of whom argues as follows—"The passage, as I read it, has the following significance. I attempted, says Socrates, to discover *τὸ ἀγαθόν* as the ultimate cause working in nature. But when, after long endeavour, I failed in the struggle, I began to fear that by fixing my gaze too intently on realities I might be blinded in soul, as men are bereft of their bodily vision by gazing on the sun. So I bethought me of framing in my own mind

images or concepts of those realities which I desired to study, and in them safely to examine the nature of their types. But though I admit these concepts are but images of the realities, mind I don't allow they are so in any greater degree than material phenomena: both in fact are images; but whereas phenomena are the images presented to us by our senses, concepts are the images deliberately formed by our understanding; concepts therefore are more real than phenomena in proportion as understanding is more sure than sense" (*Phaedo*, App. ii., p. 189).

This interpretation has no support in either the language or the logic of the passage.

A. (1) There is nothing in the Greek to suggest the distinction of "universal" (λόγος) and Idea, and there are several expressions which imply their identity; cf. particularly 100 A, ὑποθέμενος ἑκαστότε λόγον, with 100 B, ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό,<sup>1</sup> where λόγος and εἶδος seem equivalent, just as we have οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον in *Phaedrus* 245 E.,

(2) The interpretation gives a very forced sense to straightforward expressions. Surely ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν must refer to what has just preceded, the history of Socrates' experiment in the study of nature, and the words μὴ παντάπασιν τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθεῖν βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὁμασι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῶν (99 E) lose all their meaning unless they refer to sense-objects grasped in sense-perception. The argument that τυφλωθεῖν here cannot apply to the obscurer objects of sense is absurd. The word was used in just the same meaning a few pages back (96 C). The rapid and ceaseless process of phenomena as they appear to the philosopher's eye might be compared with the effect of a dazzling light, though Socrates himself is unwilling to press the analogy. Further, it is so difficult to fit into the view under consideration the words that follow (βλέπων . . . ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῶν), that both Mr. Archer-Hind and Prof. Jackson are inclined to resort to the desperate theory of interpolation. But their case demands a far more rigorous excision.

B. The logical difficulties are no less serious.

(1) If Plato had made this distinction of "universal" and Idea he would have cut himself off from all knowledge of reality, though he has in this same dialogue already expressed confidence in his power to grasp it. The theory of ἀνάμνησις might indeed suggest the distinction of concepts or the "reminiscences" of Ideas from the Ideas themselves, but

<sup>1</sup> Since writing the above, I notice that this argument has been employed already by Mr. R. P. Hardie in *Mind*, N.S., vol. v., p. 171.

such a distinction would have been self-destructive, for being for ever cut off from knowledge of the Ideas we are for ever incapable of knowing that the concepts are like or "represent" the Ideas. The tentative and temporary theory of *ἀνάμνησις* must not be pressed to this conclusion, for Plato here in the dialogue which introduces that theory states very clearly his belief in the soul's direct knowledge of reality, her "communion with the unchanging" (79 D), her "pure apprehension of pure existence" (83 A).

(2) The interpretation fails entirely to account for the discussion of physical or efficient causes and to relate that investigation to the course Socrates represents himself as now pursuing, and it fails to show how one or the other method of study is connected with the ultimate principle, "the necessary and containing power of the good".

The whole difficulty arises from a failure to recognise that in fact the teleological explanation was for Plato the ultimate principle of *all* knowledge. Why did the philosophy of Anaxagoras cause so profound a sense of disappointment in the mind of Socrates? "And I thought that I would then go on and ask him about the sun and moon and stars, and that he would explain to me their comparative swiftness, and their returnings and various states, active and passive, and how all of them were for the best" (98 A). Natural science is no knowledge at all unless it seeks to answer this last question. *His* natural science, the study he perforce abandoned, sought to answer this question. It was to be something more than the science of the physicists who mistake the presuppositions of knowledge for knowledge itself. The science that constituted his first method was not physical science at all, as ordinarily understood. Physical science investigates physical law, but law reveals reason and reason seeks an end. Therefore we postulate an end behind the law, and because science or the knowledge of law is not necessarily the knowledge of the end which it implies, it can never by itself satisfy such an inquirer as Socrates or be regarded by him as knowledge at all. He himself tried to find the knowledge which consists in the relation of the facts of science to the principle of the good, but found the task too hard. He could not rest content with the efficient causes, but when he tried to go beyond them, the multiplicity of the phenomenal world bewildered him. It was as if one should attempt, say, from the movements of the chisel to explain the beauty of a statue or, to take his own instance, from the various co-ordinations of muscle and bone to explain the presence of Socrates in the State prison of Athens. Or per-

haps we may compare it to the attempt to read the design of a tapestry from the crossing and interweaving of the threads, a method more difficult and more minute and conceivably impossible. It may happen we are looking on the wrong side of the cloth, that which does not reveal the design. In rational conduct this design, the only possible design, is the good. "When we walk we walk for the sake of the good and under the idea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for the sake of the good" (*Gorg.*, 468 A). In the phenomena of experience this design is too hard to unravel. We give up the attempt, in this world of constant becoming, to understand how behind it there lies the "binding power of the good". Yet since the world is essentially rational (this view is fundamental for Plato's earlier thought, that the forces of the world without us are actuated by the same power that lives and moves in us) such a connexion must remain an "hypothesis".<sup>1</sup>

This then is the method that Socrates abandons for his alternative way. Instead of seeking the goodness of the phenomenal and changing<sup>2</sup> we may turn our attention to the permanent revealed in and through this constant process, the universal that abides, which is in truth all that is known or knowable in the world of becoming. If we can relate these permanent elements to the principle of the good, can see these to be reasonable, we shall have explained everything in the phenomenal as well—except the fact of its phenomenality. The abiding is the real; if we can explain the abiding, or the universal, we shall have accomplished even more than was possible by the first method, we shall have shown the goodness or the reason of the permanent in its permanence, instead of in its transient manifestation,—we shall have understood reality.

(It was only at a later stage that Plato saw how little it availed to call some obstructing element "unreal," and indeed the later realisation of this truth had much to do, as will appear presently, with the modification of the theory.)

So far as the ultimate principle is concerned Plato might

<sup>1</sup> We may note that in the *Timæus* Plato does make the attempt, though only on "probable" grounds, to construct the natural science here abandoned as too hard, a science, *i.e.*, which relates laws to ends.

<sup>2</sup> Note that Plato says τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἐργοῖς σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα (100 A), not τὸν τὰ ἔργα σκοπούμενον. The ὄντα are the phenomena known in their reality, *i.e.* in their relation to the good (for Plato holds with Parmenides, ταῦτ' ὃν ἐστὶ νοεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐκείν' ἐστὶ νοῦμα), the ἔργα the inadequately known objects of physical science. How else can the opposition be accounted for?

have left the universals outside the rank of the Idea, but this the logical method rendered impossible. That method gave the same kind of reality to all universals. What Plato therefore has to do is to show the relation of these inferior Ideas to the archetypal Idea, and this begins to appear, though obscurely, in the *Phædo*. Everything is what it is by participation in some λόγος; the great, the small, the equal share in greatness, smallness, equality—they are what they are in virtue of the form or proportion they exhibit. So far then they are explained by reference to what is more real than themselves. But these reals are not reals in their own right, and therefore not a sufficient explanation (*cf. ἄλλην αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις*, *Phædo*, 101 D). A thing is great because it shares in greatness, we must say, but only when we know that it is good to share in greatness, *i.e.*, that greatness shares in goodness, have we the true explanation. Just as phenomena reflect the Ideas, so do the lower Ideas reflect the good. The system begins to appear as an hierarchy. The only way up from these lower Ideas is by the recognition of their participation in the good, just as the only way from the world of sense is by the recognition of its participation in the Ideas. The two methods of the *Phædo* are now clear; the one would go straight from phenomena to the archetypal Idea, the other uses the lower Ideas as media. This is the explanation of the ascent by hypotheses suggested in the *Phædo* (101 D) and more explicitly described in the *Republic* (511 C).

Already in the *Republic* the difficulty caused by the introduction of the second class of Ideas has forced itself on Plato's attention. In the *Republic* he virtually says that these both are and are not Ideas; he admits in fact that only the self-explanatory is Idea, only that in which the light of its own purpose is manifest. Hence the division of the world of νοητά into two sections, of which the higher consists simply of the true or ethical Ideas. (Plato distinguishes these latter Ideas as the good, the beautiful, and the true, but it is obvious that the lower members of that hierarchy are there at all because of their ethical significance, their immediate attractiveness or "value".) The lower section is only potentially or "hypothetically" Ideal, the "hypothesis" being not the existence of these objects, but their goodness,<sup>1</sup> that

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Jackson, in an otherwise instructive article in the *Journal of Philology* (vol. x., p. 144), misses this important point. He says: "His meaning must be that the geometer starts from such propositions as, 'There may be such a thing as length without breadth, henceforward

they are best and for the best. When they are seen in the light of the good, when they reflect the good, they become objects for the pure intelligence (*καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς*, 511 D). We destroy their hypothetical character.<sup>1</sup>

Within the world of Ideas there is now an essential cleavage manifest, in fact there is a certain inconsistency in making these mathematical concepts Ideas at all, for if the objects of sense 'reflect' the various Ideas and yet are not, when seen in this light, made objects of pure intelligence, why should τὰ μαθηματικά become such intelligibles when they reflect the good? If these are to be Ideas we want a new name altogether for the highest class of existences. It may have been a perception of this difficulty that led Plato at some time to give the mathematical concepts a place midway between Ideas and phenomena.

But in the *Republic* this inconsistency has not yet broken up the Ideal system. In books vi. and vii. Plato definitely attempts to read the universe in the light of the Idea, and the scattered hints of the *Cratylus*, *Symposium*, *Phædo* and perhaps *Phædrus*<sup>2</sup> are now developed into a coherent system. It may be well to look at this unification before considering how the unreconciled elements rendered the unity only ap-

called a line,' but does not show, or even attempt to show, that there is such a thing. If he could prove that there is such a thing, this which is now a *ὑπόθεσις*, i.e. an ἀρχὴ ἀναπόδεικτος, would become an ἀρχή proper." But in the first place the geometer never does make such a proposition—he is not concerned with any other existence of lines and circles than that existence which they have for his thought, and his study is not in the least affected by the denial of straight lines "in nature". In the second place, no philosophy proves or tries to prove these "hypotheses," and Plato least of all would suggest that the mathematician may be making a mistake by investigating thought-realities for whose objective existence he has no warrant. How can they be placed in the region of νοητά at all unless already they are recognised as belonging to the real? What is yet unconfirmed is their relation to the supreme reality. Because the world is rational—this being the fundamental hypothesis—they must be related to the good, but so far this is taken on trust. The hypothesis is simply the act of faith which the full vision of goodness will render needless.

<sup>1</sup>(*Cf.* 533 C, οὐκοῦν ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνῃ ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναγοῦσα, when their goodness is manifested or their relation to the good. The mathematician does not ask the value of the square and circle, he keeps within the bounds of his spatial systems; but if "God always geometrises," it is not for the sake of geometry. As the phenomenon is an image of the Idea, so is the lower Idea, the mathematical object, an image of the highest—when seen in its goodness (*cf. Rep.*, 517 B *sqq.*).

<sup>2</sup>Certainly the argument of the *Phædrus* suggests a fairly early date, though stylometric evidence seems to place it not earlier than the *Republic*.

parent, and led Plato, who showed here an energy of self-criticism unparalleled in the history of philosophy, to a deep and progressive process of modification and reconstruction.

The world is fundamentally rational. The real is the abiding, and the abiding is the knowable, therefore the real is the knowable. The reason that is in us is the reason that is in the world. Reality has two aspects, the known and the knower, and these correspond in every relation—as is the kind of object so is the kind of knowing. “All nature is akin and the soul has learnt all things,” Plato had already said in the *Meno* (81 C), and now he shows how truth and understanding are begotten of the contact of the pure intelligence with the pure Idea (*Rep.*, 490 B). So again to the desire of mind there corresponds the desirableness of the object of mind. The philosopher is not simply the knower of knowledge, but also the lover of it because knowledge is lovable; and the universe is representable as a scale of existences corresponding to the various faculties of knowing. There is no attempt so far to give priority to either aspect, mind or existence. The Ideas are eternal, and so is mind that knows the Ideas.<sup>1</sup>

It is noteworthy that the description Plato here gives of the Ideas is truest—and indeed profoundly true—of the ethical Ideas. The peculiarity of these has already been

<sup>1</sup> Zeller and other critics argue in favour of making the Idea of the good identical with Deity. This view does not fit into the construction outlined above. The Ideas are powers but not intelligences; they are even akin to intelligence inasmuch as mind can only know what is of its own nature, but they are essentially the correlates of mind in an eternal correspondence. The difficulties of the position we may well believe led Plato to postulate an original creative mind (of which there are hints already in the *Republic*), just as a further difficulty to be considered later led him at last to postulate two world-spirits—but by that time the Idea theory had undergone much modification. The Idea theory demands this correspondence throughout, so that at the summit of the scale of existences there would be the good as perfectly known (*i.e.*, the good as it fully is) and the perfectly pure intelligence that knows it, *i.e.* God. This is the logical relation of the Deity and the Idea of the good, as is implied in *Parm.*, 134 D, “and if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge, no one is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge”. The development of the view that creative intelligence is prior to created existence is part of the process of reconstruction (*cf. Philebus*, 22 C). In the present view mind is not regarded as originally creative nor yet are the Ideas powers in themselves. It is out of the correspondence of mind and Idea that creation is created. If so, Zeller's question (*Plato and the Older Academy*, Eng. ed., p. 267 n.), “Is the Divinity actually a second cause together with the Idea, or merely another expression for the causality of the Idea?” presents no dilemma at all. Plato, who had to face as had never been done before the question of the relation of knower and known, of the subject and object of thought, did not begin with but only ended in dualism.



dwelt upon; being able to serve as ends or purposes they are something more than mere concepts, and all the characteristics which Plato ascribes to his Ideas are *in some sense* applicable to these. They are powers, being final causes. In a rational world—the world as now conceived by Plato—there can finally be no distinction between *ought* and *is*, the possible of realisation and the realised, and so also whatever *becomes* possible is *ipso facto* made actual.<sup>1</sup> We may compare how even Aristotle who so constantly attacked the dynamical deficiency of Plato's theory made the conclusion of his practical syllogism not the recognition of some particular end as to be done, but the doing itself.<sup>2</sup> Further they are exemplars to be realised in action, "fore-pictures" of something to be produced (as Fichte said), thought-schemes to which a phenomenal counterpart, a concrete action, can somehow correspond. They are prior and "above substance," in so far as in a rational world the goodness of a thing is the very ground of its existence. They are purer, more perfect than their realisations in action, for "what act is all its thought had been"? What exemplar is not better than its copy? In all conscious production it might be held that the idea or form being manifested is better than the manifestation, that the expression is never adequate to the thought that is expressed.<sup>3</sup> Finally they all lead up logically to one supreme end presupposed in every mediate end and making them all coherent, an end which so far as the world is rational is the ultimate explanation of all things. So much perhaps we may say without entering on the controversial ground of metaphysics at all, though the elements of controversy are not far off.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Kant, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, "Eine intelligibele Welt in welcher alles darum wirklich sein würde, bloss nur weil es (als etwas Gutes) möglich ist".

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *De Motu Animalium*, 701 a 9 sqq. "Whereas in the theoretical syllogism the end is inference, the apprehension of the two premisses being the apprehension and putting together of the conclusion, in the practical syllogism the conclusion that arises from the two premisses is action. Thus when a man apprehends that every man should walk and that he himself is a man, an act of walking immediately follows." Of course the ethical concept cannot unless particularised, cannot as a pure Idea of the good, become an end, and does not necessarily become one even then, and if it does become an end, its realisation does not necessarily follow. What is said above of ethical Ideas must be understood with this reservation.

<sup>3</sup> It is true that Goethe speaks of his work as containing more than he knew, and Kant declares that we can sometimes better understand an author in his words or writings than he understood himself, but that does not touch the question of the relation of the end as conceived to the end as realised. It is, to say the least, logically impossible that the realisation (or expression) should be *more* than adequate.

But the further we pass from the ethical Ideas the greater do the difficulties grow, the more alien are the elements introduced into the system. This becomes manifest in the last book of the *Republic* itself, where now the logical principle is openly asserted—"whenever a number of individuals have a common name, we assume them to have also a corresponding Idea" (*Rep.*, 596 A), and accordingly the instance of a bed is chosen, and the analogy drawn, picture of a bed: a bed:: a bed: Idea bed—an analogy not possible in the case of the ethical or even of the mathematical notions. We seem to have now introduced a third class of Ideas, with which our difficulties grow exceedingly. In fact in such a case the Idea can be nothing except the form or shape of the object given by analogy, a kind of self-subsistence, and the famous "third man" argument (attributed to the sophist Polyxenus but really only a development of an objection suggested by Plato here (597 C)) depends entirely on the conception of Ideas as shapes or forms. This objection, like many another, is quite inapplicable to the earlier conception, to the "colourless and *shapeless* and intangible essence" that originally the term Idea signified (*ἡ ἀχρώματος τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφής οὐσία ὄντως οὐσα*, *Phædr.*, 247 C).

In fact to understand the Idea system as a coherent whole, to understand the scheme of *Rep.*, vi. and vii., we must remember that it is based on and leads up to the primary Idea of the good. This Idea is ultimate, ultimate for knowledge and for reality. If so, it must be admitted as a fundamental "hypothesis" that whatever we know is what it is because that is for the best and that whatever becomes becomes for the best, in short, that every efficient cause is for the sake of a fully rational final cause. But here the inconsistency of a metaphysic at once absolute and teleological reveals itself (though it is perhaps less obvious in a system which makes the ideal a good to be attained rather than a law to be observed). Plato realised the difficulty, and after various attempts to save the situation by calling "unreal" whatever was neither absolute nor "for the best," by making the objects of opinion, the world of multiplicity and error, a strange union of "real" and "unreal," "tossing about in some region which is halfway between pure being and pure not-being," chose to be greater than his system, to reveal rather than obscure its difficulties. The main difficulty was the obvious problem of all ethical or religious monism; if the world is rational, whence the "unreal," and whence error: if good, whence evil? If the real is the abiding, is not becoming itself an abiding principle? Thus the two problems, the problem of

change, in general of movement, the problem of evil, in general of imperfection, are unsolved, nay insoluble, on the Idea system as now conceived. It was to the fuller consideration of these that Plato now turned.

Hitherto he had somewhat neglected one side of reality. His characterisation had been of the known rather than of the knower, of the Idea rather than of the soul for which it is. But now that the difficulties just mentioned became prominent, he was led to consider more especially this other side. For the real evil is the evil in the soul (*Rep.*, 353 E *sqq.*), and as for movement, surely it must be explained by the self-moving, the soul which is the beginning of motion (*Phædr.*, 245 D). What if after all the *τόπος νοητός* be *νοῦς* itself?

## V.—DISCUSSION.

### HUMANISM, INTUITIONISM AND OBJECTIVE REALITY.

#### I.

I do not know that there is much in Father Walker's reply (N.S., No. 71) to my comments (N.S., No. 69) on his article in N.S., No. 67, to which I need take exception. He has certainly made much more intelligible in it the exact nature of the parallel between Humanism and the philosophy of Martineau which he originally sought to draw. But he has also qualified it considerably, and confessed that the comparison only holds between essentials in the one case and secondary features in the other. It is no wonder, therefore, that I failed to recognise so recondite a likeness.

It is true that the experience of consequences is not, in Martineau's philosophy, entirely cut off from all influence on the judgment of moral worth. Martineau admits that their computation "is already more or less involved in the preference of this or that spring of action," and again, that "the choice of means by which to carry out the workings of a spring of conduct can be made only by consideration of consequences". But these admissions, though they temper, can hardly be held to override, the dominant intuitionism of his view. In the very same passage in which they occur,<sup>1</sup> he goes on to explain that the "Canon of Consequences" is "a subsidiary rule" and to be regarded as intellectual rather than moral, and contrasts it with "the Canon of Principles which gives the true *Moral Criterion* for determining the rights of the case" and "suffices for the estimate of *Character*". Plainly therefore the appeal to consequences was, for Martineau, quite a secondary and subsidiary affair, on which little stress was laid. Apparently, moreover, he supposes that it is possible to 'compute' the nature of the consequences once for all, and thereby to *fix* the order of the 'springs of action' for all time, though he says so little about this empirical factor in his system that one can feel sure of this only because otherwise the whole would crumble under the pressure of experience.

In the Humanist elaboration of truth on the other hand this

<sup>1</sup> *Types of Ethical Theory*, ii., 255-256.

constant pressure and reaction of experience is the essential thing that determines the direction of intellectual progress. For though experiments of all sorts are tried, only a few succeed; and so human needs and postulates can hardly sustain themselves against a persistently hostile course of events. Nay, they have themselves absorbed to a vast extent the lessons of experience. It is true that the initiative rests with them and that they always make the first move. They are psychologically primary and indispensable, and seem at first sight arbitrary. But ultimately this arbitrariness is an illusion, except in so far as the 'matter' they work upon is really plastic to their manipulation—as, to an as yet undetermined extent, it appears to be. Thus though the doctrine is psychologically an apriorism, it works out logically as an empiricism. This *change of quality* causes I believe the chief difficulty intellectualists seem to have with Humanism; they do not grasp that 'origin' does not necessarily determine 'validity' and that things may really *change* their character.<sup>1</sup> At any rate it is clear that because of this unceasing criticism of human demands by the course of experience, the notion that we can (or should) compile a hierarchy of human needs to be referred to in all doubtful cases, is essentially impracticable. It is impossible to say *a priori* and beforehand of what demands satisfaction may be obtained, or to guarantee that the particular order of rank which seems to be empirically proper now must be rigidly preserved to all futurity. Of course this does not deny that inquiries into the present rank of needs and satisfactions may have considerable interest and temporary value. But they would be concerned with the working out in detail of what it is as yet more urgent to establish as a principle. If Father Walker will help, he is very welcome; but it is no objection to Humanism that all the applications of its principles have not yet been made.

To conclude the subject of the relation between Humanism and Martineau it will suffice to refer to two of Father Walker's admissions. He admits (p. 408) that according to Martineau an intuitive judgment of Conscience lords it over the (partly empirical) springs of action. He also admits (p. 409) the distinction that whereas in Humanism "consequences determine logical values relative to human needs, in Martineau human springs of action determine ethical values relative to consequences". Plainly therefore what is primary in the one theory is secondary in the other and *vice versa*. I am quite content with these admissions and also with the way Father Walker has now dropped the Absolute. For it has long been the primary aim of my philosophic efforts to make clear the total and irremediable irrelevance of this treacherous notion to every problem of human knowledge.

<sup>1</sup> This difficulty ultimately no doubt arises from an old intellectualist postulate that change is unthinkable.

## II.

But if I stopped at this point I might fail to content Father Walker, who considers that the charges of 'subjectivism' and 'minimising the intellect' have not been met by me, but only denied.<sup>1</sup> Hence I feel bound to attempt an answer to the questions he puts to me.

(1) He asks why, if I do not intend to minimise the intellect, I should reduce it to the powers of inhibiting impulsive reactions and analysing a situation. Now (a) in the first place the passage in *Studies in Humanism* (p. 356) to which (quite rightly) he refers, mentions also two other factors in the intellectual functioning, viz., the *rearrangement* of the presented continuum and the *salutary modification* of the habitual reaction. Both of these are subsequent to the 'analysis' at which intellectualism is content to stop; both are essential because they form the tests of the value or 'truth' which the 'analysis' claims, and the former at least might demand recognition even from the most abstractly intellectualist conception of intellectual functioning. The objections to intellectualism at this point are that in the first place it provides no reason why the mind should function at all, and in the second it provides no means of distinguishing valuable from worthless functioning.

(b) In the second place, while I willingly and fully admit that my own analysis (like many of my positions) might be greatly improved by further elaboration and exemplification, I can see nothing degrading to the intellect in the functions assigned to it. And so I can fairly claim that my *intentions* at least were innocent and void of offence. I was merely trying to state in definite psychological terms the value of the intellectual processes which all reflective men have always felt, but which hitherto have been the subject only of vague and uninformative eulogy. In other words, I was trying to answer the questions—'What is Reason?' and 'What does it *do* for man?' If Father Walker, or any one else, can give better answers, I shall be happy to adopt them. But I am not acquainted with any rationalistic attempt to define 'Reason' in scientific terms.

(c) I must protest against the false abstraction of Father Walker's distinction between the 'strictly cognitive' and the 'merely physiological' aspects in the 'rational' act. The whole point of my analysis was that the function of analysing a presented situation must *not* be separated from its *biological* value and that consequently no part of the whole process was either 'strictly cognitive' or 'merely physiological'. It is purposive and vital and

<sup>1</sup> I had always regarded every line that I had ever written as an implicit refutation of such charges, but can now also point to a more explicit treatment of both in articles in N.S., No. 70, and in the Aristotelian Society's *Proceedings*, 1908-1909.

personal *throughout*, and only truly *intelligible* as such. The humanist interpretation is in principle a protest against destroying the biological integrity of rational action by applying to it such artificial, dualistic and inadequate distinctions.

(2) Father Walker wants to know why, if we have not intended to insult man's intellect, we have called concepts 'symbols'. In reply, I may say (a) that I cannot remember that I have ever done so. But (b) even if I had, I should not certainly have conceived a symbol as "an arbitrary sign which has no meaning apart from a concept and cannot of itself represent, though it may stand substitute for, objective reality". 'Arbitrary' could not mean for me 'illegitimate' and absurd. Nor could signs be said to 'have' meanings *per se*. Again, the distinction between 'representing' and 'standing substitute for' is hard to swallow for one who has discarded the 'correspondence' theory of truth. And lastly (c), I can see no reason why "symbolism, when applied as a general principle to the product of intellectual activity," should "imply subjectivism".

(3) Father Walker ascribes to us the doctrine that as all knowledge has a personal tinge and is relative to our needs, it to some extent *mutilates* even the perception of facts. On this he bases a 'dilemma'. If the 'personal tinge' and the 'effects of mutilation' do *not* permeate all knowledge, but leave some intact, it is possible to abstract from them; while if they *do*, "knowledge can have for us no really objective significance and meaning". For we cannot then "eliminate what is the product of our own subjective activities from what is due to the reaction of the object" (p. 410).

I must point out (a) that while it is a humanist contention (and one which has never seriously been impugned), that all knowledge *is* personal and relative to human needs, it is emphatically *not* asserted that it is any the *worse* for this. The 'object' is not 'mutilated' by becoming an object of knowledge. But for this process it would not *be* at all. And it does not lose, but gain. It is not deprived of any value, but literally receives thereby all the *value* it has. To interpret the *selectiveness* which pervades all perception and all thinking as a 'mutilation' of 'fact' is not a humanist doctrine at all. It once was the pet doctrine of Mr. Bradley in his absolutist days. As compared with the uncritical 'objectivism' (which apparently some forms of modern 'Realism' are anxious to share with sensationalism and Hegelian panlogism) which imagined that 'objects' entered minds *proprio motu* and that the percipient had nothing to do with the way in which his 'objects' appeared to him, it was no doubt an enormous advance. For it began to recognise the activity of the human knower. But in itself the position was totally untenable and could only end in scepticism. For though it was not naïve enough to look for incorruptible 'facts' on earth, it was sophisticated enough to represent 'knowing' as a way of corrupting facts.

I take some little credit for discovering (some years apparently



before Mr. Bradley himself) that this interpretation of human activity as a 'mutilation' was a fatal mistake, and for making this discovery a starting-point for the humanist criticism of that eminent ex-absolutist. To escape from the arbitrary and gratuitous scepticism in which the rationalist theory of knowledge had needlessly involved itself seemed easy enough. One merely had to take the bull by the horns, and to recognise the so-called 'mutilation' as a normal, necessary and salutary procedure, which far from undoing knowledge, was literally the making of it. For how could determinate objects and scientific facts arise out of the primary chaos of presentations and come to exist for us at all, without such selecting, shaping and adjusting to our purposes?

In adopting this attitude Humanism does not of course stand unsupported by philosophic precedent. It is only carrying through more resolutely, completely and consistently the principles of every critical theory of knowledge there has ever been. That the objects of ordinary perception cannot be simply taken as given without more ado, is common ground which Humanism shares with Hume, Kant and modern psychology. Indeed it is mainly the growth of scientific psychology that enables it to show that what for Hume was merely an incitement to doubt, and for Kant merely an unproved postulate of metaphysics, *viz.*, the so-called 'subjective' factor in knowing, is a thoroughly indispensable item in any scientific treatment of actual knowing. Only instead of saying intellectualistically 'the *understanding* makes the object,' Humanism ascribes this function to the whole man as the heir of all the ages, and explains in detail how he does it. The advance is so direct and obvious that I cannot believe that merely dogmatic assertions about the intuitive givenness of objects, which make no attempt to explain the facts of perception, will induce philosophy to sacrifice a principle it has laboured so long to make clear.

It is evident, therefore, which horn of Father Walker's dilemma we must choose. Personality and choice cannot be disavowed. They pervade *all* knowing and participate in the building up of *all* objects. But does it follow that therefore knowledge can have no objective significance and meaning? Nothing could be further from the truth. The significance and meaning of knowledge are thoroughly human. Relation to human purposes is the sole source of its value. It is what discriminates the real from the unreal, the true from the false, the good from the bad. All value is strictly 'subjective'; it is an attitude which cannot be conceived without a mind which is a judge of values. Neither can meaning exist without a mind which means, nor can any 'object' or 'fact' be recognised, except through a cognitive process which always selects, *i.e.*, reacts on, rearranges and reconstructs its data.

Call this process 'mutilation' if you please, but realise at least the implications of the bad name you are affixing to our knowing. It commits you to the dogma that the real object is unknowable,

and that knowledge is impossible. And do not imagine that you can close your eyes to processes which occur in every act of cognition, even by the desperate device of denying the existence of psychology.

### III.

But I am not of course accusing Father Walker either of a self-sought scepticism or of a wilful blindness. His real position is well brought out by his final paragraph. It is that of practical commonsense realism, which takes for granted the reality of objects of perception until there is occasion to doubt them.

This is a position no pragmatist can assail without compunction. If philosophy were *merely* commonsense, and if commonsense were *never* puzzled, there would be no assailing it. But though our commonsense acceptance of objects works pragmatically for most purposes, it inevitably engenders the difficulties which incite to philosophic wonder. After all even in ordinary life men *sometimes* perceive falsely and reason wrongly. They desire therefore to avoid error and illusion, and to be told how to do this. Hence the question arises *how* false perception and error are to be detected and conceived. And to this question the humanist epistemology gives the only answer in existence. Its answer is the only real one, because it is the only one which *discriminates* between a 'truth' and a 'reality' which *excludes* and one that *includes* 'error' and 'unreality'.

To effect this discrimination successfully, and to satisfy the practical man who means something more by 'truth' than formal 'claim,' it may be necessary to transcend naïve realism. It may require 'methodical doubt' and a recurrence to the principle of Descartes. But I fail to see anything 'methodical' about a 'credulity' which fights shy of any systematic account of error and illusion, and merely 'hopes' that on each occasion what it apprehends as 'reality' may not turn out to be 'illusion'. Neither practically nor 'theoretically' does such an attitude seem to meet the requirements of a theory of knowledge. And inasmuch as after all this procedure is merely what "the realist *prefers* to start from," it does not seem clear even how he escapes from the charge of 'arbitrariness' in the worst sense which he has himself attached to this term. Surely it is a perverse intellectualism that would prefer to fail by remaining uncritical to succeeding by becoming 'arbitrary' (*i.e., selective*). And it is only in the eyes of a dogmatic determinism that the exercise of choice which the 'arbitrary' implies carries with it its irrevocable condemnation.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

## VI.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

*A Pluralistic Universe.* By WILLIAM JAMES. Longmans, Green & Co., 1909. Pp. vi, 405.

LIKE everything that Prof. James gives us, this course of Hibbert Lectures on the Present Position of Philosophy has a freshness and charm about it which is almost enough to disarm criticism. It is an eminently distasteful task to set to work, as a critic must perforce do, to find flaws in a book which has yielded him intense enjoyment. And Prof. James's book is one which, I should imagine, even those whom it directly attacks cannot help enjoying. It is all so breezy, so fresh, so alive with humour and happy illustration that the firmest adherent of the Monism which it lashes so unsparingly could hardly find it in his heart to wish that the scourge had been laid on with a lighter hand. Prof. James's polemic withal is, as usual, of that urbane kind which leaves no bitterness behind it; the wounds he inflicts with so much gusto, like those of the righteous, are a "precious balm". For myself, I will add, the book is something more; it seems, at least, to make it clearer than the last published utterances of the author what it is that he finds fundamentally wrong in the mental attitude which he has so long been denouncing. But before I attempt to indicate what seem to me to be the essential features of Prof. James's doctrine in its latest exposition, and some of the difficulties I think I find in it, I should like to refer, in the interests of justice, to one or two minor blemishes. Prof. James, as it seems to me, has not avoided a source of unconscious unfairness, the nature of which he has himself in this very book analysed with great happiness, what one may call the fallacy of reasoning from a self-made classification. He complains himself that his opponents, having once set him down as a Pluralist, proceed to form their own conception of what the Pluralist is bound to believe, and then assume that he must hold every position, however absurd, which they have shown to their own satisfaction to follow from *their* definition of Pluralism. The procedure is unjust enough, but the odd thing is that Prof. James is all along treating his opponents in the very same way. He starts with his notion of what Monism or Intellectualism must be, a notion derived apparently from the consideration of views held by one or two eminent thinkers, such as Spinoza and Mr. Bradley; on the strength of this notion he frames a general conception of an "ism,"

Monism or Intellectualism, rubricates a number of thinkers under either head, and then takes it for granted that the individuals so rubricated *must* exhibit the vices of the "ism" to which they have been assigned. The most striking illustration of this injustice is afforded by the treatment meted out to the greatest of all philosophers. Plato gets set down as an "Intellectualist," apparently on the ground that he held right definition to play a fundamental part in science; then, as Intellectualism is understood by Prof. James to involve the belief that nothing can be true about a thing *except* what is asserted in its definition, Plato is saddled with this ridiculous theory (p. 218), and the "thinness" of Oxford absolute Idealism is found to be due to the place held by Plato and Aristotle in the "Greats" curriculum (p. 330). Now all this, let it be said with the utmost respect for Prof. James, is little better than nonsense. So far as Plato is widely studied in Oxford at all, it is as the author of the *Republic*, just as Aristotle is mainly known as the author of the *Ethics*, and if "thinness" means, as it appears to do, intellectual satisfaction in the contemplation of abstract metaphysical formulæ, it is the last reproach which should have been levelled at the philosopher who, more than any one before or after him, used his philosophy as the basis of a searching analysis of social and educational institutions and a daring scheme for their entire reconstruction. So, again, Fechner is deservedly praised for his splendid attempt to frame a positive conception of the hierarchy of beings who compose the Universe, but Prof. James seems to be quite unaware that the "world-soul," the "souls" of the planets, the life of plants are all prominent features of the Platonic view of the world, and that most of the analogies, taken from Fechner, by which Prof. James recommends the *Tagesansicht* of the Universe are to be found in the *Timæus*. Indeed Prof. James might almost have taken as a motto for his own attack on Monism such a Platonic saying as this: "the philosopher must needs therefore refuse his assent to those who say that the Whole, whether it be one or be many Forms, is static, while to those who hold that what is is change and nothing more, he must not so much as listen, but, in the words of the children's wish for 'all that is movable and immovable,' he must say that the one and all is both at once".

There are other pet views of Prof. James which equally strike me as due to the same tendency to rely too much on hastily-formed classifications. For instance, he will have it that Monism and Idealism are philosophies of the tender-hearted and sentimental, Materialism and Pluralism of the cynical. It might be a hard matter to "validate" this belief by an appeal to facts. There does not seem to have been much sentimentality about Spinoza, and Hegel and Schopenhauer were not precisely remarkable for tenderness of heart. And the spiritualist Descartes is about as cynical in his view of human nature as the materialist Hobbes. Altogether, Prof. James, in his anxiety to make out that everything is at bottom irra-

tional, seems to me to exaggerate the influence of temperament in determining a man's philosophical views. It counts for something, no doubt, but the mental environment perhaps counts for quite as much. The man who enjoys a good fight is pretty sure to be a materialist when the reigning views are spiritualist, and a spiritualist when they are materialistic. I doubt whether Prof. James himself would not at this moment be a champion of Monism, if only the fashion among Professors of Philosophy had happened to favour Pluralism. And something, after all, has to be allowed to a factor which Prof. James does his best to ignore, genuine intellectual conviction based on what are believed to be rational grounds. Locke and Herbart, for example, strike one as probably not very greatly influenced by temperamental bias in their outlook on things.

To come however to closer quarters with Prof. James's argument. I find it a little difficult to form a clear estimate of its force, inasmuch as it seems to be directed at once against two distinct enemies, Monism and Intellectualism. Apparently in Prof. James's mind the two are logically inseparable. To me it appears that the conjunction between them is accidental, just as it is a mere accident that, in the hands of Prof. James, Pluralism allies itself with Irrationalism. Surely if Rationalism means anything, the greatest pluralist of the classic German period, Herbart, was a rationalist, and equally surely the most thoroughly monistic philosophy of the same age, that of Schopenhauer, is as irrationalistic as the greatest hater of Rationalism could wish. Indeed, I would suggest that Monism is itself inherently *irrational*, and that no philosopher has ever arrived at the monistic result except at the cost of a breach with logic. (Belief in logic, it seems, is with Prof. James the distinctive mark of the intellectualistic beast. See pp. 211-218 of the present book.) Hence, while I am willing enough to admit that Prof. James succeeds in his second and third lectures in making Monism appear an illogical and absurd thing, I cannot see that his success is any proof of the illogicality and irrationality of the universe. Where the present book does appear to me enlightening is in the proof it seems to afford that Prof. James only hates Monism in a secondary and derivative way because he supposes that it is *par excellence* the consequence of Intellectualism. What he really seems to hate for its own sake with a perfectly disinterested hatred is logic, and the logician's habit of asking for reasons. If I do not misapprehend his contrast between Hegel and Fechner, his objection to Hegel is quite as much that he tried to give a reason for the faith that was in him, as that the reason was a bad one. I suspect even unqualified Monism would get a great deal more respect from Prof. James than it does if it were put forward magisterially without any appeal to reason at all. This anti-logical animus is, I must confess, something I find it exceedingly hard to understand. I cannot reconcile it with the fact that Prof. James clearly does not hold his beliefs merely as a matter of personal taste, because it

gratifies or amuses him to hold them, but seriously believes them to be truer and worthier of general acceptance than those which he wishes to displace. Not only does he make the logical absurdities of Monism a ground for rejecting it, but he has to construct arguments in order to persuade his audience of the illogicality of the real. And I presume he would allow it to be an intelligible question whether these arguments are sound or not. If it is an intelligible question, the canons of logic have not been given up "fairly, squarely and irrevocably"; if they have, surely it is waste of time for Prof. James to go through the form of pretending to offer us any grounds for imitating his *salto mortale*. The abandonment of logic is not even consistent with the doctrine that the sole test of a theory is its "validation" by experience. For, when logic has once gone "fairly, squarely, irrevocably" by the board, how do we judge whether a given experience "validates" an hypothesis or not? You may say, no doubt, that logic deals only with possibilities, and the real is something more than any mere complex of possibilities, but it is another thing to deny that, however much more it is, the real must at least conform to the conditions of possibility. If Intellectualism means no more than that an interpretation of life which cannot justify itself before the understanding must be wrong somewhere, it seems to me to be so much of a truth as to be a mere truism. In short, I suspect that Prof. James falls into the error of supposing that logic is a complete and finished science, identical with the actual logical doctrines of Aristotle or some other established authority. How far this is from being the case everyone who has interested himself in the enormous developments of logic within the last generation must be well aware. To declare that facts give the lie to logic because they cannot be adequately represented by the logical categories at the disposal, say, of Aristotle, would be like saying that Physics must be thrown overboard because there are facts which would have seemed paradoxical to the physicist of fifty years ago. Yet Prof. James does not think of arguing that Physics is discredited by the reappearance of the transmutability of metals as a scientific possibility.

To put the case as plainly as I can, Prof. James seems to hold the following curious position: (1) The fate of logic is bound up with the validity of Zeno's famous paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. Logic *proves* that Achilles can never catch the tortoise; experience shows that he catches it in a few seconds; *ergo* logic is futile. Now, I do not know how to reconcile this reasoning, which will be found at pages 254-258 of *A Pluralistic Universe*, with Prof. James's conversion to the doctrine of Bergson, since it is part of the Bergsonian theory, and is announced as such by Prof. James himself, that the "conceptual logic" which both philosophers treat *de haut en bas*, owes its existence to its practical usefulness in enabling us to deal with the geometrical "outside" of things, and thus to compute, *e.g.*, where they will be at any moment, though not to

obtain any insight into their "inner life". If this be the case, it ought to follow that, though "conceptual logic" can give us no clue to the reasons why Achilles cares to race with the tortoise, nor to the feelings of the animal when he finds himself beaten, yet if it says Achilles will always be behind the tortoise, he will as a matter of fact always be behind it. And further, "conceptual logic" does *not* prove that Achilles cannot catch the tortoise; it is for want of adequate logical analysis of the implications of movement that the paradoxical conclusion seems to be proved, and if philosophers have found the refutation of the paradox troublesome, the reason is simply that their logic has been bad. The apparent difficulty arises purely from not seeing that there is a one-to-one correlation between two infinite series of the same ordinal type, one of which (the path of the tortoise, as resolved into a series of positions) forms a proper part of the other (the path of Achilles). The argument, which, as Prof. James seems not to know, was intended as a *reductio ad absurdum* of Pluralism, only looks cogent so long as we suppose a line to consist of a finite number of indivisible unit lines, and is dissipated entirely by the modern arithmetic of the transfinite.<sup>1</sup> Thus the conclusion is only reached by the logically false assumption that  $(a + b) > b$  universally holds good when  $a$  and  $b$  are transfinite. Or, to put it more simply still, all that the argument proves is that Achilles will not overtake the tortoise while it occupies the same position which it occupies at any moment *before* he catches it. Altogether, I would suggest that Prof. James's attack upon "conceptual logic," so far as it rests on this argument, involves a mistake as to the precise nature of the limitations of "descriptive science". Descriptive science does not lead to the false conclusion that Achilles cannot overtake the tortoise; it is merely unable to say how it feels to Achilles to win the race or to the tortoise to lose it. It describes, but it does not interpret. But the limitations of descriptive science are not necessarily limitations of logic. They only become so if you assume, as Bergson and James seem to do, that logic cannot be applied to the study of types of relation which are teleological. In fact, what Prof. James seems to be assuming is that there are no concepts but those of mechanics. But if "good," "evil," "purpose," "attainment," "defeat" are not concepts, then frankly I do not know what a concept is. And once more, I repeat, I find it odd that the philosopher who taught that the Good is the ultimate principle of intelligence, life, and existence itself should be singled out for something almost like abuse as the originator of a type of thinking which shuts us up in a closed circle of bloodless categories.

The same misconceptions seem to me to affect the attack on another of Zeno's arguments, the proof that the tip of the flying arrow is "at rest". In the sense that at any one moment the

<sup>1</sup> See Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, i., p. 350, for a clear exposition of the whole matter.



arrow-point is at just one position and at no other, this is obviously true. Motion, as we require the notion for science, *is* just the co-ordination of successive positions one-to-one with successive moments, and no more. It is true that the analysis does not interpret the facts by revealing what it feels like to move, but that is not Prof. James's objection to it. He objects to it *as* a description, because it does not tell us *how* the arrow gets from one point to another. In other words, logic is to be dispensed with because it cannot tell us what "becoming is made of," a question which Prof. James and Bergson have equally to leave unanswered for the good reason that it is unmeaning. If we are to get rid of every science which cannot show us how one moment "sprouts out of" its predecessors, what will be left?

(2) Another curious feature of Prof. James's argument is the assumption that any one who refuses to abandon logic, that is, to give up serious thinking, must be committed to the belief that no one thing is really connected with any other thing, or that, at least, no one thing can be related to a third thing, if it is already related to a second. Here again, I profess myself unable to see the consequence, and I suspect that it is only made plausible by the assumption that rigid Monism is the necessary outcome of faith in reason. To be sure, you do arrive at some such strange consequences if you take it for granted, as the Monist *pur sang* does, that the only intelligible kind of connexion is that of subject with predicate, because then it follows at once, first that there can be only one thing, or subject of predication, and next that the predicates of this thing cannot ever be related among themselves, since they are *ex hypothesi* predicates of it, and not of one another. But why is it logical to suppose that the only intelligible relation is connexion of subject with attribute? Or why, seeing there are other types of relation, are they to be excluded from the purview of logic, merely because they cannot be dealt with by the old-fashioned logic of the syllogism? And again, why should the alleged continuity of sensible experience be made a ground for pronouncing logic incapable of dealing with it? Is it meant that a continuum as such lies beyond the power of logic to analyse or define? If it is so meant, the significance of the work of Cantor in defining the number-continuum, the only standard we have of perfect continuity, must be wholly ignored.

(3) Far the most interesting and singular feature of the book, however, is Prof. James's remedy for the philosophical sterility which he finds characteristic of current Oxford thought; and which he puts down to Oxfordian respect for logic, while I should prefer to charge it upon Oxford's sublime indifference to the vaster logic which lies outside the narrow bounds of that doctrine of Syllogism to which Mr. Bradley's successors have returned in spite of his example and precept. The remedy lies in an immediate acceptance of the ideas of M. Bergson. That Prof. James should avow his

personal conversion to the theories of his brilliant younger colleague is, of course, a most interesting fact, but I doubt if his narrative of the way in which he has, for the present, found peace will do much to make acceptance of the new gospel much easier to those of us to whom M. Bergson's own utterances have not brought enlightenment or conviction. To begin with, we are perhaps far from sure that the disjunction "Bergson or an unintelligible Absolute" is a complete one. And in the next place, the directions of Bergson and Prof. James to the neophyte who seeks escape from the body of death of Monism are far from explicit. He is to "dive into" the stream of sensible experience, and he will find it a continuum, in which the artificial "cuts" made by scientific analysis and its conceptual logic vanish, a many-in-one in which every element, because related to every other, "is its own other," as completely as the most fervent Hegelian could wish. In particular, all the difficulties which Prof. James himself, when he was writing what after all, even against his will, remains his master-work, pointed out in the notion of mental states which compound themselves into a single consciousness, will cease to trouble. He will then understand how my sensations and yours can of themselves fuse to form the experience of the "earth-soul," and the experiences of the sun and his planets to form that of the soul of our system, and is even at liberty to think, if he likes, of a God whose consciousness is made by the fusion of all mental states, a regular Neo-Platonic "soul of the whole," though this supreme soul is apparently for Prof. James what an old Greek thinker called the moon, a "corker" in the cosmic boat. In a word, the way will be open to admission of the whole mythology of Fechner.

Now I have myself a great and long-standing admiration of Fechner's mythology, all the more because most of it comes straight out of Prof. James's enemy, Plato, but I am not so sure that I have an equal admiration for the short cut by which Prof. James reaches it. I doubt very much if it is ever the business of philosophy to invent short-circuit routes to its results. "Dive into the stream of sensible experience," says Prof. James, and by this I suppose he means that we are to revert to the stand-point of pure immediate experience, as it is felt before the fatal work of analysis has ever begun. It is his own metaphor that we are to "become as little children" to enter into the kingdom of Truth. But, as I remember, it is also Prof. James's own teaching that the world is to the little child "one big, buzzing, blooming confusion". Is it not reasonable, then, to think that if we mean to reach a view in which the confusion has become something fairly intelligible and communicable to others, we must not merely dive into the stream, but come up again with our report of the pearls we have found at its bottom; we may become little children, if we can, but it should be our aim as philosophers, no less than as Christians, to grow into the stature of the perfect man. What we need is not to do without

concepts, but to supply ourselves with better ones. Moreover, I feel, like Nicodemus, a doubt whether the "new birth" is even possible. Prof. James, at any rate, never seems to have taken his own prescription quite seriously. What he gives us, in the place of Monism, is not pure unanalysed experience, but experience analysed just so far as it commonly is analysed by the ordinary man under the pressure of the immediate practical affairs of life. His "vision" of the world is already one in which relations, though not isolated from their terms (did any sane person ever really perform such a feat of *χωρισμός*?), are distinguished from them, things distinguished from their qualities and positions, and so forth. He never really gets back to the primitive "buzzing, blooming confusion" at all; if he did, of course, his result would have become too intimately personal to be even communicable. Hence we are left entirely in the dark on the question why analysis should be carried just so far as to yield the kind of view Prof. James wants, but checked the moment it tends to go any farther. As a point of historical justice, it is strange that nothing should be said about the classic effort of Avenarius to construct precisely what Prof. James wants, a philosophy of "pure experience" *minus* all conceptual hypothesis, or about Prof. Ward's criticism of Monism, the results of which must, one would think, be wholly to the author's liking. Perhaps, however, the crime of Avenarius and Ward is that they make the attempt to justify their results to the understanding.

Frankly, I am amazed that Prof. James should imagine that the reality he describes has been purged of conceptual elements and brought back to the state of inarticulate sensation. To begin with, if you take the concrete moment of experience in all its detail, concepts figure in it as constituents no less than sensations. The concepts on which my mind is dwelling as I write these lines are just as much part of the total object present to me as the colours of the trees or the notes of the thrushes of which I am at this moment "marginally" aware. And, to take only the most general term in Prof. James's description of the moment, the word "continuum," if this is not the name of a very complex conception indeed, pray what does it stand for? I do not say a word against the stress laid upon the fact of immediate awareness and its supreme importance, nor do I deny that many of our Oxford thinkers, though emphatically not Mr. Bradley, have gone grievously wrong by trying to "mediate" everything. Nor do I deny that the total moment of immediate experience is incapable of being put together again out of the elements reflection detects in it, just as a living creature is incapable of being made from the "elements" into which the chemist decomposes it. But I do say that philosophy is not life, but reflection upon life, and that the philosopher's business is not simply to live,—that we all have to do,—but to interpret life, and that interpretation without concepts is impossible. Prof.

James speaks, and speaks truly, of the worth of "sympathetic insight" for the interpretation of the life of Nature, but we must not forget that the "insight" is as important in the process as the "sympathy". An Oxford tradition, possibly still existent, used to ascribe to Lewis Nettleship the saying, "How few of us really know what it would be like to be a triangle!" And, one may add, "How few of us know what it would be like to be a daisy, or to be the earth". Meanwhile, if we are to philosophise about the matter, we must at least be in a position to judge which of the conflicting divinations offered for our acceptance shows most "insight". We seem to be in danger just now of a reaction against systematic hard thinking. The demand seems to be for what Prof. James calls a "vision," an imaginative presentation of things which appeals to the emotions, but few seem to care whether the vision has any claim to be accounted veridical. Meanwhile those of us who cling to the conviction that the philosopher at least ought to give some ground for the acceptance of his vision, may at least comfort ourselves with the thought that on our view progress remains possible. We may not enjoy the distinction of the prophet, but we can at least hope that, as the contradictions and illogicalities of our conceptual scheme are realised, the vision of our successors will be clarified. But when logic has been dismissed, lock, stock and barrel, what is left to look for but a succession of "philosophies," like those of the German period of fermentation, each of which displaces its predecessor for no better reason than as this year's fashion, which is no more beautiful nor convenient, throws last year's fashion into the shade, or, I may say, as Prof. James, the great Pluralist, tries to wear the garb of Bergson the Monist, because it is "the newest mode, imported direct from Paris". To vary the phrase, Prof. James seems to me to hunger for the fine flour from God's mills, but to be too impatient of the slow turning of the wheels. And so we find him in his penultimate lecture willing to accept even the Absolute at any rate as a distant connection, provided no *proof* of identity is produced, while in the "last scene of all," we see the Absolute once more dismissed with disgrace, and are left with a plurality of finite "gods," each doing the best he can for himself and his little private state in the "federal republic" which calls itself the Universe, much as another federal republic sometimes arrogates to itself the name America. Yet there are some of us who think that the Federal Republic is not the ideal form of government, and Aristotle, it will be remembered, opted for "one god" on the ground of the advantages of monarchy.

This last lecture, with its undisguised bid for clerical support, suggests some interesting reflections. Prof. James truly says that no philosophy can be on the right lines unless it takes adequate account of our "religious experience". And I suspect that this is actually the real reason why the clergy, as he seems to complain, have not taken his philosophy so seriously as he could wish. Some-

how or other, while I find all that Prof. James writes about religion full of interest, he has always seemed to me not to apprehend the Christian position from the inside and with "sympathetic insight". In the present work, I see no hint that the Christian conception of God means to him anything different from a sentimental variety of Deism, and the clergy, after all, suppose themselves to be Christians. From their point of view, just the all-important point in the relation of God to man, is one on which Prof. James has nothing to say, that God has become man, and that the God-man has "overcome the world". This is what the "gods" of Prof. James have never done; each of them is "limited" by an environment in the face of which he is partly impotent, and which must therefore be regarded as to an unknown extent hostile; he has not "overcome," and there is no guarantee that he ever will. For all that the "vision" gives us, our special "god" may find himself bankrupt at any moment like the President of a South American republic. Nay, it is always in my personal power to make him bankrupt, if I will only doggedly refuse to measure good and evil by his standard. It may be urged that at any rate even so powerless a being, inasmuch as we can be fellow-workers with him, is less of a disappointment to religiously-minded men than the Absolute who has no fellows, and in whose hand we are mere clay in the hands of the potter. But is the disjunction, no God with whom we can have social relations, or a God of the polytheistic stamp, a complete one? The very facts of abnormal psychology to which Prof. James appeals for examples of the "compounding of mental states" seem to me to suggest a third possibility. For what some of them indicate is that while two personalities may both possess a common immediate experience, the total reaction of each on that experience may be different. One "self" may know directly the inmost thoughts and desires of the other, and yet may distinguish itself from that other and dislike or be amused by it.

What if this should be the type of relation between God and other centres of immediate experience? Then the immediate experience of God would include that of each "finite" centre, and yet God might distinguish Himself from each and all, and might, while e.g. immediately knowing all my motions of sinful desire, hate their sinfulness with a perfect hatred. God would, indeed, be the All-in-all, but He would not be all, He would have His environment, a social one made up of all other experiences, but it would contain no element of the unknown and unprovided for. The struggle against "the world, the flesh, and the devil" in me would be most fully real, and yet by what theologians call the "grace of God" provision would be made at every moment for the final victory. Such an alternative seems to me at once as legitimate as either of those which Prof. James contemplates, and, from the clerics' point of view, to do much fuller justice to the religious experience which finds expression in the cry, "If God be for us, who can be against

us?" Prof. James seems to forget that the Christian experience of God is not expressed whole and entire in the first article of the Creeds.

Incidentally, let me observe that in his new-found zeal for the "self-compounding of consciousness," Prof. James seems to stretch the principle to cover much that does not fall under it. It is even invoked to explain how A and B can both see the same sun, a fact which is oddly assumed to be unintelligible to the believer in logic. But in this case there is really no question of one mental state figuring as the content of two experiences in virtue of two acts of "self-compounding". A's sensation remains private to A and B's to B, just as A's retina is not B's nor B's retina A's. What is common is the sun which is seen, and this is not a "content" at all, but a physical object perceived *through* sensation. And the "intellectualist" treatment of the matter is quite simple. It consists in observing that there are such things as one-many relations, relations in which one term can stand at once to several. It is really no more contrary to logic that the same sun should be seen by both A and B than it is that the same man should owe money to both of them. Yes, you say, but is not your method of meeting the case as empirical as Prof. James could wish? I own at once that it is, and that all methods are, in the end, empirical. The only way to establish the being of a certain type of relation is to point to examples of it. But an empirical method is one thing, empiricism as a philosophy is another. You are following the empirical method when you establish the fact that there are prime numbers by pointing to 2 or 3 as examples. You would be accepting empiricism as a philosophy if you argued that we cannot be sure that there are not other even primes besides 2, because we have never examined each even number. The contemptuous rejection of logic makes Prof. James not merely a follower of the empirical method but an empiricist.

A word further as to the doctrine of the self-compounding of sensations to which Prof. James now confesses himself a convert. Surely it is an odd thing to give this name to the mere fact that many distinct constituents are present in a total moment of consciousness. As I look out of my window at this moment, I see a number of trees on the opposite side of the lane. But, when I try to analyse the fact, I find no traces of anything which can be called self-compounding. The *trees* do not "compound" themselves, they simply *are* there simultaneously. And my knowledge of their being there does not seem to be "self-compounded" of the individual knowledges of the presence of the separate trees; it is a single knowledge which has all the trees together for its object, an individual attitude of a knower to a complex whole. To drag in the isolated "sensation" as the knower of its own particular object seems to me to be a flagrant example of that abuse of conceptual hypothesis against which Prof. James's book is a prolonged protest.

In the nearest approaches I can make towards the recovery of a primitive experience which is to be all "immediate," I never find myself coming upon a sensation as the knower of anything. It is always I that know, however ill-discriminated the constituents of the known object may be. The very existence of the sensations through whose instrumentality I know seems to me a relatively late conceptual hypothesis which can only be verified by indirect argumentation. And this suggests to me that, from what Prof. James calls an "intellectualist" standpoint, the unity of the one and the many presents no difficulty. The many distinguishable things are one for me so far as I attend to them in one act. That is, they are one in virtue of a teleological principle of subjective interest. Whoever has formed the concept of interest or end, has, it seems to me, already at his disposal a conceptual category exhibiting plurality in unity. (And, in fact, I find that, once more following the much-decried Plato, it is only in virtue of reference to an end, by the light of the "good," that I can conceive of the Universe as one.) I venture to suggest, then, that Prof. James is not really called upon to make his recantation, and to express a hope that he may yet see reason to recall the recantation. To my mind, what he himself admits as a possibly fruitful departure, the reintroduction of the "soul" into our psychological thinking is what is really required to deliver us from the rival phantoms of the All-knower of whom we are merely states, and the sensations which are no one's and yet by "fusion" make a some one to whom they can pretend to belong. This last line of thought surely must end, with every one who has not thrown logic "fairly and squarely over-board," in proving the self to be mere illusion. It would be a singularly urbane instance of the irony of Fate if some such result were to be the last word of Pragmatism.

I have already said so much that I must forbear to add any remarks on Prof. James's Appendices which deal with the important concepts of Relation, Activity and Change. And there are still many topics in the lectures themselves which I have had most unwillingly to pass over. I hope I have at least made it clear that Prof. James has once more given us a book of great interest and fascination, however gravely I may doubt if the line he follows is likely to lead to steady progress towards a truer conception of the world. And I should like to lay emphasis on this last point for a particular reason. There is no charge which "Pragmatists" and "Humanists" are fonder of bringing against the "rationalist" than that of want of faith, unwillingness to believe where we cannot prove. Yet surely there is no nobler or more inspiring faith than the faith in reason itself and the belief which it carries along with it that bit by bit those who seek shall find. No sane rationalist, least of all Plato, has ever thought that he has learned all that there is to be known; his belief is simply that loyalty to reason is the right way to the attainment of truth, and that those who follow



that way after him will get nearer than himself to the light, and may perhaps be helped to do so by his own words and deeds. This may seem a tamer method of progress than the taking of erratic leaps in the dark, but is it not written in the sayings of the wise, *Claudus in via antecedit cursorem extra viam?*

A. E. TAYLOR.

*National Idealism and a State Church : a Constructive Essay in Religion.* By STANTON COIT, Ph.D. London: Williams and Norgate, 1907. Pp. ix, 386.

*National Idealism and the Book of Common Prayer : an Essay in Re-interpretation and Revision.* By STANTON COIT, Ph.D. London: Williams and Norgate, 1908. Pp. xxv, 467.

It is commonly stated (for instance, by Prof. Watson in his recent important work) that religion includes a creed, a ritual, and a life. Philosophical writers, naturally enough, have usually given their attention mainly to the question of creed, placing life next in importance, and giving very little prominence to the subject of ritual. Dr. Coit has on the whole reversed this order. Ritual stands with him in the forefront, and is considered primarily in its bearing on life; while the discussion of creed, though by no means absent, is relegated to the background. In a philosophical journal, however, it seems best to observe the usual order. Accordingly, I intend, in this review, to give some account, first of all, of Dr. Coit's creed, then of his general view of life, and only after that to notice briefly what he has to say about ritual. In other words, it is his metaphysical and ethical presuppositions that must claim our chief attention, rather than his application of these to the practical organisation of a church.

A large part of the significance of these books lies of course in the fact that they are a declaration of faith by the recognised leader of the 'ethical movement' in this country; and they are specially important as an indication of the way in which that movement may be connected with the general development of religious life and thought in our time. They bring out its connexion, not only with the Religion of Humanity and with Agnosticism, with which it is more particularly apt to be associated, but also with some of the more recent lines of growth within the Catholic Church, the Church of England, and the various dissenting bodies; and, in a more negative way, with Theosophy and Spiritualism. They show, in particular, its close relation to the teaching of Seeley and Matthew Arnold, to the 'Modernists,' to the Broad Church movement, and to what is commonly described as the 'New Theology'. It should be borne in mind, however, that the books are in no sense a manifesto of the ethical societies. Their leading tenets have been hotly assailed by some of those most intimately associated with the work of these societies—especially by Mrs. Gilliland Husband in a critical

notice published in the *Ethical World*. They must, therefore, be accepted only as an expression of Dr. Coit's own view of the essential nature of ethical religion.

The metaphysical presuppositions of Dr. Coit's doctrine are kept so much in the background that it is not altogether easy to bring them clearly into view. It seems doubtful, indeed, whether he has ever quite definitely formulated them to himself. He characterises his own position, somewhat vaguely, as that of 'humanistic idealism'; but there are points at which one cannot but feel a certain suspicion that humanistic idealism, as he understands it, is not very widely removed from naturalistic materialism. He says in one passage (*State Church*, p. 161): 'Atomism, materialism and mechanism, although never for an instant to be denied in the domain of physics and chemistry, are an utter irrelevance in a scheme for the moral redemption of mankind. Morals treat of matters wholly disparate.' If this means merely that atomism, materialism and mechanism are good working hypotheses in physics and chemistry, no objection need be raised to it—though the work of some recent physicists would seem to show that, even for their purposes, these conceptions are in need of some revision. But the statement quoted might be held to carry us somewhat farther. On the whole, however, Dr. Coit's view evidently is that physics and chemistry do not deal with ultimate reality; and that this must be interpreted as mental. 'The universe,' he states, 'does not exist except as it is perceived'; and 'the forms and categories which are the framework of the perceived universe are given to it by the mind itself' (*Common Prayer*, p. 171). He further suggests that the human mind is 'essentially ethical will'; and that, consequently, 'Plato's doctrine of the Good as the ultimate idea' may be accepted as philosophically sound. Such statements might seem to imply that Dr. Coit is an idealist in the sense in which Plato, Hegel, T. H. Green and others were idealists—the sense in which Kant may be regarded as having laid the foundations of modern idealism. But he does not appear to discriminate sufficiently between the doctrine that the universe is what we perceive—or that it is 'experience'—and the doctrine that it is to be interpreted as a system in essential relation to a self-conscious end. The former is subjective or Berkeleyan idealism; whereas the latter is the kind of idealism to which the followers of Kant have been pointing; and the distinction between them is fundamental. Now, I judge, from the general tenor of Dr. Coit's language, that, in spite of his occasional references to Plato and Kant, it is idealism of the former type that he has mainly in his mind—idealism of the type that both Plato and Kant thought they had refuted.<sup>1</sup> His attitude is essentially a subjective one; and this seems to me to be of the utmost importance, as determining the view that he is led to take both of religion and of life. His point

<sup>1</sup> Plato in the *Theatetus* and *Parmenides*, Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason* ('Refutation of Idealism').

of view in this respect, as well as in some others, might be profitably compared with that of Dr. Rashdall; but indeed the confusion between the two different types of idealism is too wide-spread among our philosophical writers to be made a legitimate subject of complaint in the case of one who is not professedly metaphysical. I need only add that Dr. Coit's constant use of the term 'Humanism' might suggest to some readers a certain affinity with the pragmatists; and he seems, in one passage, at least (*Common Prayer*, p. 171), to recognise such an affinity. But I believe it to be on the whole a superficial affinity. He uses the term 'Humanism' in a wider and, I think, a better sense than that which has recently been made popular; and indeed the general attitude of William James is one of those that he most vigorously attacks. (See especially *State Church*, chap. i.)

At the same time, I must confess that it is not altogether clear to me why he does not go a good deal farther with the pragmatists than he does. If the universe is simply a creation of the human mind, it is hard to see why the human mind should not proceed to transform that creation as it pleases. The really practical course would seem to be that suggested by Omar Khayyám. If we have made the universe somewhat badly, why should we not set ourselves at once to

‘shatter it to bits, and then  
Remould it nearer to the heart's desire?’

One would like to know what, according to Dr. Coit, is the source of those limitations which cause human life to be always—as he recognises that it is—a struggle of good against evil.

When we pass from Dr. Coit's metaphysical to his more purely ethical presuppositions, we find a somewhat similar indeterminateness; and in this case it is perhaps even more to be regretted. We know, of course, from some of his other writings, that he is a convinced utilitarian; and there is at least one passage in these books (*Common Prayer*, p. 66) in which he gives a slight indication of this fact; but it is a passage in which he states that he has ‘not resolved the socially expedient into the happiness-producing; because . . . even if universal happiness be the ultimate goal, there is no practical necessity for exacting a recognition of it’. He contents himself, accordingly, with the vaguer statement, that he takes ‘as the universal test or standard of right conduct what might be called the advancement of social welfare’. ‘I have assumed,’ he says, ‘that what is best for the social life, what is well ultimately for the nation, is right’. In another passage (*Common Prayer*, pp. 237-8) this view is explained biologically. ‘According to the law of natural selection, it is easy to show that those tribes among whom deeds destructive to the community were applauded and honoured soon became extinct. It is easy to see, on the other hand, that a habit of disinterestedly approving deeds of self-sacrifice for

the general welfare would be a tribal asset of considerable value.' And the following summary statement is italicised (*ibid.*, p. 235): 'Only after men have discovered that a line of conduct leads to general prosperity have they called it righteous'. On the whole, then, we may take it that national prosperity is to be regarded as the ultimate good at which we are to aim; and that prosperity is to be interpreted as meaning the maximum of pleasure. This view I cannot here attempt to discuss. I only note in passing that, while it seems to be thoroughly in harmony with the subjective type of idealism previously referred to, it might be more difficult to reconcile it with the Platonic or Kantian conception of what is ultimately good for man.

Turning now to Dr. Coit's view of religion, we find that he presents us with the following definition—'It is the focussing of men's attention steadfastly and reverently upon some being from which they believe that they have derived the greatest benefits, in order to derive still further benefits' (*State Church*, p. 291). I cannot but think that the word 'reverently' ought to be omitted here, as it is almost synonymous with 'religiously,' and is consequently out of place in a definition. I suggest that we substitute for it some such phrase as 'accompanied by the feelings that are naturally connected with this attitude of mind'. The definition thus given is obviously open to the objection that it identifies religion with a form of self-interest. Some religions are so, and indeed quite frankly so; but it can hardly be supposed that this is true of the highest forms of the religious consciousness. Dr. Coit seeks to guard against this by explaining (especially in the Foreword to *Common Prayer*) that the benefits sought in the highest forms of religion are social benefits. In fact, it is part of his contention that religion, in the only forms in which it has much real significance, is essentially a social phenomenon. The ultimate type of religion, if I understand his view rightly, is that in which the attention of a people is concentrated upon its own highest efforts as the source of national prosperity. The conception of social unity which he thus introduces, and which is accompanied by a running polemic against all forms of individualism, naturally raises the question whether it is quite consistent with the view that the ultimate good for man is pleasure—which is surely an individual feeling. But this is the rock on which all utilitarian theories split; and it would be out of place to do more than call attention to it at this point.

Now, the object of religious devotion is God; for this term means simply (*State Church*, p. 162) 'any Power which has become an object of worship'. It follows that, in the ultimate form of religion, God means the strenuous effort of a nation directed towards its own prosperity—i.e., it would appear, towards the maximum pleasure of the individuals who compose it. Dr. Coit points out that God, thus conceived, may appropriately be represented as a Trinity (*Common Prayer*, chap. v.). For the conception includes the

general principle involved in the effort, the persons by whom the effort is made, and the social organisation through which the efforts of these individuals are sustained. (See, especially, pp. 159-161.) God the Father would thus seem to mean the general idea of human prosperity as the inspiring principle of action ; God the Son would mean each individual human being in so far as he participates in such action ; while God the Holy Ghost would mean any form of social organisation that is directed to this end—such as a Church or Ethical Society or the Independent Labour Party. These three forms of the divine Dr. Coit regards as equally real and important, but at the same time as inseparable from one another. I think it might be urged, however, that in practice he hardly gives as much importance to God the Son as to the other two. In this respect his view might be contrasted with that of Dr. McTaggart, whose metaphysical position is not really very widely different,<sup>1</sup> but with whom the persistent reality of the individual tends almost to supersede both the unity of the Father and the formative influence of the Holy Ghost. Dr. Coit is peculiarly emphatic in his scorn for any theories of the persistence of human personality. (See, for instance, *Common Prayer*, pp. 107-108.) I am inclined to think that, if he recognised more fully the divinity of the Son, he might be led at the same time to a somewhat fuller recognition of the personality of the Father, and perhaps also to a somewhat less purely socialistic view of the Holy Ghost. But this is only an *obiter dictum*.

It is on these general presuppositions that Dr. Coit bases his conception of a State Church. The discussion of this lies rather outside the scope of a purely philosophical journal ; but a few remarks may be permitted. The main points in his conception are easily understood. The need for a democratic basis in Church organisation follows from his general position. *Vox populi vox dei* is for him almost literally true—indeed, it is almost a tautology ; but it is true only when we are dealing with the voice of the people acting as a whole, and with its mind concentrated upon the idea of national prosperity. The Church, in particular, when it is organised on a thoroughly democratic basis, is to be regarded as God the Holy Ghost—God engaged, as we might say, in the organisation of His own worship. So far all seems plain enough. When, however, we ask what is the relation between the Church, thus conceived, and the central government of the country, the answer is not so clear. Dr. Coit emphasises, in many places, the close connexion of the Church with education. In one passage, for instance (*State Church*, p. 67), he makes the following statement : ‘ Any education which is not religious is bad ; and any religion which is not educative in an all-round and comprehensive sense is false. Elementary schools are the churches of the children, as the churches are the schools of

<sup>1</sup> For he also, as I think, inclines to a somewhat subjective interpretation of Idealism. Of course, I am aware that he prefers to avoid the use of the term God, which he defines differently.

adults. In so far as the organised churches are not instructing the people in science and art as well as in the principles of righteousness, in so far they fall short of being churches. On the other hand, as I have just been saying, in so far as any other bodies are doing true educational work of any kind, they are in so far churches. It would appear from this that Dr. Coit understands by a church very nearly the same as most other people understand by a university; except that he conceives that university teaching should be connected with an elaborate ritual, leading men to subordinate all their studies to the great end of national prosperity; and that a similar aim should be at the basis of the organisation of the schools. Now, Dr. Coit recognises also (*ibid.*, p. 68) that 'the transference of the control of elementary schools from *ad hoc* governing bodies to county councils and other authorities which are not purely educational,' was a 'retrogressive turn'. It would appear, therefore, that the government of the Church—or, in other words, the government of education—ought to be kept separate from the control of other municipal, national, or imperial affairs. It would be, as it were, a state within the state. Many questions naturally arise in connexion with this, which we cannot here do more than indicate. The first question would be, whether it is right to identify worship with education. Many hold that education, so far as it is organised by the state, should be strictly secular; and even those who think that there should be some religious teaching in state schools would seldom be prepared to urge that it should be all religious. Especially if religion is to mean the concentration of our attention upon national prosperity, it might surely be maintained that there is a legitimate place for a more disinterested love of knowledge and beauty, without any direct reference to this ultimate end. Another question would be, whether it is desirable that all education should be under direct popular control. Dr. Coit seems to think that it is implied in the general principle of social democracy, that everything must be so controlled. (See, especially, *State Church*, p. 193.) Would he insist that even Newspapers should be conducted by the nation as a whole? It is worth noting that some recent Socialists have begun to recognise that, even if most things were brought under the control of a national mechanism, it would still be desirable to leave some things to voluntary control. But I suppose Dr. Coit would say that such socialists are anarchists at heart; and perhaps he would be right. It seems possible to maintain, however, that, while it is the business of the state to provide for its children such an education as is necessary to enable them to become efficient citizens, it is not its business to try to control the development of their individualities or their relations with larger forms of unity than the state itself. But this raises what is perhaps the most fundamental question of all—Is there any real reason why the religious life should be regarded as specially national, rather than cosmopolitan? On this it may be worth while to offer a few observations.

It seems to me to be the most fundamental defect of Dr. Coit's social philosophy, that he identifies the social organism too purely with the state. It was partly this that I had in mind at an earlier point, when I said that his particular type of idealism is not far removed from materialism. A nation struggling for its own prosperity is no doubt somewhat better than an individual engaged upon a similar effort; but it is surely not the highest conception of social unity. It tends, indeed, to become the conception of a social mechanism, rather than that of a social or spiritual organism. The machinery by which a state is bound together does no doubt give it a more apparent unity than that which belongs to any other mode of social relationship; but ties of a more cosmopolitan kind may often be finer, subtler and more truly spiritual. Social democracy itself, to which Dr. Coit is so warmly devoted, is essentially a cosmopolitan movement. So is ethical religion. So is, or was, the Roman Catholic Church. So is Buddhism. Indeed, it might be urged that Dr. Coit's view involves the denial of that unity of the divine on which he himself in some places insists. (See, for instance, *Common Prayer*, p. 164.) The Holy Ghost is surely not to be identified with any one form of social unity. It should rather be interpreted as the underlying significance of social development as a whole. This would, I think, have become more apparent if Dr. Coit had taken a wider view of the history of social evolution, instead of confining his attention in the main to Judaism and Christianity. The Greek philosophers, for instance, tended to think of the social organism in the form of a City State; but it is easy for us, looking back, to see that the Greek City States were contained within the larger unity of the Hellenic nationality, from which some of the best elements of their life were derived, and with which, in particular, their religious ideas were inseparably connected. A modern nation is a larger and more complex whole than a Greek City State; and it is also included within a still larger unity, which tends more and more to become that of the civilised world.

Dr. Coit, however, seeks to bring his view more particularly into relation with the religious consciousness of the Jews; and he is no doubt right in thinking that we have here the supreme instance of a national religion, in which the effort after national prosperity was a leading element. It must be left to experts in Hebrew literature to determine how far such an interpretation of the Jewish religion is complete. To the lay mind I think it will be apt to appear that there are other aspects of it that are hardly less important. Surely the God of the Jews was not merely thought of as the embodiment of their national aspirations, but also in some degree as the maker and ruler of the universe. And indeed Dr. Coit's own philosophy would seem to imply that the human mind, in its efforts after the good, is rightly to be regarded in this way. It is not quite apparent, therefore, why he should seek to minimise this aspect of the Jewish religion, as on the whole he seems to do.



In his estimate of Christianity, again, I am inclined to think that he does not sufficiently recognise the significance of this movement as directed against the purely national conception of religion. The emphasis that it laid on cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and on the heart and conscience of the individual, on the other, can hardly be properly appreciated from such a point of view as that of Dr. Coit. It is true that some forms of Christianity have taken on the appearance of national religion; but it may be doubted whether its essential spirit can ever be identified with any such forms. It may be doubted also whether any one who is trying to construct the religion of the future—which appears to be Dr. Coit's aim—can afford to overlook other cosmopolitan systems of religion, such as Buddhism. But on these points I cannot here enlarge.

Most of what Dr. Coit has to say on the subject of Ritual is of great interest. The essence of it is, I think, contained in the well-known statements of Hume: 'The ceremonies of the Roman Catholic religion may be considered as instances of the same nature [*i.e.* of the way in which beliefs may be engendered]. The devotees of that superstition usually plead in excuse for the mummeries with which they are upbraided, that they feel the good effect of those external motions, and postures, and actions, in enlivening their devotion and quickening their fervour, which otherwise would decay, if directed entirely to distant and immaterial objects. We shadow out the objects of our faith, say they, in sensible types and images, and render them more present to us by the immediate presence of these types, than it is possible for us to do, merely by an intellectual view and contemplation' (*Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, sect. v.). Dr. Coit illustrates and emphasises this in many ways, and shows how the general principle may be used in the interests of ethical religion. He seeks also to remove the leading objections that are felt by many to the extensive use of an elaborate ritual. (See, especially, *State Church*, chap. xi.) I am not sure that he is altogether successful in this. It is the very efficacy of ritual that leads many of us to distrust it. It tends to give too great a permanence to beliefs that may have only a transient significance, and too great a definiteness to the gropings of the human mind after truth. I think there is some lack of historical perspective in the emphasis that Dr. Coit lays upon ritual. There have been times in the history of the human race when it was specially important to impress upon men's minds a few simple fundamental beliefs; and this had to be done by means of striking ceremonies, powerful organisations, and definite creeds, even at the risk of stamping in the false along with the true, the transient along with the eternal. Our generation has the task of sifting out these divergent elements; and it may be doubted whether at such a time ritual can have any such part to play as it has had at certain periods in the past. This is not to say, of course, that it ought to be entirely neglected; but only that it must probably be more and more subordinated to the problems of creed and life.

Similar criticisms might be applied to the more detailed elaboration, in the volume dealing with the Book of Common Prayer, of those general principles that are set forth in the earlier book; but I must content myself here with a slight reference to a single point. The treatment of the Ten Commandments is one of the discussions that have most definite philosophical interest. Here the recognised commandments are taken as a basis, and an attempt is made to remodel them in such a way as to make them an expression of the best moral ideas of the present time. Such an attempt has certainly some value; just as there is some value in the effort to use Aristotle's list of virtues as the basis for a more modern classification. But in both cases I think it must be added that the interest of the tables is largely historical. It is interesting to know that there was a time when the Jews found it convenient to sum up the most important duties that were recognised by them in the form of ten commandments; and it is interesting to know that there was a time when the Greeks found it convenient to sum up the most important civic excellences that were recognised by them in the form of lists of virtues. It is also interesting to compare these tables; to criticise them; to consider in what respects they satisfy, and in what respects they fail to satisfy, the requirements of the modern conscience. But, when all this has been done, it surely becomes apparent that neither a list of commandments nor a list of virtues is of very much use to us. It is not in either of these forms that we naturally set before ourselves what is expected of the good citizen. Such compendia would be apt to be more a hindrance than a help to us. In their historical setting they retain a great value; and we may profit greatly by reflexion upon them. But it may be doubted whether it is worth while to remodel them for present use. And somewhat similar remarks apply to most of Dr. Coit's reconstructions. In general, he seems to me to have given too much attention to the effort to revise and reinterpret (in ways that occasionally become almost grotesque) the letter of antique forms, and relatively too little (though, I gladly admit, a good deal) to revive the spirit in which they were made, and to use it as an instrument for the building up of newer kinds of expression.

But I am anxious not to conclude with a note of doubt and disagreement. It is often made a reproach against our British writers, that they do not deal freely and openly with ultimate theological issues. These two books, along with one or two others that have recently appeared, ought to go far to remove this reproach. On theological and religious questions—as distinguished from ultimate metaphysical and ethical presuppositions—Dr. Coit always states exactly what he means, with the utmost clearness and directness. And, even when he is dealing with somewhat ancient creeds, he is always concerned, in reality, with living issues. Subjective Idealism, Humanism, Hedonism, Social Democracy, Moral and Religious Education, the existence of a State Church, the Religion of Human-

ity—all these are problems that are very much alive for us. If few can quite agree with the particular manner in which they are brought together by Dr. Coit, yet the very attempt to bring them together in a coherent way can hardly fail to throw a fresh light upon each of them. And for his moral enthusiasm, the vigour of his style, and the many fresh illustrations that he has collected from various sources, there can be nothing but praise. I cannot believe that a purely humanistic basis for religion can be ultimately satisfactory; but Dr. Coit is certainly one of the most convincing and inspiring of its advocates—partly perhaps because he comes rather near to the transcendence of its limits. If he had thought out a little more fully what is involved in the idealism that he professes, he would speedily have been led to a very different conception both of religion and of morality. But, at any rate, whatever we may think of the value of his conclusions, it may at least be said, with truth, that, in both these books, there is not a dull page from beginning to end.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

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*What is Pragmatism?* By JAMES BISSETT PRATT, Ph.D. Pp. xii, 256. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909.

THIS book consists of a series of six popular lectures, originally delivered in 1908 at an American "Summer School". As Mr. Pratt explains in his preface, his object has been to produce "a book which (while not presupposing any prior knowledge of the subject) shall present, with some attempt at comprehensiveness and unity, the position of those who find themselves unable to accept the pragmatist view" (pp. ix-x). He also tells us: "When the movement first began I was an enthusiastic pragmatist, and my enthusiasm lasted until I came to understand clearly what it really meant" (p. x). Thus the book presents a novelty to science in that its author is the first known case of a convert *from* pragmatism. But in it we find none of the traditional acrimony of the convert. On the contrary, the book is a model of controversial fairness and good-temper. Nevertheless its perusal yields no clear answer to the question, Why has Mr. Pratt renounced Pragmatism? In part his relapse into a hesitating Intellectualism seems due to his *not* having, after all, quite clearly understood what pragmatists "really mean". But his objections to pragmatism cannot all be regarded as misapprehensions of the actual intentions of pragmatist writers. In part they are due to his persuasion that, whatever the actual aims of real live pragmatists, the ideal pragmatist (of whom Prof. Dewey is apparently the nearest earthly representative) is logically imprisoned in Solipsism, a *Weltanschauung* which Mr. Pratt is doubtless right in regarding as practically untenable. Such a position on the part of a critic is of course by no means indefensible in the abstract. But Mr. Pratt's conclusion that, "if strictly carried

out to its logical conclusions, pragmatism is essentially a philosophy of scepticism" (p. 210), seems hard to reconcile with the concessions he makes to pragmatic theory, and the tribute he pays some of its actual achievements.

"Certain it is that the only truths we know or can know contain *ipso facto* a human element, and that this element cannot be lightly despised. It is in the pointing out of just this fact . . . that the chief merit of pragmatism or humanism lies. . . . We have only sincere admiration for the brilliant exposition given by them [James, Schiller and Dewey] of the contributions which we men make to our own truth" (pp. 56-57).

"Our beliefs are intellectual tools which serve us in more or less useful ways. The process by which they get themselves verified and thus cease to be mere claims and become truths, . . . all this can be traced within the stream of consciousness as concrete psychic fact. . . . The truth is that which works best, and that which works best is the truth. Successful working is thus the tag or ear-mark by which we distinguish the true idea" (pp. 60-62).

"In its attack upon the identification of truth with reality, pragmatism has done a genuine service to the cause of clear thinking" (p. 55).

The difficulty of harmonising Mr. Pratt's commendation and condemnation of pragmatism is enhanced when we observe that what he concedes with one hand he is apt to take back with the other. In the second of the above-quoted passages he speaks of claims *becoming* truths by the process of verification. He even goes so far as to say (p. 87) that "the pragmatist contention that a claim must be verified in order to become 'a truth' is neither novel nor open to any serious criticism". And yet he finishes this last sentence by saying: "But the pragmatist takes it for granted that once this is admitted it follows that the claim is *made true* by being verified and that its trueness consists in its verification". That is to say, he requires us to draw a distinction between "becoming a truth by being verified" and "being made true by being verified".<sup>1</sup> Mr. Pratt's position, so far as we can gather with the help of the explanations given on pages 58-59, is that the pragmatist theory of the relation of "truth" to "working" is so unobjectionable in itself that for the sake of peace he will "agree to define" truth in those terms; while the consequences of accepting that definition are so momentous and so horrible that for the sake of truth he must energetically repudiate the substance of the definition.

In justice, however, to Mr. Pratt, we hasten to add that his defence of unverified truth is by far the weakest thing in the book, and we will not linger over it. He shows to much better controversial advantage in his main line of attack.

"The complete definition of knowledge," he says, "must include something which distinguishes the true from the false, a reference to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 59 n., where the confusion seems to reach a climax.

a reality beyond the experience itself which makes it true. . . . Here in fact is the crucial point of the controversy—the pragmatists insisting that knowledge can be sufficiently described and defined without going beyond the experience of the knowing individual; the non-pragmatists maintaining that a reference to something outside of his experience is essential. And, in a sense, the whole problem may be said to hinge on the question of mistaken or false opinion. How will the pragmatist interpret this? The question really is unavoidable: When one is mistaken but satisfied, does he know?" (pp. 164-167). [The prior and really relevant question is, How does A *know* that B is mistaken?] "Unless there be transcendence, there is no criterion for judging between two opinions, except, of course, the relative subjective satisfactoriness of the two" (p. 169).

Mr. Pratt hardly goes far enough in saying that "in a sense" the problem turns on the question of discriminating truth from error. Pragmatists have been at pains to point out that this is the really vital issue. But our author fails to see that what we want is not a verbal distinction between truth and error, but an explanation of how mistakes are actually detected and corrected. He has not grasped the really revolutionary character of pragmatist logic; and so has not realised how largely his criticism rests on preconceptions as to the function of logic which pragmatism directly challenges. He would hardly have so missed the real *fundamentum* of the controversy if he had included the writings of Alfred Sidgwick in his study of pragmatist literature.

I repeat that the Sidgwickian attitude in logic amounts to a revolution in that science. For whereas the old, or intellectualist, logic ambitiously inquired into the ideal meaning of "truth" for an *infallible* consciousness, and then contented itself with a merely *formal* answer, pragmatist logic humbly asks, What must be the actual meaning of "truth" for a *fallible* consciousness such as ours?—and then insists on getting a *real* answer. It insists, that is, on knowing how truth and rationality must be conceived, if truth-seeking is to be a rational pursuit *for us*. Nor can it be too much emphasised that the pragmatic identification of truth with usefulness primarily concerns the "truths" of logic as such. Logical "truths," when so "refined" and "abstract" as to be incapable of *utilisation* in the establishment of concrete truths, are of use only to those who make a not too reputable living by teaching them. The humanist may be excused for describing so limited a utility as practical uselessness. And to the question how this kind of practical uselessness is to be distinguished from theoretical meaninglessness no intellectualist philosopher has as yet given an intelligible answer.

For those who like their problems served up in a severely technical form, and look with suspicion on any formulation of the fundamental philosophical problem in which the phrase "possibility of knowledge" does not occur, we humbly submit the problem in

this form: How must Knowledge and Error be defined, in order that (a) the possibility of attaining knowledge, and (b) liability to error can simultaneously inhere in one and the same mind? Intellectualist philosophers have invariably attempted to frame a conception of "absolute truth" which shall *exclude* all possibility of error *ex officio*. I.e., they have arbitrarily substituted, for the useful distinction between truth and error, a relation of mutual exclusiveness between the possibility of knowledge and the possibility of error—and then they have been naïvely surprised to find that the bare fact of our human liability to error must *ex hypothesi* eternally debar us from attaining to real "knowledge". And as in his capacity of a human being the devotee of "absolute truth" is not himself an incarnation thereof, his logical position would seem to be extremely delicate, not to say perilous. The philosopher who regards truth and infallibility as inseparable must either gain the Whole Truth or be hurled to intellectual perdition. He must either become a Super-Pope or else an utter sceptic.

Such is the dilemma we would oppose to the one in which Mr. Pratt asks us to choose between pragmatism and the principle of contradiction (p. 121). His dilemma would have force only if pragmatism had claimed to possess an infallible criterion of absolute truth—the very thing the proved futility of which has called pragmatism into existence! In fact all that Mr. Pratt's dilemma really proves is that the correspondence-notion is as purely formal as the abstract principle of contradiction itself. The abstract "truth" that A cannot be both B and not-B does not help us to make up our minds as to which of these two A really is. Neither does the correspondence theory. Intellectualism indeed, as a "system of thought," is just the systematic neglect of this question, which the pragmatist's coarsely practical mind insists on regarding as the real problem of logic. Now Mr. Pratt admits that the pragmatic principle *alone* enables us to decide between real alternatives. As the only way of discovering error is by practical failure, so the only *applicable criterion* for distinguishing truth from error is that of experimental success. What meaning then is left in the assertion that the correspondence theory does, and the pragmatic principle does not, "distinguish the true from the false"? Of what use to us is "something which distinguishes the true from the false" *per se*, if it does not enable us so to distinguish it?

Ultimately, Mr. Pratt's theory of truth is an attempt to combine two conceptions of "truth" which are not only severally futile, but are also, so far as they have any apparent meaning, of the Kilkenny-cat description when combined. He demands a "truth" which shall be (a) "true" of a transcendent "reality," (b) theoretically infallible. Now the first demand, while assuming that for truth to exist "reality" must be independent, at the same time defines that independence as *independence of verification*. For if a belief, in order to be "true," must "correspond" with a "reality"

which preserves its independence by remaining *transcendent*, then we can never *know* that it is true, nor can we ever discover it to be false.<sup>1</sup> In short, "transcendence" means independence of verification; and that is why we say it has no real meaning at all. *Per contra*, the second demand is one for *absolute verification*. The only thing that these two demands have in common is that neither can justify either the adoption or rejection of any actual assertion about reality. Each therefore "makes knowledge impossible" in the only legitimate sense of that sorely misused expression. That is to say, knowledge, as "theoretically" defined, in practice ceases to be any concern of *ours*. For if "reality" is "independent" (in the sense defined) of our judgments, then, reciprocally, our judgments must be independent of it. In deciding for or against any proffered "truth," we must be guided by something more rational than the vain desire to get in touch with a "reality" which is *ex hypothesi* beyond our reach. If, on the other hand, we are not prepared to face the risk of deciding "wrongly," i.e. of having subsequently to change our minds, then we shall do wisely to take up some other occupation than that of thinking. Risk is as inalienable a condition of intellectual as of physical life.

Another objection to which Mr. Pratt attaches importance is that "the test of truth is one thing; the nature of truth is another" (p. 75). Or, as he puts it elsewhere: "The meaning or nature of a material, a quality, a relation, is one thing; the sign by which you make sure of its presence is another. And in like manner . . . the ear-mark by which we have now learned to tell a true idea from a false one [i.e. by "successful working"] does not answer the further question, what we mean by its being true" (p. 64). The distinction in question is indeed, as Mr. Pratt says, "obvious," but, in the use he makes of it, it is meaningless. For if *every* condition that justifies our bestowing the name A on a given thing be classed as a mere "tag" of A, what will be left over to constitute the "meaning" of A? The distinction, when taken so absolutely as Mr. Pratt takes it in the case of "truth," becomes a distinction between *all* the nameable characteristics of A on the one side and the unknowable nature of A as a *Ding-an-sich* on the other. The pragmatist's way of avoiding this Charybdis of the Thing-in-itself is to retort that whatever we agree to accept as the *ultimate test* of whether so-called A deserves its name, becomes for us the meaning of that name. Thus an inquiry into the *ultimate applicable criterion* of truth is the sole form that any inquiry into the meaning of truth can take, if that inquiry is itself to have any real meaning.

The charge of Solipsism which Mr. Pratt brings against pragmatism<sup>2</sup> must be dealt with more briefly. Stated as concisely as

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dr. Schiller on "The Rationalistic Conception of Truth" in *Aristot. Soc. Proc.* for 1908-9.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 121-123 and note. In principle Lecture V. (on "Pragmatism and Religion") is a development of this line of attack.



possible, his argument is this: To identify the concrete truth of an assertion with the experiences which validate it is to reduce all reality—and therefore the reality of other selves—to conscious states of the experiencing individual. It is possible that *Deweyism* may lend itself to this interpretation—except in so far as by minimising the importance of personality it tends to substitute a sort of pan-subjectivism for solipsism. But Prof. Dewey, I apprehend, may well be left to take care of himself. It is noteworthy, though, that our author seeks to fortify his position by quoting a criticism of Dewey on James (pp. 202-203). It is, in fact, quite certain that James and Schiller expressly repudiate the ultra-subjectivist *intentions* which Mr. Pratt attributes to Dewey.<sup>1</sup> And I fail to see why, even if Dewey has overshot the mark, James and Schiller must necessarily be made to suffer for it, or why the good that Mr. Pratt admits is to be found in pragmatism must necessarily come to so bad an end. However, I cannot now do much more than suggest that here again the root of the trouble is that, when pragmatists mention the word "truth," Mr. Pratt's fancy lightly turns to thoughts of infallibility. But, as we have already seen, it is just this identification of truth with infallibility which, while it leads to absolute idealism when one regards one's self as an official mouthpiece of the Infinite, leads to absolute scepticism in one's private capacity as a "finite centre". In fact, as Dr. Schiller has demonstrated, since the Absolute is a Solipsist, in trying to be as like It as we can, we too must become solipsists. If therefore pragmatism also should in the end lead to solipsism, then solipsism must indeed be the Rome to which all philosophical paths converge. But the truth is rather that this Rome, like that other, is a predestined goal only for those who, with hearts set on infallibility, have the intelligence to recognise its incompatibility with the right of private judgment.

Because he has not realised this aspect of the case, Mr. Pratt has misconceived the real nature of the opposition between the correspondence—theory of truth and pragmatism. They are not, as he supposes, conflicting answers to one and the same question. Pragmatism (of the James Schiller variety at least) is not, as he supposes, a denial of the formal relation of "otherness" as between "subject" and "object". It is essentially the determination to substitute the spirit of living, progressive, human truth for the dead formalism of the cult of verbal "exactitude" and dogmatic "finality". We simply deprecate as futile the assuming of a *transcendent and absolute* reality as the standard to which our actual judgments are to "correspond". For (a) if an absolute standard were available for actual comparison the comparison itself would be purely superfluous. We should already be *de facto* in possession of absolute and infallible certitude. And (b) to say that the reality is transcendent is simply to say that it is *not*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dr. Schiller on *Solipsism*, in N.S., 70: especially pp. 170-171 and 180 f.

available as a standard at all. We do indeed distinguish, in all our judgments, between the circumambient "reality" and our own private "experience". But, in the first place, this distinction is *within* "experience" in the wider sense; and it is this wider sense which is relevant to pragmatic theory. And, in the second place, the "reality," or environment, that we so distinguish ourselves from, is still reality *as it appears to us*; so that at any given moment our beliefs must be in exact formal correspondence with it. That *this* reality corresponds with our judgments is only another way of saying that it responds to, and keeps step with, every advance in our knowledge. Hence this immanent "reality" avails as little as the unknowable transcendent "reality" to stamp our actual beliefs with finality—though for precisely the opposite reason. Just because it is accessible to thought, it does not itself possess finality. Thus the pragmatic objection to the correspondence-theory is not that we cannot distinguish between ourselves and the environment, whether material or spiritual, to which we consciously react. We insist that this conscious reaction, which is always experimental, is the very marrow of the distinction. Our real objection to the correspondence-theory, in the form in which it is held by Mr. Pratt, is that the "theory" is essentially a confusion between the immanent "reality" which is known, but is not absolute for knowledge nor rigidly indifferent to our purposes, and the "absolute reality" whose transcendence is only another name for unknowableness, and whose stability is only another name for irrelevance to human problems. When philosophers once consent seriously to consider the difference between these two "realities," I am confident that Mr. Pratt will be among the first to be (re)converted to Pragmatism.

HOWARD V. KNOX.

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*The Religious Teachers of Greece ; being Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion delivered at Aberdeen.* By JAMES ADAM, Litt.D., Hon. LL.D. of Aberdeen University, Fellow and Senior Tutor of Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Edited, with a Memoir, by his wife, Adela Marion Adam. Edinburgh : T. & T. Clark, 1908.

THE writer of these Lectures, whose early death will be lamented by all who knew anything of him or his writings, was one of those scholars who studied ancient Philosophy in and for itself, and not—after the fashion so prevalent in Oxford—as an introduction to Philosophy in general, an introduction to be interpreted in the light of the modern Philosophy which has grown out of it, even if it is not so interpreted as to be made almost identical with the particular modern system which happens to command the allegiance of the interpreter. But he was very far from regarding ancient Philo-

sophy merely as a matter of antiquarian interest. Very early in life Dr. Adam, as we learn from the beautifully written little memoir prefixed to the Lectures by Mrs. Adam, was fascinated by Plato. Plato became to him not merely his principal interest as a scholar, but a guide for life, an enthusiasm, almost a Religion. Throughout life he might very well have been described as a Christian Platonist. In early days the emphasis would have been very decidedly on the Platonist: later he was, we should gather from the tone of the Lectures, and from the Memoir, more and more impressed by the essential harmony between a liberally interpreted Christianity and the spirit of Plato, though he was far too genuine a scholar to countenance crude and uncritical attempts to make Plato talk Paulinism or St. Paul Platonism.

This attitude of mind was probably a positive advantage in dealing with the particular side of ancient thought which is the subject of the Lectures. The book represents a systematic attempt—critical and yet very sympathetic—to estimate the exact attitude of mind on religious questions of each writer—poet or philosopher—with whom he deals. Though doubtless not unacquainted with the general course of modern philosophic thought, he does not appear at any time to have devoted himself very seriously to modern Philosophy. He was able all the better perhaps to put himself at the point of view of the authors themselves, without being continually tempted (as the scholar who is also a teacher of Philosophy is tempted) to substitute some equivalent taken from modern Philosophy, or some modern development which has arisen out of the doctrine itself, for the doctrine as the ancient author actually held it. He can tell us about Heraclitus without even once holding him up to us as an awful warning against the consequences of Sensationalism, and he can write respectfully and reverently of Plato without explaining away as mere conscious allegory or myth everything in him which presents itself to a modern rationalistic thinker as scientifically or philosophically impossible. In his treatment of the constantly recurring questions how far this or that Platonic conception is to be taken literally, and how far mythically, allegorically or metaphorically, he seems to me invariably to show excellent judgment and sense of proportion. The same sanity of judgment appears in his treatment of the theories of modern scholars about the various questions of interpretation. He is particularly learned in the German and other literature of his subject; he is successful in exhibiting the modicum of truth which each theory contains without being led astray by wild and fanciful speculations.

These remarks may be illustrated by his treatment of the *Timaeus* :—

“For my own part, I think that Plato’s emphatic statement about the creation of the world—by which, of course, he means the introduction of order into chaos—is intended to be taken literally, and not figuratively; but the details of the exposition are mythical in the

Platonic sense of the word—an *εἰκὸς μῦθος*, that is to say, as we may learn, perhaps, from the *Phaedo*, a story about which it may be said, 'This or something like it is true'. The business of a critic of the *Timaeus* should therefore be to separate the underlying principles or ideas from the particular form in which they are expressed; and so far as concerns the subject of these Lectures, I will endeavour, however imperfectly, to perform this task. . . . It would seem, therefore, although this is another of the many disputed questions of Platonic scholarship, that the cosmology of the *Timaeus* is dualistic. . . . The Creator takes in hand the primeval matter, and fashions it, as far as necessity allows, in accordance with the perfect model in his own mind. The details of the narration do not concern us; they are almost entirely *a priori*, poetical, or fanciful. But Plato's cosmology is nevertheless pervaded from beginning to end by one great idea, the importance of which every physicist must recognise, namely, that the world is constructed on mathematical principles. It is by means of 'forms and numbers,' that is to say, mathematical forms and mathematical numbers, that the Creator, who, according to the famous Platonic text preserved by Plutarch, is always playing the mathematician—*θεὸς ἀεὶ γεωμετρῶν*—brought order out of chaos. . . . Besides this fundamental principle, the germ of which was already present in pre-Platonic Pythagoreanism, there is another point claiming particular notice in connexion with the cosmology of Plato. I have spoken of Necessity as the power which is responsible for the evil and imperfection of the world. But we must carefully observe that, in proportion as Necessity yields to the persuasion of the Deity, her maleficent influence is held in check. Or, to put the same statement in another form, so far as the primeval chaos submits to be mathematically determined, its inherent ugliness and evil are controlled. It is true, of course, as we have already noticed, that Necessity is sometimes obdurate, and that imperfection always cleaves even to the fairest of created things. . . . No ancient writer has a livelier sense of the beauty and magnificence of the Universe; it shows itself again and again throughout the Platonic writings, more especially in the myths of the *Phaedrus*, the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*; but all the beauty, all the beneficence is of God: whatever is malignant and foul comes from Necessity" (pp. 361-366).

These isolated sentences will, of course, give a very inadequate notion of the author's view, even on this particular point, but they will serve to illustrate his qualities as an interpreter of ancient thought. The sincere Theism of Plato is recognised without any attempt to identify his system of the Universe either with that of Christian Theology or with that of Hegelian or any other modern Idealism. Dr. Adam can point to the element of truth in Plato's theories about numbers, without crediting him with anticipations of the newest discoveries in the modern Philosophy of Mathematics. He tells us simply what he finds in his author without

endeavouring to extract out of him a completely articulated and fully intelligible system in which all difficulties and obscurities, all crudities and inconsistencies, disappear.

Of course, this attitude of mind was not without its limitations. Dr. Adam gives excellent reasons for rejecting the attempt to explain away the familiar criticism that "Plato hypostatized abstract universals," and all that he says in explanation of the process by which he came to do so is eminently true and sensible. But it may be doubted whether Dr. Adam himself fully appreciated the real difficulty of the problem with which Plato was dealing, or the importance of the metaphysical discovery that Plato had made about the part which Universals play in the constitution of knowledge and of reality. If the reader wishes to understand the importance of Plato for modern metaphysics he must consult other writers; but all the same it is likely that he will often get a better impression of what Plato actually thought (if not of the mental process by which he came to think it) from Dr. Adam than he will get from many more metaphysically-minded historians and interpreters of ancient Philosophy. In particular is this true of his account of Plato's religious attitude. One of the best features of the book is the persistency with which he sticks to his subject, and examines other aspects of his authors only sufficiently to make their religious position intelligible. And this is a side of ancient thought which is too much neglected. Even good "Greats" men often, I suspect, leave Oxford with a very hazy or erroneous conception of Plato's religious attitude,—partly because the *Timaeus* is so constantly kept out of sight in what they read or hear about him. But more often, I imagine, well-read classical scholars would find it difficult to give a clear and definite account of what was really thought about the traditional mythology by such a man as Pindar. Mark Patteson has told us that the notion that the pagan worships had died, or were dying out in the first century A.D. is "an illusion created by literature". A similar illusion is often entertained as to the attitude of the educated mind towards Paganism at a much earlier period, though the literature of that period supplies less excuse for it. That Paganism did mean something, even for the very man who was trying to purify it, is one of the conclusions which this book is likely to impress upon its readers. Dr. Adam abstains from drawing morals, or asking what general conclusions as to the history of Religion may be drawn from the intellectual evolution which he chronicles so well. Had he done so, he might perhaps have seen in his own book a valuable body of evidence in favour of the great generalisation of Mark Patteson in the volume of University Sermons from which I have quoted—that the history of ancient Philosophy and that of early Christianity are the history of two parallel attempts to purify Religion from the immoralities with which Paganism had connected it—an attempt which ultimately succeeded through the fusion of the two movements.

Dr. Adam has made his lectures about as interesting as they could well be. He has evidently written them with his eye on his audience and not on the critics with whom he may be for the moment doing battle. His style is remarkably clear and direct. The book is consequently peculiarly suited to students, and will help to give them that sense of the close connexion of ancient Greek literature with old and living Religion, which is often obscured by our very familiarity with the details of a mythology which even in antiquity the more highly educated could not treat quite seriously.

H. RASHDALL.

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*The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas.* By EDWARD WESTERMARCK, Ph.D. London: Macmillan and Co. Vol. ii., pp. xv, 852.

It is fitting that all scholars should rejoice when a noble piece of research is carried through by dint of untiring zeal and patience to its appointed end. Dr. Westermarck's labours have been immense, and there is every reason to hope that their effect on moral theory will be proportionate to the energy and skill they so conspicuously evince. It was indeed high time that the trained anthropologist should seek to present in systematic form the actual facts concerning the nature of the moral judgments of mankind. Others who have essayed the task—and they may be counted on the fingers of one hand—have almost without exception been philosophers by profession, whose incursions into the field of ethnological inquiry were inevitably conducted more or less *en amateur*. Nevertheless it is in his capacity of philosopher that Dr. Westermarck must be judged here. But from the purely philosophic point of view there is almost nothing fresh to be said about the present volume, since it but completes the illustration and verification of the principles enunciated in the earlier chapters of its forerunner.

In the interval, however, between the appearance of the first and second instalments of his work, an important ally has come forward to assist in the defence of Dr. Westermarck's central position. Mr. McDougall, in his *Introduction to Social Psychology*, has made out a very strong case for the correlation of emotion with instinct; and that not merely in a vague and general way, but specifically. Sundry prime factors into which even the most complex of our emotional states can be resolved are exhibited as the direct subjective counter-part of organic tendencies implanted in man by natural selection. Mr. McDougall, indeed, arrives at his results by introspective analysis combined with empirical considerations of the psycho-physical rather than of the historical order. He defers to a future occasion the task of showing how far, in the concrete life of mankind, the congenital trend, taken together with its effect—one might almost say its echo—within conscious-

ness, holds its own against less inelastic and fatally determined forces. Consequently we cannot yet tell whether the key he provides will open the door—whether, that is to say, a social psychology which is primarily interested in the emotions and their instinctive basis will actually succeed in explaining the phenomena of society with some approach to comprehensiveness.

Dr. Westermarck, on the other hand, tackles the same problem, as one might say, from its other end. His first object is to record the facts about the moral life of man in all their concreteness. Desirous as he is to pursue a definite line of explanation—indeed, if the will to explain be wanting, description is bound to prove an utter failure—he nevertheless indulges, anthropologist fashion, in a massive treatment of detail that preserves the flavour of genuine history with its rich confusion of elements. As for his explanatory clue, it is Mr. McDougall's; though possibly there is less precision of specific application in proportion as the mastery of the niceties of psychological analysis is less thorough. Dr. Westermarck has read his British moralists carefully, and these, notably such as are of the associationist persuasion, may have helped to suggest to him that the moral ideas might be regarded as primarily the reflexes, as it were, of certain persistent emotions. For the rest, biological analogies, doubtless fortified by his former researches into the history of human marriage, wherein the influence of a well-defined group of powerful instincts was everywhere apparent, led him to connect emotion with instinct, and behold his theoretical groundwork complete. And that Dr. Westermarck adduces a *vera causa*, what psychologist will deny? Call them 'instincts' or what we will, there would certainly appear to exist in man a number of congenital tendencies causing him to respond to this or that type of vital situation in a relatively fixed way, the accompanying emotions, images, and ideas seeming, in extreme cases at all events, to be without modifying influence, like bubbles on the surface of a stream.

What, however, of those conditions of moral development which do appear to exert a modifying effect, namely the forces that manifest themselves in economics, law, religion, philosophic reflexion, and so forth? Dr. Westermarck does not neglect them. The general scheme of his work, indeed, tends to emphasise the general uniformity of the moral nature of man. He sets out in the first instance to compare, not types of concrete social life, but types of sentiment. Naturally he finds on all sides evidence of a certain similarity of moral approval and disapproval; but of the actual effectiveness of such feelings, of their power to hold their own under the stress of practical life, he—or at least his reader—is scarcely able to judge. On the other hand, so far as dissimilarities and differences in moral sentiment present themselves in the course of his investigation, he endeavours to deal with them faithfully. It is especially to be noted how, by carrying his inquiry right through from savagery, the special province of the anthropologist,



to civilisation with its endless complexities, the province of the historian of culture, he has been able to realise what a thinker of biological proclivities might be tempted to ignore, namely the enormous importance of reflexion as a factor in moral progress. As he says, "Though moral ideas are based upon emotions, though all moral concepts are essentially generalisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth moral approval or disapproval, the influence of intellectual considerations upon moral judgments is naturally very great". He goes on to prophesy that in the future the influence of reflexion upon moral judgments will steadily increase, and that correspondingly the influence of sentimental antipathies and likings will diminish.

When this qualification (as it might almost be called) is borne in mind, there will be the less unwillingness on the part of philosophers, who as such are disposed to exalt the function of philosophic reflexion, to accept the fundamental thesis propounded by Dr. Westermarck. That thesis, as will be remembered, consists in two closely connected propositions; firstly, that the moral judgments of mankind have an emotional basis; secondly, that the moral emotions are specifically of a 'retributive' type, that is, are akin to gratitude and revenge. Dr. Westermarck claims that no other theory of the moral consciousness has ever been subjected to an equally comprehensive test; and, if by 'test' we are to understand an appeal to evidence of the historico-psychological order, that claim may surely be allowed. Now a doctrine which insists that the motive springs of human conduct are in large measure the same all the world over, if rightly interpreted, is full of hope for man, in that it invites all to participate in the fruits of the best life as achieved by the most truly progressive portion of mankind. Such a doctrine, however, might easily be twisted into a misology, a glorification of the 'noble savage'; or again might result in a view of history 'through the wrong end of the telescope,' that is to say, with the significance of the change from barbarism to culture not so much travestied as simply dwarfed and minimised. Dr. Westermarck, however, gives instinct its due without being therefore unfair to reason. Perhaps rationalistic philosophers in the future may be led to imitate his impartiality, and to allow that a 'pure' thought, cut off altogether from its emotional basis, must be morally impotent. Certain it is that academic moralists would be the better for some knowledge about the moral life of mankind at large, and that they will get this, as nowhere else, in the pages of Dr. Westermarck.

R. R. MARETT.

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*Hegel's Educational Theory and Practice*. By MILLICENT MACKENZIE. Swan Sonnenschein, 1909. Pp. xxi, 192.

THERE are no more striking passages in the recently issued Poor Law Reports than those which deal with the defects of our present

educational system with respect to adolescence. They naturally press the question on us from the side of boy labour. But the same problem is brought home to us from other sides. There is the Workers' Educational Association demanding a higher type of education than that which ends at fourteen. Even in connexion with our secondary and public schools we are beginning to realise that their boasted effect upon 'character' is of very limited extent and makes for a narrow type. As Mr. Wells puts it the ordinary boy doesn't adolesce, he stumbles unprepared on the problems of adolescence. In spite of some recent exceptions such as Dr. Stanley Hall's book upon the subject, educational theory has hitherto given us little guidance in this all-important subject. It has been occupied mainly with the study of childhood. Its achievements here cannot be over-estimated. It has been guided by the true insight that the object of education at this stage is the appropriation by the child through sense, feeling, imitation and creative effort of the contents of the natural and social worlds that surround it. Educational writers are now commencing to feel that this is only the beginning of education. To such properly called primary education there has to be added a secondary, whether we call it by that name or not. Its aim differs from the earlier as self-consciousness differs from simple consciousness. It starts from the division and possibility of conflict between the merely natural and the moral or spiritual. In opposition to instinct, sense and habit stands the world of social relations, thought and imagination. With this new world the youth has to come to terms. He has to find his place in it by winning for himself the power of moral self-control, of self-directed attention, of contributing through a self-chosen industry or profession to the contents of its life. What is wanted is orientation in a world of social relations and of ideas which is at once above, yet a continuation of what has gone before. A system of education which fails of this and leaves large masses of the population in the condition of children, morally, intellectually, industrially and politically, is self-condemned. It is like a system of horticulture that takes much pains with the planting and drilling of the seeds and early plants, but for the rest leaves them to find their way into the sunshine and struggle with weeds and a damp surface soil as best they may. It is this orientation which is the central educational problem of our own time on which we need all available light from educational theory.

For this reason we give a hearty welcome to Professor Millicent Mackenzie's book on *Hegel's Educational Theory and Practice*. It appears some years after Dr. Luqueer's *Hegel as Educator* (which is perhaps partly responsible for the recent interest in adolescent education in America, though it has had little influence in this country), but is all the more valuable because it has been conceived and written independently of it. What makes Mrs. Mackenzie's book particularly timely is that the problem as above stated is precisely that with which Hegel in his educational work as Rector of

the Nürnberg Gymnasium was constantly occupied. To him as to Plato education meant freedom not only from natural passion and desire but from the merely natural and habitual however innocent. Freedom he held to be the essential quality of the mind as weight is of solid bodies. "Pedagogy is the art of making men moral: it regards man as one with nature and points out the way in which he may be born again, in which his first nature may be changed into a second—a spiritual nature—in such a way that the spiritual nature may become habitual to him." What is characteristic of himself is his mode of conceiving the transition from the natural to the spiritual as a process of self-estrangement and self-recovery. As he expressed it in his own *Phenomenology*, which was written at this time, the soul must break away from its own substance and re-enter it as something foreign to itself. The boy's love of adventure is only a sign of this deeper unrest. "It is a necessary self-deception that depth must first of all be sought in the form of distance." Youth seeks for happiness in leaving the familiar and occupying with Robinson Crusoe a remote island. But this "centrifugal force," like the childish love of adventure with which he compares it, if left to itself is apt to waste its energy in vague wandering from the beaten and familiar. The soul is apt to seek for the depth which is its birthright in mere distance from its early innocence and the life of habit and convention—not only sowing but reaping its wild oats. It is here that the teacher comes in. It is the business of the teacher to conduct it to a world where there will be ample scope for effort and adventure, but where the effort will be disciplined and the adventure will nourish and strengthen, building up a new self which is not merely the destruction of the old. The end is a moral one in the widest sense of the word, the appropriation of moral ideas, the concept of right, but it is achieved through what is in the first instance an intellectual training. There is no opposition between the moral and the intellectual. "To have the concept of right one must be educated to the stage of thinking and not linger in the *régime* of that merely which appeals to the senses." Virtue is knowledge: "if youth but knew."

On the question of the choice of studies Hegel was the rector of a classical gymnasium and naturally emphasises the place of the classics in effecting this vital change. The classics and especially Greek have the power of most effectively securing this break between sense experience and the world of thought and imagination and at the same time of giving the mind back to itself. The study of them necessarily starts from grammar and than grammar "nothing intellectual is more comprehensible"; they contain the best concrete examples of the civic spirit; while for beauty they are "the paradise of the human mind"; their dramatic and philosophical literature offers a basis for moral and religious instruction and the beginnings of philosophy. But he was no doctrinaire in all this, and on occasion emphasises the power of the 'new world' of mathematics and

physical science to serve the same end. Had he lived now he would doubtless have had much to say on the place of German history and literature.

All this and much that is subsidiary to the central idea Mrs. Mackenzie's book sets out in three excellently conceived sections, the first dealing with Hegel's life as a teacher, the second with his contributions to the theory of education, the third consisting of extracts from his *School Addresses* on classical studies, discipline, military exercise, moral education, study and character-building and other subjects of which we are beginning to hear a good deal and are likely to hear more in connexion with our own system of public education. The writer hints that it is the absence of any settled principles on these subjects that is the cause of much of our educational unrest at the present time and was her own motive in undertaking this book. "To many of course the Herbartian philosophy appeals, but for the large and increasing number of those who fail to find full satisfaction therein it may be that the Hegelian philosophy will be found to provide that which they have vainly sought elsewhere." Yet it is a discriminating educational Hegelianism that is recommended. One of the best chapters is on Some Difficulties of the Hegelian point of view. When she has given us so much it would be ungrateful to ask for more. What one misses and hopes that the writer will supply in a subsequent edition is a chapter on the applicability of Hegel's main aim and methods to the problem of our own time, which has little apparent resemblance to that of the Nürnberg High School of 1810. Meantime perhaps we may take a hint from Hegel himself as to what the answer to such a question might be. He complains, as we have seen, that it is a natural fallacy to seek for depth through distance. The object is depth and deep calls to deep. What is wanted to deepen character in the nation is not something remote in time and place but a deeper hold of the kind of knowledge, whether scientific, imaginative, practical or religious, which the ordinary school curriculum has already begun under carefully trained teachers to supply. We are beginning to realise that it is possible to go through the best classical training at school and at college and miss just those fruits which Hegel claims for it and knew doubtless himself how to reap. On the other hand we are beginning to realise that there is not one of them which the literature and history, the art and religion and philosophy of our own country may not be made, when properly handled, to produce even more abundantly.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

## VII.—NEW BOOKS.

*Aristotle's Criticisms of Plato.* By J. M. WATSON. Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press, 1909. Pp. 88.

THERE are obvious reasons why it would be improper to subject the present essay to such criticism as would be appropriate in the case of a "work" published deliberately after receiving its author's final revision. The writer, who composed it in its present form as a Fellowship dissertation, died, unhappily for classical scholarship, very young, and before he had the opportunity to develop what he had written into a mature treatise. Hence, as Prof. Burnet says in his introductory note, there are indications scattered through the essay of a view of Platonism and Aristotle's relation to it very different from that taken in the pamphlet as it actually stands.

I think it most becoming, therefore, to treat the essay in the main as a monument of the acuteness and ability of a youth of great promise prematurely lost to us, and to do little more than call the attention of lovers of Plato to his work as presenting at least a clear and penetrating analysis of the problems to be solved in forming an opinion on the value of Aristotle as an interpreter of his master. In the main, one is, I think, bound to come to Mr. Watson's conclusion that Aristotle is at least to be absolved from the imputation of bad faith in his account of what Plato taught, though it is, to my mind, quite another question whether he fully understood what he reports to us. As to the question of his accuracy about positive facts, I should, indeed, go further than Mr. Watson does. I believe *e.g.* that subsequent study, had Mr. Watson's life been spared, would have led him to see that Aristotle is absolutely correct on two points where Mr. Watson, like the Cambridge school against whom some of his most telling criticisms are directed, decides to reject his evidence. Careful study of the *Timæus* and the other dialogues of Plato's old age will, I believe, make it certain that Aristotle is quite right in saying that Plato seriously taught both that the *kóσμος* is *γεννής* and that the earth moves. On the other hand, while it is a distinguishing merit in the author to have taken full account of the value of M. Milhaud's work, I cannot feel that he is justified in opposing his conclusions on the ground that Aristotle *cannot* have been so deficient in mathematics as M. Milhaud requires us to suppose. If Aristotle was really abreast of the mathematical science of his times, we may ask, how comes he to show no acquaintance with the development of the doctrine of incommensurables by Theætetus or the theory of proportion as worked out by Eudoxus? How is it, again, that he shows no appreciation of the application of the method of exhaustion to the finding of curvilinear areas, or that when he talks about the "quadrature" he ignores the remarkable discovery of the *τετραγωνίζουσα* by Hippias, and never, so far as I know, seems to be aware of the numerous investigations of properties of curves other than the circle which had occupied Pythagorean and Platonist mathematicians?

How, again, are we to explain the standing confusion which vitiates book *M* of the *Metaphysics* between three such different things as (1) the Variable, or ἀόριστος δῶς, (2) the number 2, the αἰρόδυνας, (3) a pair of things? I cannot rate very highly the mathematical thought of a philosopher who does not understand that though there are countless pairs of things, there is only one number 2, and thinks that the number 2 is a collection of two "numbers 1," because a pair of things is a collection of two things.

The fundamental assumption which seems to me to have prevented the author from putting matters in the right light, is the current belief that Plato invented the εἶδη, and that there is consequently an "earlier" Platonic doctrine represented e.g. by the *Phædo*, and a "later" Platonism which begins with the *Parmenides*. It is then argued that the *Parmenides* is a recantation of the *Phædo*, and we get involved in the problem, with which the author wrestles very bravely, whether Aristotle means to attack the "earlier" or the "later" doctrine. Since his main polemic is against the εἰδητικοὶ ἀπὸθοῖ, it then becomes hard, though Mr. Watson does it, to acquit Aristotle of bad faith in mixing up with this polemic arguments only applicable to the supposedly disavowed "earlier" doctrine of the *Phædo*. Further, the theory requires us to manufacture a history of the Academy after Plato for which there is no evidence, and which is out of keeping with all that we positively know about Plato's pupils. In my own view, the only way out of this insoluble difficulty is to recognise, what the text of both Aristotle and Plato properly read implies, that the doctrine of the *Phædo* is not specifically Platonic at all, but a faithful presentment of the views current in the Socratic circle generally at the end of the fifth century. There is no recantation in the *Parmenides*, because there was nothing to recant. Aristotle's attacks on εἶδη are by no means always to be taken as aimed specially at Plato; they concern all the "friends of forms," of whom the Platonists were a special section, distinguished by their identification of the "forms" with ἀπὸθοῖ ἀνυπόδητοι, and in particular, when Aristotle contrasts "those who first said there are εἶδη" with those who added that the εἶδη are "numbers," he means to contrast Plato neither with himself at a later date, nor with his followers, but with his predecessors. From this point of view, the *Parmenides* ceases to be the hopeless puzzle which Mr. Watson rightly pronounces it to be when interpreted on the assumption that it represents the turning-point in Plato's career, and contains a "recantation," or is addressed to disciples who were unwilling to follow their master in pulling to pieces the edifice of his "early" philosophy. The dialogue is, in fact, like all Plato's dialogues, intensely dramatic, and deals neither with the views of its author nor with those of Aristotle, but with an historical situation which had long passed away when the Academy came into existence. Its real object is to show at once the impossibility of such a theory of reality as was maintained by the εἰδῶν φίλοι of the *Sophistes* (persons who are there carefully presented as contemporaries and acquaintances of the "stranger from Elea," and must therefore be sought among the Eleatic and Pythagorean friends of Socrates), and partly to point out the conditions which a satisfactory doctrine of μετέξις has to satisfy. There is no need whatever to suppose, what is in itself unlikely, that it has any particular connexion with the studies of Plato's pupils in the Academy.

As for the problem of the εἶδη τικὸν ἀπὸθοῖ, Mr. Watson is clearly right in holding that the doctrine, whatever it meant, was actually taught by Plato; had he been spared, further acquaintance with the modern philosophy of number would probably have made its general meaning clear to him, with the result that he would have had to revise his views on the quality of Aristotle's mathematics. For the understanding of the whole

matter, a study of one or two such works as Frege's *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* or Peano's *Formulaire* is perhaps the most indispensable preparation. The "arithmetisation" of geometry, which seems to be an actual achievement of recent mathematical theory, is quite in the line of Plato's thought, and is exactly the kind of advance which Aristotle tried to cut short by the arbitrary assertion of the irreducible difference between the provinces of the two sciences. Here I will only make one suggestion. So far from the "numbers which are the Ideas" being creatures of paradox, they are the inevitable last word of the theory of *εἶδη*, for the simple reason that the *εἶδος* itself is, in all likelihood, the lineal descendant of the "patterns" by the aid of which the Pythagoreans investigated the properties of the figurate numbers. The *εἶδος* ended as a number because it began as one. I cannot here produce the proof of this suggestion, but it seems to me at any rate a "probable hypothesis". As a final remark, I would say that I am sorry that Mr. Watson should have repeatedly contrasted what he regards as the absence of personal irreverence and ingratitude from Aristotle's criticism with its alleged presence in Leibniz's criticism of Spinoza. We now know, though Mr. Watson could not have done, that Leibniz was never a Spinozist at all, and therefore lay under no special obligation to deal tenderly with Spinoza's memory. And I will add that, to my own mind as to that of others whose judgment is entitled to carry more weight, Leibniz's critique of Spinozism is, as Aristotle's critique of Plato has always been felt not to be, absolutely and finally annihilating. "Spinoza would be in the right if there were no monads" is no more than an unadorned statement of the simple fact.

A. E. TAYLOR.

*Scholasticism Old and New.* By M. DE WULF. Translated by P. Coffey, D.Ph. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son, 1907.

This book is an outcome of the movement called Neo-Scholasticism, which has its principal seat in the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie or École S. Thomas d'Aquin, founded at Louvain under the auspices of Pope Leo XIII. This Institute is not to be identified with the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Louvain, its relation to which is described on page 289 of this volume as that of a 'special school or department'. So far as a very superficial acquaintance with this movement enables me to judge, it represents an attempt to bring the new knowledge of the universe gained since the middle ages, chiefly through the progress of the natural sciences, within the lines laid down by St. Thomas Aquinas, without departing, as 'Modernism' in all its forms would do, from the general philosophical attitude of the great Schoolmen. While Modernists claim to occupy as regards the relation of Catholic dogma to modern philosophy a position analogous to that which St. Thomas and his immediate predecessors occupied as regards the relation of Catholic dogma to the revived Aristotelianism of their day and its Averroistic development—and, for that very reason, demand a new synthesis instead of that elaborated by St. Thomas—the Neo-Scholastics hold that St. Thomas's synthesis itself will be found adequate to do again in our days what it did in his, and to take in all that is valuable in the knowledge gathered by later generations. It is characteristic that the energies of Neo-Scholastics should be directed rather to research in the experimental sciences than, like those of the Modernists, to historical criticism and a consequential reconstruction of the theory of knowledge. For the experimental sciences can be carried on up to a certain point with enthusiasm and success by men who, however personally religious, are



disinclined through the very habits of mind which make them proficient in the studies of their choice to probe the history of their religion or indulge philosophic doubts as to the ultimate significance of its dogmatic system. The first Rector and the present patron of the 'School of St. Thomas' at Louvain is Cardinal Mercier, Archbishop of Malines, himself an exponent of Neo-Scholastic ontology and psychology, whose ill-informed charge against Modernism called forth an incisive rejoinder from the lamented Father Tyrrell under the title of *Medievalism*. The greater sympathy of the Neo-Scholastics with experimental research than with the historical criticism cultivated by the Modernists finds an English parallel in the late Dr. Pusey's readiness to promote the beginnings of the Museum at Oxford, while remaining the uncompromising antagonist of the methods and conclusions of the new Biblical criticism of his time.

More interesting than M. de Wulf's own book is the account of the studies of the Louvain Institute which is added by the translator, Dr. Coffey of Maynooth. It must be admitted that when one reads (on p. 293) that the instruction in the History of Philosophy is entrusted to M. de Wulf, no great confidence in the character of that instruction will be felt by those who read the *Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale*, reviewed by the present writer in *MIND*, N.S., 35, page 411; nor will the eulogies pronounced upon the same professor on page 302 raise their opinion of Dr. Coffey's fitness to appraise a course of philosophical studies. And when we turn in the present volume from Dr. Coffey to M. de Wulf himself, there is nothing to lead us to revise the unfavourable judgment which we were compelled to pass upon the latter's earlier work. It is true that the section on Neo-Scholasticism and History displays a scholarly and enlightened spirit; indeed the translator here (p. 197 n.) grows uneasy at his author's tendency to admit the compatibility of Catholicism with more than one philosophical system. But one gathers from the book a general impression of second-hand work. Thus Bacon and Leibnitz seem to be quoted at second-hand (pp. 28, 152); Bernard of Chartres' saying about our being dwarfs who stand on the shoulders of giants, M. de Wulf (although a professed student of mediæval philosophy) seems to attribute to a thirteenth century scholastic and quotes from a modern writer; and, whereas it is merely a commonplace to say that Scholasticism deserted Aristotle when his teaching conflicted with that of the Church, M. de Wulf, without any reference to this obvious interpretation of the fact with which he is dealing, claims that what he calls a 'new theory' (of the survival of the whole soul) 'put forth against the erroneous or misleading statements of Aristotle' (as to the immortality of the *voûs*) 'should of itself suffice to vindicate Scholasticism from the charge of undue servility to tradition in the department of psychology'. The general attitude taken up by M. de Wulf towards mediæval philosophy is indeed incompatible with a free and objective study of its history. For M. de Wulf scholastic philosophy is a 'philosophical synthesis common to a group of the leading doctors of the West' in the middle ages: among whom St. Anselm, Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventura, Duns Scotus, Occam are especially named. Any mediæval thinker who transgressed the (doubtless comprehensive) bounds of this 'synthesis,' such as Raymond Lully or Roger Bacon, is for M. de Wulf a 'rash disciple' who has 'tarnished the purity' of Scholasticism. Again, despite his reasoning against proposals to *define* Scholasticism as a 'philosophy in harmony with theological dogma,' M. de Wulf's assumption of a tied theology reacts upon his view of philosophy which for him is also tied so far as it touches on points where theology is tied; e.g. on 'the notions of person and nature' (see p. 62).

Not only is M. de Wulf's general attitude one which is scarcely com-

patible with a satisfactory treatment of his subject, but we find in him a slowness to grasp the meaning of those whom he criticises, and an unsureness of touch in dealing with the details of his subject, which make it impossible to regard him as sufficiently qualified for the task which he has set himself. Of the former defect his remarks on page 16 on the extension given to the word "scholasticism" by M. Picavet are a fair example; of the second the mysterious reference to Plutarch on page 140 which is difficult to understand unless we suppose that the author (who is certainly acquainted with John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*) has no misgivings concerning the attribution of the *Institutio Trajani* to the philosopher of Chæroneæ. It would perhaps be hypercritical to object to the omission on page 83 of any reference to the true origin of the word *Metaphysics*, did not other passages such as that on page 121 where the Aristotelian doctrine of the unmoved movers of the spheres is oddly described in words taken from a French work by a M. Piat, and without anything to suggest knowledge on M. de Wulf's part of the original; or that on page 122 where a particular distinction is described as mediæval without a hint that it was derived from Aristotle; all suggest that M. de Wulf is still as little at home in ancient philosophy (the history of which he professes) as when he wrote his earlier work. Nor can students of the history of modern philosophy (which he also professes) obtain much trustworthy guidance from the author of the remarks concerning Hegel on page 216, and of those concerning Kant on page 237.

The proofs of the translation might have been better corrected; thus on page 20 we meet with a certain *Beethius*; on page 254 'former' and 'latter' have apparently been transposed; and in a note on page 261 'Aristote' is credited with the authorship of a work of M. Boutroux's.

C. C. J. WEBB.

*Text-book of Experimental Psychology.* By DR. C. S. MYERS. London: Edward Arnold, 1909. Pp. 432.

This is a book of exceptional interest in many ways. It is meant especially for the student of psychology who has mastered some elementary text-book like Stout's *Groundwork*, has learnt something of the structure and function of the nervous system, and turns to grapple with the mysteries of "experimental psychology". Keenly he soon feels, as the author remarks, the lack of a text-book: "the literature on the subject is now so scattered and so profuse, that a student must have at his command a small library of books and periodicals if he wishes to pursue a course of independent reading".

A relatively large portion of the book is devoted to the field of sensation. One short but excellent chapter on the cutaneous and visceral sensations has had the advantage of assistance from Dr. Head, who is making such a revolution in our knowledge and conceptions on this subject. Two chapters are given to Sound, a topic which the author has long marked as peculiarly his own by numerous researches; they conclude with a masterly summing up of the rival theories of hearing proposed by Helmholtz, Rutherford, Ewald, and Meyer, the final verdict being that for the present "we can only hold a suspended judgment". A similar amount of space is allotted to the visual sensations, and here again one is particularly struck by the lucidity and fairness with which the chief conflicting theories are compared and criticised, those of Young and McDougall on the one hand and of Hering and Müller on the other. Most noticeable among the remaining sensory themes is the thorny one of spatial perception. The interesting suggestion is advanced that the

influence of 'local signs' on the spatial threshold is not simple but complex: "There are better reasons for supposing that a given point of the skin, when stimulated, evokes not only its own local sign but also to a less extent the local signs of neighbouring points; and that the degree to which the latter are evoked decreases with their distance from their point of stimulation, and possibly with a delicacy of the local signature in the district". But this and all future speculations on the matter will have to take into reckoning the remarkable discovery of Head and Rivers, that the spatial threshold and the tactual sensitivity depend on opposite sides of the spinal cord. In the chapter on "Labyrinthine and Motor Sensations" we find the time-honoured view, that awareness of position is an inference from conscious sensations in the joints; but this view, so natural logically, scarcely finds support in recent empirical investigations (for instance, that of Rupp, *Z. f. Psych. u. Phys.*, Abt. II., vol. 41).

The intellectual processes have been treated, on the whole, less generously. Great and deserved prominence is given to the work on Memory by Ebbinghaus and by Müller; this should prove very convenient to the numerous students who cannot easily cope with the original papers of these authors. Also Müller's important investigation of the process of comparing weights is well emphasised. A great deal of useful information has been collected together in a chapter on "Muscular and Mental Work". The investigation of the higher intellectual processes, particularly by Külpe's school, is not touched on; no space is allotted to Suggestibility or to Testimony; nor could room be found for experimental work on children, primitive races (though the author himself has taken an important share in this), animals, or abnormal states.

The emotional and volitional processes also have had to suffer great condensation. In this field again the reader will derive profit from Dr. Myers' power of dealing with conflicting evidence. We are introduced to the new word 'empathy,' a valuable translation suggested by Ward for the German *Einfühlung*.

The chapter on "Statistics," brief as it is, shows marked advance on anything of the sort in previous psychological text-books. The practical exercises are numerous, judiciously chosen, concisely described, and well illustrated. Further study is facilitated by an excellent bibliography at the end of each chapter. There are many things out of the book that one would like to see in it, but it would be very hard to find any case of the converse. The whole is stamped with a rare 'objectivity'; psychologists have a great tendency to depict facts 'as seen through a temperament,' but the author's mode of presentation is one of simple transparency.

Admirable as is the manner in which he has fulfilled his task, carping criticism may yet find something to urge against the task itself. The object of the book is double: first, to describe the methods and principles of psychological experiment; and second, to set forth its most important results. It is the first of these alone that is usually understood abroad under the name of experimental psychology, and this unquestionably constitutes a special department of knowledge; while every educated person ought to learn something about the mental processes, only a few need trouble themselves with the details of experimentation. There are already several good foreign manuals on this subject in existence, but we have the pleasure of finding that this British one is better still.

When however we consider the second object of the book, that of giving a summary of the most important experimental results, we cannot help being impressed by the fact that it has hitherto found no favour among the leaders of the science; throughout the world it has been felt that to make different books of the results obtained by the different methods is about as profitable as to investigate the function of one leg

apart from that of the other. In England psychology has developed under peculiar conditions. The experimental method has met with exceedingly strong opposition. Debarred from developing in conjunction with the older methods, it has been forced to start an independent existence. At this moment we have the common spectacle of the so-called 'general' psychology belonging to one academic department while the 'experimental' part falls to another. Thus this fundamental biological science, which is to educate our children, to diagnose their proper vocations in the state, to treat mental disorders, to prevent crime, to rationalise legal procedure, to furnish a solid basis for social reform, to cultivate art, to give light and new force to religion—this Psychology we have rudely cut in twain, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ὅα τεμνοντες καὶ μέλλοντες ταριχεύειν, ἢ ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ὅα ταῖς θριξίν. Each mutilated and meaningless half has its separate position in the University and its own examinations. And the examinees want text-books. Luckily Dr. Myers has not taken this side of his task so earnestly as to interfere with the more legitimate side. He himself forcibly points out "how artificial is the line of cleavage between 'general' and experimental psychology". And we look hopefully to him for leadership back to unity and health, ἐπιχειρῶν ποιῆσαι ἐν ἐκ δυνάμει καὶ ἰάσασθαι τὴν φύσιν τὴν ἀνθρώπινην.

C. SPEARMAN.

*The Application of Statistical Methods to the Problems of Psychophysics.* By DR. F. URBAN. Philadelphia: Psychological Clinic Press, 1908. Pp. 221.

We have here an important attempt to subject the current psycho-physical methodics to fundamental revision. The need of some such drastic step is easily demonstrated. In the first place, the present state is one of general disorganisation; the results arrived at by any method admit of no comparison with those obtained by any other one; fairly concordant work has indeed been done by the method of errors and by that of just perceptible differences, but why they should be concordant is left a mystery. And secondly, psycho-physical measurement is at present based upon various philosophical notions usually proclaimed as indispensable presuppositions; whereas in reality they are superfluous, unwarrantable, and mischievous. All this discordance and lumber the author proposes to sweep away by restricting himself throughout to simple notions of probability "by no means other than those used, e.g., in the theory of life insurance or in the formal theory of population". He calls to his aid the recent Russian developments of statistical mathematics, and gives to his deductions the solid empirical support of some very careful experiments on the classical subject of comparing weights.

He begins by applying his principles to our oldest psycho-physical method, that of just perceptible differences. The threshold is shown to be a simple function of the probabilities of the various types of judgments "greater," "equal," and "less". Hereby this threshold is brought into clear contradictionless relations to the method of errors. At the same time the increased lucidity of the procedure brings about many improvements in detail; the most important of these appear to be an increased accuracy of determination and the new power of computing the probable error. He does not however attempt to grapple with the fundamental weakness of this method, which is that the threshold depends not only upon the subject's accuracy of perception but also upon his standard of certainty, an equivocality rendering it almost valueless for the majority of modern applications.

He devotes himself instead to elaborating an original method, that of "psychometric functions". He claims that it "combines the advantages of the error method with those of the method of just perceptible differences, and yields the results of the latter method almost without work". Continuing to base himself upon the probabilities of the different types of judgment, he now deals with these probabilities in a much more comprehensive manner; he makes the important assumption that they are analytic functions of the comparison stimuli, whereby he is enabled to determine their complete distribution and to represent it graphically. The chief characteristics of the ensuing probability curve are found to exhibit remarkable correlations with one another; several of them appear to afford equally good measures of sensitivity, the order of the seven persons tested being almost the same by one as by the other. Owing to the author's economy of presuppositions, these correlations were in no wise implied *a priori*; but having now been established empirically, they urgently need explanation; this, unfortunately, the author does not at present see his way to formulate.

Dr. Urban concludes with a remarkably interesting chapter on some of the deeper problems of the topic, discussing, especially from the point of view of mathematical evidence, the chief types of theories as to the relation between mind and body. He opposes the attempt of the Moscow school of idealism to turn the applicability of the calculus of probabilities into an argument for free-will. He shows forcibly that all metaphysical theories involving the notion of substance lead to very great difficulties in psychology, and he counsels us for the purposes of empirical science "to formulate the problem in such a way that it loses its ontological character, retaining only the general problem of finding relations between phenomena". He emphasises the fact that analytic functions could be applied so successfully to his experiments; the power of making full use of exact quantitative methods in psychology does not depend—as so often supposed—on whether mental processes are 'measurable,' but only on whether psychological observations are amenable to treatment by analytic functions. And this he finds actually to be the case with psychological just as much as with physical observations.

C. SPEARMAN.

*God with us: a Study in Religious Idealism.* By W. R. BOYCE GIBSON, M.A. (Oxon.), Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of London. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1909. Pp. xix, 229.

Mr. Boyce Gibson has followed up his able exposition of Eucken's thought by a volume which seeks to develop further some great ideas of the master. It is, on the whole, a study of the concrete problem of religious life rather than of the nature and limitations of religious knowledge. "The purpose of this book," he writes, "is restricted to the formulation and defence of a philosophy of the religious life from the point of view of the personal experient, the religious life being throughout conceived, not as any mere refinement of the 'natural,' but as a life whose distinctive inspiration and supreme motive is the conviction that God is with us" (p. viii). This position is described by the excessively ugly, if not obscure, term "anthropotheistic". Of this Anthropotheism the volume is, in one sense, a manifesto. It has been "adopted as mediating between the anthropocentric and the theocentric extremes. Anthropism, in so far as it is not also anthropotheistic, leaves man to save himself. Theism, again, in so far as it also is not anthropotheistic, leaves man's salvation to God alone, and is Calvinistic in tendency. But Anthropotheism commits the work of Redemption to a Power which is other than

man, only because it is ultimately one with him, and works for righteousness in and through the religious freedom of his spiritual life" (p. 227). The key to the position is Love; and in the light of that creative and reconciling principle are discussed such problems as the needs of adolescence, moral conduct, Monism, and Evil. In one place Mr. Gibson characterises his own work as a philosophy of *fruition*; and a good deal depends for our appreciation of his book on a clear understanding of this vital term. Here is an explanatory passage. "Fruition, as I conceive it, is no mere feeling of enjoyment. . . . It is rather that permanent, steadying, redeeming relation which links our mortality to the Life Immortal, and authorises the conviction that God is with us, and that the resources of our personality are not to be measured by any standard which presupposes our finitude or isolation, or any restrictions of bodily endowment or tenure of life" (p. xvi). Elsewhere the principle of Fruition is said to mean that "the whole religious life, from the first sense of sin to the perfection of holiness, is a participation in the life of God" (p. 83). Thus it becomes clear that Fruition is but another name for the feeling of Divine Immanence; and from this point of view Mr. Gibson's book takes its place as a worthy addition to the literature of a great subject.

Mr. Gibson adopts the plan, in much of his book, of elucidating his own thought by the detailed exposition and criticism of other men. Thus he comments in turn upon Eucken, Hall, Sabatier, Shand, James, and the two Cairds. Prof. Stanley Hall's Philosophy of Adolescence is regarded as furnishing Eucken's Activism with the needed support from empirical psychology; and in this there may be something worth discussion, though I should not myself go for strictly philosophic illumination to a writer who suggests that conscience "may be a wart raised by the sting of sin". But, anyhow, we may welcome the interesting and novel applications given by the new theory to the old saw that "it is love that makes the wheels go round". Mr. Gibson takes advantage of the opportunity for a full-dress debate upon the relations of morality and religion. Is it not the case, he asks in conclusion, that both have their roots in the *Gemütsleben*, or life of the Heart?

An interesting chapter deals with Pragmatism and Religious Idealism. Pragmatism, we are told, is doing Idealism the great service of compelling it to study over again the psychological bases of personality. Yet Idealism, even when religious and personalistic, "remains inveterately monistic," while Pragmatism clings stubbornly with pluralism. Here there is a broad ditch of separation. "For Religious Idealism the fundamental spiritual fact is not the mere plurality of selves, but the plurality of selves within a Spiritual Life" (p. 197). Hope is found in James's assertion of "possibilities that are not necessities," if only these be not pressed so far as to imply detachment from the sources of reality and thus sheer discontinuity in things. Life and history, in any case, are more than the running-down of clockwork wound up "ere the worlds began to be". To recognise such possibilities is to imply the reality of freedom. No ultimate problems of this sort, indeed, are soluble unless we formulate them in a way that has respect to our personal experience, and relates itself to the needs and the ideals of the ethico-religious consciousness. God and man are interpretable only through each other. And evil will eventually perish by being "depressed to the status of mere latency".

Enough has been said to indicate the main drift of Mr. Gibson's work, as well as the speculative sympathies by which it is inspired. In some degree his writing shares the opaque and elusive quality which some readers have felt also in Eucken; yet, as with Browning, the second reading of a hard page usually brings light. "Mystic Idealism" cannot expect to

be grasped all at once. But so long as it is set forth with the grave and measured sincerity of this volume, and with so close and living a bearing on modern life, it will, I believe, lack neither readers nor disciples.

H. R. MACKINTOSH.

*Laboratory Manual of Psychology.* Pp. xii., 127. *Laboratory Equipment for Psychological Experiments.* Pp. xi, 257. By C. H. JUDD. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1908.

These two books, together with the author's *Psychology*, which has already been reviewed in this journal (N.S., vol. xvii., pp. 420-422), are intended as "a series of text-books designed to introduce the student to the methods and principles of scientific psychology". All three books are now issued by the same publisher. The two volumes here under review recall the much larger work of Titchener, in so far as the one volume is intended for the student, the other for "those who wish to give demonstrations or to teach laboratory courses". One is tempted at the very outset to ask oneself how long this example of 'text' and 'crib' set by Titchener will be followed by writers succeeding him, and to wonder why, in the early days of other sciences, the books which were designed for use in the laboratory were not written on similarly dual lines. Without staying to discuss these questions, we may note that the scope of Judd's work is much narrower than that of Titchener's, and that his method of treatment is on the whole considerably more elementary. It has indeed been expressly written in order to facilitate the introduction of individual laboratory work "into a larger circle of institutions". From the preface it appears that psychology is still taught in most American colleges and normal schools without bringing the student into direct contact with experimental work.

It must be confessed that in one or two respects the *Manual* is likely to prove unsuitable for English students. Nearly all the references are to work done in America—too often to work not of first-rate character. Only Fechner, Wundt and Henri are quoted as writers in German; and there is practically no reference to English experimental work. We think too that the student will object to the vast number of unanswered questions that are put to him. Indeed, he may with good reason object to the form of the following: "Is there anything besides discrimination of tones involved in the recognition of intervals?" "How far is conscious volition in control of a co-ordinated movement?"

On the other hand, the text is written with admirable clearness, and may be recommended to the class of student ignorant of all scientific work, for which it is written. Now and again the instructions are deficient or wrong, as in the method of exploring the skin in order to demonstrate pressure spots, or as in the description of Ebbinghaus's method of testing memory. But, on the whole, the author is undoubtedly to be congratulated on the success with which he has performed the task he had set himself.

The volume which deals with laboratory equipment cannot be said to reflect great credit on the publishers. Most of the illustrations are extremely poor, due doubtless to the fact that they are copied secondhand from the catalogues of instrument makers. Some indeed, e.g., Figs. 20, 23, 51 and 71, must, owing to excessive reduction or erroneous shading, be almost useless. Further, the reader is deprived of the convenience of headings at the start of each chapter and at the top of each page.

We could wish the author had found room for a chapter on psycho-



physical and statistical methods and for mention of space- and time-errors, which are valuable, at all events from the standpoint of method. In another edition it would be well, too, to remove such syllables as *sal, rev, dor, hak, kod*, from a list of nonsense syllables recommended for use in experiments on learning.

Apart, however, from these defects, the book is of considerable interest. It describes various pieces of apparatus not to be found in previous works, and will certainly prove a useful companion to the other volumes in the sense we have already indicated.

C. S. M.

*Is Immortality Desirable?* G. LOWES DICKINSON. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1909. Pp. 63.

In this discourse, the Ingersoll Lecture for 1908, Mr. Dickinson raises what he affirms to be a very practical question, the question whether a continuance of the individual life after death is desirable. We need not, he says, be deterred from discussion by the scientific denial of immortality. For science has no proof, and "to infer wisely in such matters, one must be a poet as well as a man of science"; "hypotheses should be framed under a compelling sense of our own limitations and the vastness of the universe".

Is immortality, in fact, desired? The majority of mankind appear to be indifferent, not to think about death and what follows death. Some, and they are more numerous than is often believed, are pessimists in attitude, and desire extinction. But there are others who find immortality desirable. What, then, do they desire, and is it really to be desired?

It would certainly not be a good thing to prolong our present life indefinitely, although old people, in particular, often cling in this way to the world of the living. Nietzsche's doctrine of recurrent lives, without persistence of memory, is acceptable only in so far as lives are valuable; and there is no reason for adopting Nietzsche's cosmology. The simple and uncompromising Christian notion of Hell, if we strip it of any support in the idea of retribution,—and it is not for the sake of retribution that we desire immortality,—is so dreadful that we should prefer to it the extinction even of the best. What is really desired and desirable, what we really mean by Heaven, is "the ultimate term of a process in which we are engaged, of the end of which we can only say that it is good". "Immortality is desirable, if immortality means a fortunate issue of the quest of our souls."

But what is the soul? Soul may be simply substance, so that its immortality does not imply continuity of consciousness. Even so, immortality is desirable; it is a "consoling idea that our present capacities are determined by our previous actions, and that our present actions again will determine our future character". Much more desirable, however, would be an immortality with continuance of consciousness. We can hardly hope to particularise this continuance, to say what features of it would be desirable: the meeting of friends, perhaps, or inclusion in a wider self without loss of one's own self; it is impossible to say.

There is, then, a kind of immortality which, if it were a fact, would be a very desirable one. Whether it is a fact, we in the West have only just now, in the Society for Psychical Research, begun to inquire. The lecturer ends with an exhortation to take this branch of inquiry seriously, as befits a matter of immense practical importance.

P. E. WINTER.

*The Psychology and Pedagogy of Reading, with a Review of the History of Reading and Writing and of Methods, Texts and Hygiene in Reading.* By EDMUND BURKE HUEY. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1908. Pp. xvi, 469.

Prof. Huey here essays the impossible,—a monographic treatment of reading in popular form. He has, nevertheless, made a very interesting little book, and one that brings together a quantity of useful information. From the scientific point of view, however, it is regrettable that he did not put his special knowledge at the service of a psychology of reading, and issue Parts ii., iii. and iv. of the present work in separate form.

Part i., *The Psychology of Reading*, discusses in competent fashion such topics as the work of the eye in reading, the extent of reading matter perceived during a reading pause, the nature of the perceptual process in reading, internal speech, the rate of reading, even the interpretation of what is read, and the nature of 'meaning'. A revision and expansion of this part, in the light of recent experimental studies, would be extremely valuable. Part ii., *The History of Reading*, is brief and somewhat perfunctory, though the writer shows no little skill in the selection of his illustrations. Part iii., *The Pedagogy of Reading*, is excellently written, and seems to have been regarded by the author as the central portion of his work. The six chapters discuss present-day methods and texts in elementary reading, the views of representative educators concerning early reading, learning to read at home, learning to read at school, reading as a discipline and as training in the effective use of books, and "what to read," with special reference to the adolescent period. The part ends with a baker's dozen of practical pedagogical conclusions (pp. 379 ff.). Part iv., *The Hygiene of Reading*, has two chapters devoted to reading fatigue and to hygienic requirements in the printing of books and papers. Prof. Huey concludes by calling attention to two pressing needs: the need of detailed studies of specific problems, to furnish much more than we possess of fact and of suggestion; and the need of the determination of reading *optima*, along the more important lines mentioned in the book, by committees of specialists, if necessary with governmental aid and supervision.

The volume closes with a selected bibliography and a good analytical index.

FRANCIS JONES.

*Immortality.* By E. E. HOLMES, Hon. Canon of Christ Church, Oxford, etc. (The Oxford Library of Practical Theology.) London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1908. Pp. xv, 320.

This pretty volume discusses nearly every question externally connected with its theme, but the theme itself is virtually left untouched. The work is written, of course, from the distinctly Christian point of view, and it is all the more astonishing that it nowhere contains a serious or worthy treatment of the only argument for immortality that counts for anything in the Bible. In the Bible, faith in immortality is simply an immediate inference from faith in God. The Psalmist, and Jesus in His turn, felt that no one who knows what God is, or what He has done for men, could believe that He will relinquish them to the dust. "He is not the God of the dead, but of the living." Compared with this, thoughts upon the "Pain of Paradise," or "The Shortness of Life," on which Canon Holmes has written at surprising length, are trivial and irrelevant. We are actually told that if Apparitions could be verified by photographs, it would "at once satisfy our questionings and longings in favour of a future

existence". Only, it is added, with grave concern, "the fact that Appearitions practically always appear clothed, and are not infrequently seen in carriages, has never yet been satisfactorily explained"! Undue importance, also, is attached to the religious conjectures of the late Mr. Cecil Rhodes. Each aspect of the theme, as Mr. Holmes has chosen to interpret it, is illustrated copiously by quotations, and it strikes one as rather odd that so many Christian thinkers should have dallied with the idea of pre-existence.

H. R. MACKINTOSH.

REGINALD PECOCK'S *Book of Faith: A Fifteenth Century Theological Tractate*. Glasgow: J. Maclehose & Sons, 1909. Pp. 315.

Prof. J. L. Morrison of Kingston has edited this book, now printed for the first time, from the manuscript in Trinity College, Cambridge, and has written an excellent introductory essay. Peacock is known mainly from his *Repressor*, in which he made use of rationalism to defend the Church against the Lollards, and from the fact that he, the Bishop of Winchester, was condemned for heresy. A choice of ignominies was offered. He could abjure or be burned. Not having courage, he preferred "to incur the taunts of the people than to forsake the law of faith, and to depart after death into hell-fire and the place of torment". In spite of his inglorious weakness, he deserves to be remembered, since, according to Prof. Morrison, he was the best English representative of the Renaissance thought of the fifteenth century, and the one man of the country to be classed with the Italians. Peacock, while he honoured the syllogism with almost more than Mediaeval reverence, had the audacity of one of our own modernists. He claimed for reason the right to deal with the mysteries of faith, and, mean though his end was, he pursued truth in the light of reason.

J. H.

*L'Année Psychologique*. Vol. xiv. Paris: Masson et Cie, 1908.

Pp. vi, 500. Price 15 fr.

Original papers: *Binet et Simon*, Le développement de l'intelligence chez les enfants: a most interesting and valuable paper, giving a series of well-tried tests for children of all ages from three to thirteen years (summary of tests, pp. 58-59) (pp. 1-94). *Houllier*, Les idées des physiiciens sur la matière. *Sourian*, L'enseignement de l'esthétique. *Borel*, Le calcul des probabilités et la méthode des majorités (pp. 125-151). *Binet*, L'évolution de l'enseignement philosophique: the careful and impartial analysis of answers to a circular, questioning teachers of philosophy in France about books, methods, aims, results of their teaching, etc. This paper is exceedingly interesting, and deserves the attention of all teachers of philosophy (pp. 152-231). *Imbert*, Le surmenage professionnel: a short discussion of four reports of work on this subject read at the International Congress for Hygiene in Berlin, September, 1907. *Rauh*, Morale et Biologie. *Goblot*, La démonstration mathématique: statement and criticism of Poincaré's views (pp. 264-283). *Binet et Simon*, Language et Pensée: a discussion of observations on an imbecile, leading to the conclusion that there is thought without imagery or words, and that thought consists of an intellectual feeling (pp. 284-339). *Chabot*, Hygiène et pédagogie. *Canteor*, Le pragmatisme: ni problème défini, ni discussions méthodiques, ni solutions précises; mais des affirmations vagues, des equivoques, des improvisations hâtives—voilà ce que nous trouvons dans le pragmatisme (pp. 355-379).

The appendix in recent literature includes a summary of recent work on 'réflexion' by *Etienne Maigre*. Through the work of Ribot and Binet on intelligence and thought, France is already much in sympathy with the later work of Külpe's school; an 'Essai de chiromancie expérimentale' by *Binet*, who, with the objectivity which is so characteristic of him, attacks the subject experimentally and finds in favour of signs of intelligence in the hand; as well as a 'causerie pédagogique' with the editor, showing the position of practical efforts in this direction in France (pp. 405-431). The volume closes with sixty-seven pages of notices of papers, written largely by the several authors themselves.

HENRY J. WATT.

*Intelligenz und Wille.* DR. E. MEUMANN. Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1908. Pp. viii, 293. Geb. 3.80 marks.

The problems of intelligence and will demand at the present time continued study and revision. Many new prospects towards the investigation of intelligence have been opened out in some of the recent work on thought. On all three subjects we find in Meumann's book general discussions of a fresh and most suggestive kind.

The first half of the work, which deals with Intelligence, shows three main divisions. The first of these deals with the formal presuppositions and antecedent conditions of intelligence, such as Attention, Practice, Disposition, Fatigue and the like. In the second, 'the material presuppositions of Intelligence,' we have a chapter on Observation, in which is embodied an interesting appreciation of Ruskin as the extreme type of a mind dominated by the habit of observation, as well as chapters on Memory and Phantasy, in relation to Intelligence. On most of these subjects Meumann is, of course, particularly well qualified to write discursively. The third main division deals with Thought.

The second half of the book is devoted to the discussion of Will and its relation to Intelligence, whereby the connexions between Will and Type of Character and Temperament are treated in an interesting way. In the end precedence is given, if at all, rather to Intelligence than to Will, although both are well balanced against each other, and hope is pointed towards a possible future suppression of the antagonism between these two ancient philosophical divinities. The instincts and sentiments might, we think, perhaps have received a little more detailed treatment as part of the material basis of voluntary action.

In general the effect of different mental activities of a lower order upon thought and intelligence and the use made of the former are well shown up. Suggestive indications are given of the extent to which the lower faculties can simulate or take up the work of intelligence. The book will doubtless be of considerable service to pedagogy. It is well written and very readable, and may be heartily recommended to all interested in a many-sided and not too abstract treatment of the relation of Will to Intelligence.

H. J. WATT.

*Bericht über den III Kongress für Experimentelle Psychologie.* Edited by PROF. DR. F. SCHUMANN. Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1909. Pp. xxii, 263. 9 marks.

This report, like that of the second congress, contains a number of very valuable critical summaries of work done in important fields. The first is by Ludvig Edinger, Direktor of the Neurological Institute in Frank-

fort, on the 'Relations between Comparative Anatomy and Comparative Psychology' (pp. 1-21). The second is by Prof. Ed. Claparède of Geneva on the 'Methods of Psychological Observation and Experiment upon Animals,' in the text of which are embodied fullest references to the literature (pp. 22-58). The third, 'On the Understanding of Speech from the Point of View of Pathology,' is by Prof. A. Pick of Prague (pp. 59-90 with bibliography). Closely related to it is the fourth, 'On the Understanding of Speech from the Point of View of Normal Psychology,' by Dr. Karl Bühler, Privatdozent in Würzburg (pp. 94-128 and bibliography). Lastly we have a critical discussion of theories concerning 'the pathological behaviour of the attention,' by Dr. W. Specht, Privatdozent in Munich (pp. 131-190).

It would be difficult to overestimate the value of these papers, which give to such a congress-report an interest it could not otherwise have. It is obvious that the topics for these critical reports have been carefully chosen by the committee of the society. If the high standard of this work is kept up for a number of years, the society will become an important factor in the organisation of psychological interest and work. It would be impossible to criticise the papers in detail or justly in a short space. They are to be heartily recommended to all who are interested in the subjects they deal with, and each will be found most useful, if not indispensable. It is interesting to notice how much helpful co-operation and sympathy seems to exist in Germany between psychologists and psychiatrists.

The usual swarm of small papers follows at the end of the volume (pp. 195-263).

H. J. WATT.

*Socrate.* By G. ZUCCANTE. Milan, Turin and Rome: Fratelli Bocca, 1909. Pp. viii, 412.

It is not too much to say that, after all that has been written about him, Socrates still remains the most mysterious figure in the history of Greek thought. Every one agrees that in some way he gave a direction to Philosophy which it has retained ever since, and yet no one seems to have succeeded in explaining what he taught or even what manner of man he was. I believe myself that this is entirely due to the fundamental error of regarding Xenophon and Aristotle rather than Aristophanes and Plato as the most trustworthy witnesses to fact where Socrates is concerned, and I can see no hope that the Titanic figure of the true Socrates will be restored to its rightful place in our Histories of Philosophy until we learn that all but the latest writings of Plato adhere, as he says himself in his *Letters*, to the historical truth about his master, to a degree which modern expositors do not suspect. Meanwhile Mr. Zuccante's book represents at least a step in the right direction. Though he builds in the first instance upon Xenophon, and has not found out that every statement of importance which Aristotle makes about Socrates comes direct from Plato, he has so far availed himself of the Platonic evidence, corroborated as it is by Xenophon's own admissions, as to do some measure of justice to the influence of mathematics on Socrates, and to that extent to recognise the verisimilitude of the caricature of the *Clouds*. What he fails to see is that the evidence of Plato and Aristophanes proves the existence of a curious mystic strain in the thought of the great rationalist, and drives us to admit, what his knowledge of mathematics and his acquaintance with Simmias and Cebes confirm, that Socrates stands historically in very close connexion with the Orphic-Pythagorean circles. It is, to my mind, precisely our persistence in ignoring the Pythagorean

element in Socraticism which makes the current accounts of the development from Socrates through Plato to Aristotle so incomprehensible. Mr. Zuccante shares in the general blindness on this point, but his work is an excellent exposition of the thought of Socrates so far as it can be learned, while Plato continues to be used merely to illustrate a conception of the philosopher based throughout on the view of him as a mere rationalistic moralist, though a moralist with a wonderfully developed dialectical method. I could wish, however, that in his account of the life of Socrates, he had attended to the important chronological data supplied by Plato, which of themselves are enough to dissipate most of the assumptions commonly made by those who rely on Xenophon for the mental history of the master. (Thus, much may be inferred from the fact, revealed by a chance allusion in Plato, that "the *φροντιστής*" was a current nickname of Socrates years before Aristophanes put the *φροντιστήριον* on the stage.) I cannot speak so favourably of the author's conception of the "sophists" and their connexion with the Socratic philosophy, in which he seems to be influenced by certain popular but demonstrably mistaken ideas about Athenian life. It is a pure fancy that the great "sophists" took to the teaching of rhetoric because, having by their scepticism deprived thought of all content, they were driven to deal only with the forms of its verbal expression. Their real object was the practical one of making a living, and the teaching of rhetoric provided a living because, in the Athenian democracy, rhetoric was, as Plato puts it, a life-preserving appliance. That is, it was an art by which the suspected oligarch might contrive to get off when brought before a democratic jury.

It is a similar mistake to suppose that "sophists" were popular at Athens, and that the reason for their popularity was the amusement which their rhetoric and discussions gave to an idle<sup>1</sup> and quick-witted populace. Any study of the works of Isocrates, Plato, Xenophon will show that the sophists were regarded by the democracy with the greatest ill-will, and that their pupils were drawn not from the "people," but from the anti-democratic minority of youth of wealth and high position. The man of the people, like Anytus, hated the sophist because he felt that sophistry was putting into the hands of the oligarchical few a weapon which the ordinary democrat was too poor to purchase. So it is really too late in the day to bring up the old fable of the corruption of public morality by the wicked sophist. One might reasonably doubt with Grote whether Cleon and Hyperbolus were really *morally* worse men than e.g. Pericles; their inferiority seems to be mainly in taste and intellect. But if it were true that they were also morally inferior, the blame could not lie with the sophists, since no one suggests that Cleon and the rest of

<sup>1</sup> Any careful study of Aristophanes and the orators will show that the Athenian citizens were, for the most part, farmers and small shopkeepers, not a class who can afford to spend the day idly listening to oratory. The persons whom Aristophanes satirises as passing their whole time on juries after all did so largely from necessity and not from choice. The dicast's pay must be regarded very largely in the light of a State provision of employment for citizens who had been driven from their farms by the war, and would have starved from enforced idleness but for the occupation afforded by the *Helieia*. In fact it was at first hardly so much "pay" as "compensation for loss of time," since the amount was carefully kept down to the minimum on which life could be supported, as my colleague Prof. Burnet reminds me. As Prof. Bury has already observed, the raising of the dicast's *μισθος* by Cleon was an economical necessity brought about by the war.

the democratic leaders were the pupils of the sophists. An equally grave misconception which dominates a good deal of the present work is the notion that Socrates was led to undertake his public career as a moralist by dissatisfaction with the superficiality of sophistic theories of conduct. Any careful study of Plato will show this view to be a delusion. According to the *Phaedo* the great philosophical change due to Socrates was the abandonment of speculation based upon loose analogies supplied by sensible experience for the application of mathematical methods to all the problems of philosophy, and the cause of it was dissatisfaction not with the moralists but with the cosmologists. The appearance of Socrates as a moralist is connected by Plato with the famous response of the Delphic oracle. Neither he nor any other ancient authority gives any ground for believing that Socrates stood in any relation to the "sophists" beyond that in which he stood to all persons who claimed to be in possession of *ἐπιστήμη*, and sophists are not even mentioned in the *Apology* among the classes of such persons upon whom the elenchus was exercised. In short, if we follow the only evidence we possess, Socrates stood in a very close relation to ancient cosmology, particularly to the school of Anaxagoras, and to Pythagorean mathematics and religion, but had no special connexion of any kind with the sophistic movement. Until we see that Socrates has really very little to do with this movement, but is first and foremost the connecting link between Anaxagoras and Philolaus on the one side and Plato on the other, I do not believe that we shall ever understand the real development of Greek thought.

A. E. TAYLOR.

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- Enrico Ruta, *La Psiche Sociale, Unità di Origine e di Fine*, Milano, etc., Sandron, 1909, pp. 381.
- Benedotte Croce, *Logica come Scienza del Concetto Puro*, Seconda Edizione, interamenta rifatta, Bari, Laterza & Figli, 1909, pp. xxiii, 429.
- Rodolfo Mondolfo, *Tra il Diritto di Natura e il Comunismo*, Mantova, Bandiera, 1909, pp. 70.

## VIII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

**PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.** Vol. xviii., No. 4. **A. W. Moore.** 'Absolutism and Teleology.' [Can absolute perfectionism be reconciled with the conception of evolution as an essential character of reality? This issue is as critical in ethics as in logic. The absolutist declares that unless there is an all-inclusive fixed purpose, end or goal, there is no standard for moral progress, and that a demand for participation in the reconstruction of the ideal also overlooks the problem of the standard of this construction. The evolutionist replies that the all-inclusive purpose is either unknown or irrelevant to the here and now, and that he cannot reconcile the absolutist doctrine with moral responsibility as directly experienced. He himself then appeals to social process, only to be met by the rejoinder that the social character of experience is impossible without the absolute.] **Reviews of Books.** **Notices of New Books.** **Summaries of Articles.** **Notes.**

**PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW.** Vol. xvi., No. 3. **Darwin Number.** **A. T. Hadley.** 'The Influence of Charles Darwin upon Historical and Political Thought.' [The idea of evolution had long been current in history and politics. Darwin showed two things in these fields: that natural selection develops, not only individuals of superior ability and intelligence, but also types of superior adaptation to their surroundings; and that this adaptation is what gives the type its right to exist. He thus made it possible for historians and political thinkers to set up objective standards and attain to objective results. It is this objectivity that differentiates Morley on *Compromise* from Mill on *Liberty*, and that makes the one author readable and the other unreadable to-day.] **J. R. Angell.** 'The Influence of Darwin on Psychology.' [Darwin came late into modern psychology, and found analysis already in the field. In general, however, Darwinism has helped to bring into prominence functional and genetic (including animal) psychology. In particular, Darwin gave us a theory of the evolution of instinct, the doctrine of continuous mental evolution from the lowest animal to man, and principles of emotive expression. The psychology of instinct has passed through the stage of acquired characters to that of organic selection, and is now passing with Jennings and Loeb into the stage of experiment. Darwin's view of mental evolution holds its ground against Mivart and Wallace, on the one hand, and Loeb on the other. His list of emotive principles has not been materially improved upon, though it cannot be taken as final. Darwinian problems for the future are the study of animals in the laboratory but under natural conditions, and the determination of mental types on the general analogy of genera and species in zoology.] **J. E. Creighton.** 'Darwin and Logic.' [Indirectly Darwinism brought renewed confidence in the fruitfulness of their method to the humanistic sciences that were already employing evolutionary conceptions. Directly, the suggestion made in the *Descent* regarding the function of imitation has led to important results in logic.

But while logical thinking is a mode of living, and so advantageous to the organism and capable of biological treatment, this treatment is not philosophy. For logic, thinking is not rightly construed as adjustment to physical or social environment. Dissatisfaction with Hegel has led to the views of Baldwin and of the pragmatic evolutionists; but the former ends his logic with a dualism, and the latter interpret thought as purely practical and instrumental. In fact, Darwin's conceptions can be fruitful for logic only when transformed in the light of an idealistic philosophy. For reason and purpose are not explicable in terms of phenomenal relations, but are presupposed in all science and experience.] **C. A. Ellwood.** 'The Influence of Darwin on Sociology.' [Darwin's great influence upon sociology may be ascribed to the facts that natural selection was a principle that had already been recognised and applied (Malthus) in social theory, and that the biology which he established is a necessary foundation of sociology. The effects of the influence are seen in the sociological use of the concepts of natural and social selection, in Galton's eugenics, and indirectly in the rise of functional psychology.] **J. H. Tufts.** 'Darwin and Evolutionary Ethics.' [Historically, the questions of origin and validity have been persistently and almost inseparably connected; this appears from a review of evolutionary theories of morals down to Spencer. Darwin approached the ethical problem exclusively from the side of natural history, and makes the acquisition of a moral sense or conscience inevitable at a certain stage of mental development. His view is weak in that it conceives the moral consciousness preponderantly in instinctive and emotional terms, and lays too little emphasis upon the social character of the individual; strong, in that it gives the whole theory of moral development a widely conceived and definitely evidenced concrete setting, and furnishes a broad basis for the social nature of man. He regards his own discussion of the part played by natural selection as imperfect and fragmentary. His emphasis on sympathy is in contrast with current views of Darwinism in ethics.] **J. M. Baldwin.** 'The Influence of Darwin on Theory of Knowledge and Philosophy.' [In theory of knowledge, the doctrine of evolution has given us the ideas of instrumentalism and of community. Instrumental or experimental logic holds that all truth is confirmed hypothesis, and that all reason is truth woven into mental structure. (Pragmatism, maintaining that truth, apart from its utility, is not true, defeats itself.) The theory of the common validities of knowledge and of the corresponding common interests of society is, again, a possession that we owe to Darwinism. In general philosophy, we have, first, the introduction of the methods of scientific naturalism and positivism; probabilities and natural law, *e.g.*, replace chance and special creation. We have, secondly, the broadening of the idea of cause, beyond that of energy; we have been taught that nature achieves novelties, that there is, qualitatively, more in the effect than there is in the cause. In short, Darwin gave the death-blow to uncritical vitalism in biology, to occultism in psychology, to mysticism and dogmatism in philosophy.]

**AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY.** Vol. xx., No. 2. **T. Nakashima.** 'Contributions to the Study of the Affective Processes.' [(1) Experiments with colours and tones, by the method of paired comparisons, warrant the conclusion that affective judgments may be and usually are as direct and immediate as the sensory judgments of psychophysics. (2) The method of single stimuli does little more than bring out the theories and idiosyncrasies of the observers. It shows, however, incidentally, that affection never precedes its sensation. (3) The method of the cognitive and discriminative reaction may be applied to pleasantness-

unpleasantness; the times are regular, but are longer than the corresponding sensation-times. (4) There is no unambiguous evidence for mixed feelings, affective localisation, or difference of quality within pleasantness-unpleasantness.] **F. Kuhlmann.** 'On the Analysis of Auditory Memory Consciousness.' [An attempt to determine the conscious processes that enter into the memorisation and recall of a given sensory material,—verbal discourse and groups of familiar sounds. Words were recalled directly by auditory imagery, associatively by visual imagery, or inferentially, through the verbal or visual context. With lapse of time the visual imagery increased in amount and continuity, while the part played by auditory recall markedly decreased. With the groups of sounds, auditory imagery was very fragmentary; its course was irregular; and as a rule it was beyond the reach of direct voluntary control. The motor processes used in imitating the sounds were the most important factor in recall; they were inseparably connected with the effort to recall a sound vividly and minutely. Visual imagery was fairly prominent.] **C. H. Waddle.** 'Miracles of Healing.' [Reviews the theories of disease held by primitive peoples; discusses primitive applications of the healing art, with especial reference to magic and miracle; traces the course of miraculous healing throughout the Hebrew and Christian civilisations, indicating current survivals of ancient superstition; and offers psychological interpretations. Cures deemed miraculous "are brought about in accordance with the law that the mind tends to translate into physical reaction any suggestion or idea which can be actively aroused and kept at the focus of attention. That this may be done, the idea must seem reasonable and possible, and inhibiting and opposing ideas must be banished." Advocates the co-operation of churchmen, physicians and psychologists in the application of the laws of mental healing; these have not only a hygienic, but also a moral, spiritual and pedagogical value. Bibliography.] **M. W. Calkins.** 'The Abandonment of Sensationalism in Psychology.' [Sensationalism has been transcended by the Wundtian extension of the doctrine of feeling and by the recognition of relational elements. (1) Wundt's tension, however, is attention; his relaxation is sensational; his excitement and quiescence are relational. (2) The relational elements are now explicitly accepted by a number of psychologists of different periods, prepossessions and training. Their acceptance does not involve that of imageless thought.] **I. M. Bentley, E. B. Titchener, and G. M. Whipple.** 'Some New Apparatus.' [Describes an observation table for work with protozoa and other small animal forms; a combined stereoscope, telestereoscope and pseudoscope for demonstrational purposes; and an arrangement of forks for testing the pitch-discrimination of school children.] **M. McMein and M. F. Washburn.** 'Minor Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of Vassar College, xi. The Effect of Mental Type on the Interference of Motor Habits.' [A study of card-sorting habits, begun with the view of finding out whether two relatively simple or two relatively complex habits interfered the more with each other, led to difference of result in accordance with mental type, as visual or motor. Visual images are acquired and lost more rapidly than motor habits. Visual change in the task to be learned affected the motor more than the visual type; visual distraction affected the visual more than the motor.] Psychological Literature. Notes.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. ii., No. 2, April, 1909. 'The Reports of the Poor Law Commission': **Bernard Bosanquet**, 'The Majority Report'; **Sidney Webb**, 'The End of the Poor Law'. [Dr. Bosanquet considers that the conflict of ideas is as to whether the dis-

tion between what we may call social therapeutics and normal provision for health and education is justified. Regarding minor objections he holds that to deny private charity a place in the scheme of social assistance would be in practice to close the principal laboratory of social invention; and that the more powerful and secure the democracy, the better it can afford to give comparative independence to its authorities. In regard to main divergence, Dr. Bosanquet points out the enormous difference between the treatment of sickness in ordinary and in necessary cases. Similarly with education. An able and effective paper. Mr. Sidney Webb gives some space to reconsidering the 1834 Report in regard to modern developments. The Majority Report would practically condone the present overlapping of functions, waste and confusion. The Minority alone have a plan to meet this, and they alone really face the question of unemployment.] **G. Chatterton Hill.** 'Race Progress and Race Degeneracy.' [Consideration of the influences which may effect the germ-plasm.] **M. E. Robinson.** 'Music as a Social Discipline.' [A plea for aiming at imparting an intelligent appreciation of music, rather than a superficial technical ability. The function of music in society.] **A. E. Zimmer.** 'Was Greek Civilisation Based on Slave Labour? II.' Discussions: 'The Moral Education Congress.' **E. Lyttelton.** 'The Present Position of Positivism.' **James Oliphant.** Annual Meeting of the Sociological Society, etc.—Vol. ii., No. 3, July, 1909. **Right Hon. Sir John Gorst.** 'The Reports on the Poor Law.' [A careful and interesting comparison. The questions to answer in considering the two Reports are: (1) Shall the County Councils, in dealing with the non-able-bodied poor, be allowed to act through their already established committees, or shall a newly constituted committee be imposed upon them to deal with these matters on the lines of the old Poor Law? (2) In dealing with the able-bodied and unemployed poor, shall the authority charged with the task be Local or National?] **C. W. Saleeby.** 'The Obstacles to Eugenics.' [These are the antagonism between individuation and genesis; the ignorance created by modern "education"; misrepresentation by friends and enemies; prudery; social, political or other bias; definitely anti-eugenic practices, e.g., conscription.] **W. Leslie Mackenzie.** 'Sociological Aspects of Health.' [Curative medicine and preventive medicine have come to a fresh synthesis in the medical inspection of the school child. Reflexions on Jones's *Malaria—A Neglected Factor in the History of Greece and Rome*, etc.] **G. Chatterton Hill.** 'Race Progress and Race Degeneracy—Conclusion.' [Consideration of the decreasing French birth-rate. How far due to the union of two originally distinct and antagonistic racial elements. The least fertile unions those in which racial asymmetry is combined with religious disharmony.]

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. vi., 9. **E. B. McGilvary.** 'Experience and its Inner Duplicity.' ["The real question is whether all the peculiar features of 'consciousness' are not differentiating peculiarities of a unique way of togetherness of things."] **W. P. Montague.** 'The True, the Good and the Beautiful from a Pragmatic Standpoint.' ["The best antidote for the intellectualistic ethic of Mr. Bradley was the voluntaristic logic of Mr. Schiller. But why neglect the middle ground of common-sense?"] **E. L. Thorndike.** 'A Note on the Specialisation of Mental Functions with Varying Content.' **K. Schmidt.** 'Concerning a Philosophical Platform.' [Reply to J. E. Creighton in v., 6.]—vi., 10. **R. S. Woodworth.** 'Hermann Ebbinghaus.' [Obituary.] **W. T. Marvin.** 'The Field of Propositions that have full Factual Warrant.' ["Intuitions do not give us premisses

from which causal propositions can be inferred or deduced." **I. W. Riley.** 'Transcendentalism and Pragmatism.' [Compares James with Emerson.]—vi., 11. **K. Schmidt.** 'Critique of Cognition and its Principles.' [Four in number, viz., logical purity, completeness, simplicity and truth.] **H. R. Marshall.** 'Clearness, Intensity and Attention.' [Clearness is only the term to describe intensity in fields of a broader nature than those in which the typical intensity, viz., sensational intensity, appears.] **A. W. Moore.** 'Antipragmatisme.' [Points out that M. Schinz's book with this title (1) openly argues against Pragmatism on the pragmatic ground of 'consequences' and (2) attacks Dewey by garbled quotations.] Meeting of the North Central Association of Teachers of Psychology in Normal Schools and Colleges.

**REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE.** Mai, 1909. **M. S. Gillet.** 'Moral Temperament according to Aristotle.' [Moral temperament supervenes upon physical. A healthy moral temperament comes of the cultivation of the moral virtues, by which we play the philosopher with passion.] **C. Piat.** 'Sanctions.' [That nature is not indifferent to morality.] **M. de Wulf.** 'History of Æsthetics.' [Whether beauty is an attribute of things, or of our representative states, or of both. Greek and German theories.] **P. de Groot.** 'A Chapter of the Life of St. Thomas.' [His defence of the Friars at the University of Paris.] **L. Noël.** 'The Neo-Thomist Movement.'

**REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE.** 1<sup>er</sup> Juin, 1909. **E. Baron.** 'The Theory of Knowledge in Pragmatism.' [Origin and present state of Pragmatism in England. Pragmatism still in course of formation. "Pragmatists may severally develop different metaphysics, indeed they have already begun to do so."] **E. Baudin.** 'The Psychological Method of W. James.' [A highly eulogistic exposition. "The Science of Mind must necessarily be an original Science. The Ego will ever hold in check the organising principles of the Non-Ego, and its life cannot but refuse all formulas of Inertia. The principle of Inertia, the foundation of Physical Science, is the one principle of which we may be certain that it will never enter into Psychology."] **P. Charles.** 'The Philosophy of Rudolph Eucken.' **G. Michelet.** 'Critical Review of Moral Science.' [Is Moral Science normative? Review of five recent French works on the subject.]

**REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE.** 17<sup>e</sup> Année, No. 2, Mars, 1909. **J. Tannery.** 'Pour la science livresque.' [A defence of book-learning.] **M. Calderoni.** 'Formes et critères de responsabilité.' [Distinction between moral and judicial, penal and civil responsibility, and long discussion of the two latter.] **L. Weber.** 'La morale d'Épictète et les besoins présents de l'enseignement moral' (*Suite et Fin*). **A. Reymond.** 'Note sur le théorème d'existence des nombres entiers et sur la définition logistiquie du zero.' Étude Critique: 'La religion d'aujourd'hui'. **G. Sorel.** Questions Pratiques: 'Expérience de double traduction en langue internationale'.

**ZEITSCHRIFT F. PSYCHOLOGIE.** Bd. li., Heft 1 und 2. The number has, as frontispiece, a portrait of the founder and late editor of the *Zeitschrift*, Prof. Ebbinghaus, whose untimely death is deeply deplored by all psychologists, and will be felt as a severe personal loss by those who had the privilege of his friendship. A brief appreciation of his services to science is signed by his collaborators on the editorial staff and by the head of the publishing house from which the *Zeitschrift* is issued; a sketch of his life and work is supplied by a former pupil, E. Jaensch. **G. Heymans** and

**E. Wiersma.** 'Beiträge zur speziellen Psychologie auf Grund einer Massenuntersuchung, vi.' [Examines, in the light of the authors' well-known questionnaire material, the correlations between activity, emotionality and secondary function (influence upon present conduct of past experiences) which were brought out by Heymans' biographical study, *Über einige psychische Korrelationen*. In general the two sets of results agree; their divergences are methodically important. It is found that the apparent correlation between predominance of primary function (relative independence of past experiences), on the one hand, and emotionality and non-activity, on the other, is apparent only: what is favoured by emotionality and non-activity is not primary function, but a group of attributes to which primary function is also favourable. The combination of the two modes of function with emotionality, activity and their opposites, gives rise to eight types of character: the amorphous, the apathetic, the nervous, the sentimental, the sanguine, the phlegmatic, the choleric and the impassioned. These are studied in detail.] **V. Benussi.** 'Über "Aufmerksamkeitsrichtung" beim Raum- und Zeitvergleich.' [A continuation of the author's investigation of equivocation of form, and of the internal processes which condition it. (1) In the tachistoscopic apprehension of three horizontally arranged points, the comparison of the spatial intervals depends upon two factors: the subjective grouping of the points, and the relative insistence or strikingness of the distance between two points, *D*, and of the complex *C* formed by two limiting points and the intervening space. These two factors are interdependent. In the last resort, however, the ratio of *D* to *C* is decisive: that interval is subjectively lengthened in which *D* is more insistent than *C*, and that is shortened, in which *C* is more striking than *D*. (2) In the apprehension of two contiguous temporal intervals, formed by three noises of equal intensity and of the same pitch, the judgment of comparison is determined by the rhythmical grouping or accentual form of the sounds; all moments that enhance the distance or distinctness of the stimuli tend to bring about a subjective lengthening of the interval, and conversely. If the sounds give a predominating impression of sequence or succession, the judgments tend (not by a process of comparison, but by the mere obscuration of the impression of interval) towards equality. Special tendencies of judgment are set up by variety of colour in the points and of pitch in the noises.] **K. Bühler.** 'Zur Kritik der Denkeperimente.' [Reply to Dürr and von Aster. The main point of criticism, that the introspective reports were rather indicative, informative than psychologically descriptive, is briefly met by the counterstatements that much information had to be included, to fill out gaps in the context, and that Dürr's *sprachliche Darstellung* is not the same thing as von Aster's *Kundgabe*.] Literaturbericht. Kongressanzeigen. [Haydn-Zentenarfeier; VI<sup>me</sup> Congrès international de Psychologie; xvi. Internationaler Medizinischer Kongress.]

ARCHIV F. D. GESAMTE PSYCHOLOGIE. Bd. xiv., Heft 1 und 2. **G. Stoerring.** 'Experimentelle und psychopathologische Untersuchungen über das Bewusstsein der Gültigkeit.' [Continuation of the author's experiments on the simple processes of inference. The observers distinguish a state of assurance from a consciousness of validity. The former is a state of consciousness in which there is no awareness of correctness as such, but which would discharge at once by the answer 'yes' if the question of correctness were put. It is characterised by a feeling of necessity, a feeling of identity, a feeling of satisfaction, etc., variously disposed and variously intensive. The author rightly remarks that processes such as these may be identified and discriminated by the observers, despite the impossibility of their psychological description. The full consciousness



of validity appears (as is shown by psychopathological analogy) when, given an absorbed attention, certain mental acts force or thrust themselves upon us. Judgment may be defined, psychologically, as any experience that is connected with a state of assurance or with this consciousness of validity.] **K. Beckmann.** 'Der Wille bei Descartes: eine psychologische Untersuchung.' [The ultimate mental functions, for Descartes, are cognition and volition, *perceptio* and *volitio*, which may further be identified with *passio* and *actio*. The paper is devoted to a detailed consideration of the Cartesian doctrine of will, under the headings: judgment and volition, range of will and cognition, nature of error, freedom of the will and indifference, will and causation, will and passion, particular voluntary actions (attention, recollection, imagination), will and bodily movement.] **M. Schlick.** 'Das Grundproblem der Ästhetik in entwicklungsgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung.' [The ultimate problem of aesthetics is the question: Why are things beautiful? It has been variously answered, and the possibility of an answer has been denied. In modern times, it has been customary to distinguish a direct and an indirect (associative) æsthetical factor: the former, of course, is an inexplicable datum; but the latter may be explained, if we take the biological, evolutionary view. Let us assume that all beauty is associative, and let us distinguish the beautiful from the useful, defining the useful as that which maintains the species. How, then, could the æsthetic attitude be developed? It would emerge, evidently, whenever an individual was in presence of a useful object, but was himself so situated that the desires which the object could satisfy were already satisfied; the object would not be indifferent, but its perception would (on the ground of former experiences of the satisfaction of desire) reproduce a feeling of pleasure. This view gives us the genesis of aesthetics, and in so far solves the æsthetic problem; enables us to explain the chronological order of æsthetic production; accounts for the importance of idea-feelings as opposed to stimulus-feelings; shows the relative truth of the play-theory, the Plato-Herbert theory, etc. At the same time, it seems that a direct æsthetic factor must also be admitted, a factor that is psychologically ultimate, but that may be explained biologically as a form (the play-form) of adaptation.] **L. Truschel.** 'Das Problem des sogenannten sechsten Sinns der Blinden: Heutiger Stand der Forschungen.' [Discussion of the views of Krogius and Kunz. The general distance-sense of the blind depends on the co-operation of the externalising activities of all the remaining senses; it is more especially a function of the sense of hearing (under which the reactions of the vestibular apparatus are to be included), and is at times reinforced by pressure and temperature. There is, however, a peculiar faculty, in the blind, of appreciating direction, distance, height, etc., which does not come to consciousness in terms of sensation, and which cannot be explained in the same way as their general power of orientation; the perceptions of this X-sense, as the writer terms it, depend exclusively upon the stimulation of the auditory organ by reflected sound-waves.] **G. Deuchler.** 'Bericht über den dritten internationalen Kongress für Philosophie zu Heidelberg vom 31 August bis 5 September, 1908.' Notiz. 'Die VII. internationale Kongress für Kriminalanthropologie.' Literaturbericht. Einzelbesprechungen. [Meumann on Stumpf's *Wiedergeburt der Philosophie*; Kronfeld on Nelson's *Ist metaphysikfreie Naturwissenschaft möglich?* and *Über das sog. Erkenntnisproblem*; Kiesow on Aars' *Gut und Böse*.] Referate.

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE. Band xv., Hef. 1. **H. Guskar.** 'Der Utilitarismus bei Mill und Spencer in kritischer Beleuchtung. Eine Grundlegung für die Ethik.' [Their method fruitful if

the right start is made, not from an abstract principle, but from the conative life of man.] **Theodor Lessing.** 'Philosophie als Tat.' [Importance of the personal factor in the teaching of philosophy. To be a great philosopher one must have lived and suffered.] **Leonid Gabrilowitsch.** 'Über zwei wissenschaftliche Begriffe des Denkens: zur Grundlegung einer dativistischen Logik.' [Dativism opposes the view that regards thought only as *process*, the process namely of affirming or denying the connexion of certain psychological *Begriffsvorstellungen*. The meaning of every concept presupposes a firmly concatenated system.] **Georg Wendel.** 'Metaphysische Ausblicke.' **O. Hilferding.** 'Die Ehre. Ihr Wesen und ihre Bedeutung im Leben.' [Honour a natural necessity, a function and regulator of Egoism.] **R. Seligmann.** 'Zur Philosophie der Individualität.' [A series of propositions such as: Das absolut individuelle Moment muss als ein ewig Unfertiges gedacht werden, with elucidatory comments. The conclusion is that Pleasure points the way to perfection.] **Paul von Rechenberg-Lintén.** 'Die Zeit.' [The movement from impulse to act is what we call thought, and time is the form in which it occurs. It rests on the power of memory with the perceived difference between the original condition of rest and the new state produced by the motion.] **Otto Neurath.** 'Ernst Schröders Beweis des 12 Theorems: Für die identischen Operationen gilt das "Kommutationsgesetz".' Jahresbericht: Die Rechtsphilosophie in Ungarn. Neueste Erscheinungen, etc.—Band xv., Heft 2. **Olga Hahn und Otto Neurath.** 'Zum Dualismus in der Logik.' [Refers to E. Schröder's lectures on the Algebra of Logic.] **Ernst Vowinkel.** 'Zum Problem der Persönlichkeit.' [The specific nature of Personality is its power of so meeting and diverting stimuli as to create new ethical contents, laws and ends. If men could live as a whole they would realise the transcendental ethical world.] **R. Seligmann.** 'Kausalität.' [Causality rooted in the Absolute. The "earlier" and "later" is of purely psychological origin.] **L. Couturat.** 'Expérience de double traduction en langue internationale.' **Bernhard Rawitz.** 'Über Raum und Zeit.' [Space and time are function of our body, known only *a posteriori*. Importance of Cyon's investigations.] **Georg Wendel.** 'Systematische Philosophie und Einzelforschung.' **Arthur Fleischmann.** 'Über die objektive Existenz der psychischen Energie.' [An effort to meet objections, especially Busse's, to the recognition of a special psychical energy.] **M. Tramer.** 'Ein Versuch die Dreidimensionalität des Raumes auf eine einfache lagegeometrische Erfahrungsannahme zu stützen.' **Rudolf Witten.** 'Zur Kritik des Kritizismus.' [Shows the historical limitations of Kant's theory. Hume had confused empirical with logical necessity.] **Dr. Rohland.** 'Über Kausalität und Finalität.' Neueste Erscheinungen, etc.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE. Jahrgang xxxiii. (Neue Folge viii.), Heft 1. **Willi Warstat.** 'Vom Individualbegriff. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der formalen Logik. Gekrönte Preisschrift.' [A review of the treatment of the subject by Kant, and, in the newer Logic, especially by Riehl and Sigwart.] **George Jaffe.** 'Über die räumliche Anschauungsform. Vierter Dialog zu Berkeleys drei Dialogen zwischen Hylas und Philonous.' [Conclusions drawn from the multiplicity of the forms of perception regarding the nature of geometrical knowledge. The empirical and *a priori* elements of geometry distinguished; postulation of a "raumbildende" and of a "raumdeutende" faculty.] **Paul Barth.** 'Die Geschichte der Erziehung in soziologischer Beleuchtung, viii.' [The educational theories of the German humanists, and their effect on Universities, etc.] Besprechungen, etc.

## IX.—NOTES.

The following gentleman has joined the MIND Association since the printing of the July number :—

W. CARLILE, Halie, Lipscomb, Surrey.

### NOTES ON A NOTE.

There are some points of interest in Mr. Bradley's footnote on page 338 of the last number of MIND. As the note is short I may as well quote it in full :—

"To the question if the above principle is merely 'practical,' I reply 'Certainly, if you take "practice" so widely as to remove the distinction between practice and theory'. But, since such a widening of sense seems to serve no useful purpose, I cannot regard that course as being itself very 'practical'. I answer therefore that the above principle is certainly not merely practical."

The impatient reader, if he understands what pragmatism is, will naturally be inclined to dismiss this footnote as nonsense. Here, he will say, is Mr. Bradley imagining a question put in language which no pragmatist would use—for to talk of the 'merely practical' is to assume that the 'more than practical' exists. This question Mr. Bradley says he is ready to answer in the affirmative if the *questioner* will stultify it by assuming that the 'more than practical' does not exist. And then, after giving, irrelevantly, a reason for not being willing to 'remove' the distinction between practice and theory, Mr. Bradley proposes to answer the question with a simple negative—an answer which avoids all explanations, and is therefore one which might equally well be made by a pragmatist on the ground of the false assumption which the question implies. No wonder, the reader will say, that if this be a specimen of the efforts Mr. Bradley has made to discover whether he "is and has always been" a pragmatist, he has hitherto failed to solve that simple problem.

But if we are more patient we may get at some of the sources of Mr. Bradley's confusion. The word 'merely,' for instance, has evidently something to do with it. One knows that the too free employment of this word is a common result of the (intellectualist) habit of using abstract distinctions as if there could be no doubt about their application. Readers of MIND will remember some instances collected by Dr. Schiller (N.S., No. 52, p. 528), in which Mr. Bradley had gratuitously introduced a 'mere' or a 'merely' into pragmatist doctrines, and had thereby given a false account of them. If it had not been for his faint-hearted decision that Dr. Schiller's writings should no longer "attract his attention" he might by this time have learnt his error.

Another probable source of the confusion would also have been avoided by any one who had chosen to instruct himself in the pragmatist writings. Such a reader would understand the slovenliness of any talk about 'removing' a distinction. He would be familiar with the view that a distinction is always a tool with a use of some kind, but a tool that is also liable to be misused; and that therefore the problem is to discriminate between the use and abuse of it, to reserve our trust in it for the occasions on which it is unlikely to mislead, and to criticise as sharply as possible the use of it on any other occasions. Whether he agreed with this view

or not, he would know that the pragmatist method is full of it. Pragmatists do not first 'remove' a distinction, and then by an afterthought (if at all) ask whether such removal serves any useful purpose; what they do is, first, to judge (rightly or wrongly) that for certain purposes, which the context indicates, a distinction otherwise useful does not hold good, and then to object to the use of the distinction for those purposes and openly on that ground. The relevant way of answering this contention, therefore, is to attack the judgment involved in it, and not to pretend that the 'removal' has been suggested at random.

The pragmatist has allowed himself to recognise, quite generally, that the value of distinctions is liable to vary with the varying purposes for which they are used. Mr. Bradley, though here and there like every one else he may admit such variations, seems for the most part more attuned to the easier view—the view encouraged also by formal logic—that questions about particular cases are tiresome and negligible; so that a distinction must be either valid or not valid, either kept and trusted or else 'removed'. A spade, we all agree, is either fit for use or fit for the dustheap; and the easy, natural, abstract view of distinctions treats them in a similar way.

On the whole, then, the footnote quoted above has some value as throwing a further light on Mr. Bradley's controversial methods, and as therefore providing a further object-lesson in the ways in which a controversy should not be conducted if a good effect is desired. This may also help to remind us that though Mr. Bradley is certainly not yet a pragmatist, he has at least indirectly and unintentionally done a great deal for the advancement of the cause.

ALFRED SIDGWICK.

#### THE ROOTS OF REALITY: REPLY.

As Mr. Bax has directly challenged my criticism of his book, *The Roots of Reality*, I am perhaps bound to reply, but my reply need not take up much space. For, as regards the first of the two issues to which he refers, I do not see that his explanation really removes my difficulty. He speaks of his primordial Subject as the "ultimate Matter of all perception," and I can only repeat that a Matter which is the *correlative* of Form cannot also be *prior* to it, temporally or otherwise—formless matter being as unreal as matterless form. And, as regards the second issue, Mr. Bax's remarks are wholly based on a misunderstanding, for which, however, I appear to be myself responsible. I did not mean to assert any actual or psychological existence of the "universal consciousness," and apparently I ought to have said so more explicitly. I merely used this conception as the simplest device for expressing the nature of knowledge so far as that nature is independent of the limitations inseparable from the finitude of the individual knower. But I could have stated my criticism well enough, I daresay, by saying that what is allogical for A or B here and now is not therefore destined to remain so for all men for all time coming; or, again, by saying that we have no right to transfer, as we do if we use such a notion as Chance, the deficiencies of our knowledge of reality to the reality itself. The "allogical," in fact, seems to be no more than a symbol for the limitations of actual knowledge. It was, of course, for this reason that the "principle" seemed to me "unsatisfactory" (though I do not use a phrase of this kind "more than once") when offered as a solution of any concrete problem. And I quoted, though perhaps without sufficient commentary, four applications of the principle from which, I thought, the reader could judge for himself whether my subsequent expression of opinion was justified.

H. BARKER.





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